Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Toliver is serving a life sentence for the 1992 murder of Tina Rogers. His habeas corpus petition, 28 U.S.C. 2254, asserted that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective because counsel did not call two exculpatory witnesses, and that the prosecution failed to disclose an exculpatory document. On remand, the district court granted the petition on the ground that trial counsel was ineffective, but denied relief on the exculpatory-evidence claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Trial counsel is deceased and Toliver’s testimony, which the district court accepted as true, confirmed that counsel did not call witnesses that Toliver desired because counsel thought the jury would disbelieve them based onr family relationship. The transcript from the 1992 pre-trial conference confirmed the difference of opinion between Toliver and his attorney about securing additional witnesses. Toliver’s counsel was busy preparing for another homicide trial.

Saucedo’s tractor-trailer was stopped because its paper registration plate appeared to be expired. Trooper Miller confirmed that the plate had expired, advised Saucedo that he would conduct a safety inspection, and requested Saucedo’s driver’s license, logbook, and paperwork for the truck, trailer, and load. Saucedo produced his license and other paperwork; his trailer was empty. Miller ran Saucedo’s license and learned that it was invalid and that he had prior convictions for drug distribution and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Miller asked Saucedo whether he had any weapons or drugs. Saucedo volunteered that the trooper could “open it.” Miller asked Saucedo if he could search his truck and trailer; and Saucedo said, “yes.” Because Miller saw things that raised his suspicions, he contacted a canine unit for assistance. He escorted the passenger to an officer’s vehicle. In the cab he found what he thought was an alteration to a small alcove in the sleeper/bunk area behind the driver’s seat. He disassembled one screw, pulled back molding around the alcove, peered in, and found a hidden compartment in which he found 10 kilograms of cocaine. Sentenced to 240 months in prison, Saucedo appealed denial of his motion to suppress. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.

Hare pled guilty, during trial, to being part of a methamphetamine distribution conspiracy and was sentenced to 292 months in prison. He claims that his counsel had failed to tell him of a pre-trial plea offer involving significantly less prison time than he received in the end. Hare’s previous attempt to win relief from his conviction and sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255 on other grounds was rejected. He sought permission to file a successive collateral attack on his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255(h), claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the application. Hare did not have new evidence of his innocence, and could not establish “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” His petition was not supported by Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012), which involved a failure to communicate a plea offer for a lower sentence than the defendant actually received when he later pled guilty. The Frye Court merely applied the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel according to the test previously articulated in 1984.

In a 1998 attempt to kill a member of a rival gang, gang members shot and killed Jacqueline Brenaugh, when she peered out of her apartment window After being arrested, Coleman admitted serving as an accomplice. The confession was recorded. He moved to suppress his confession, claiming that he had invoked his right to an attorney several times and that the police had proceeded in violation of Miranda v. Arizona. The court denied Coleman’s motion, holding that “the credibility is resolved on behalf of the State.” Convicted of first-degree murder under an accomplice liability theory, Coleman was sentenced to 28 years. On appeal, he included an affidavit from his attorney, Wiener, stating that Wiener had called the police station during the interrogation and requested that police cease questioning his client. After exhausting state appeals and post-conviction remedies, Coleman filed a pro se habeas petition. The district court denied relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.

In 2006 Rann was convicted of two counts of criminal sexual assault and one count of possession of child pornography. He was sentenced to consecutive terms of 12 years for each sexual assault conviction and 15 years on the child pornography conviction. Rann unsuccessfully pursued direct appeal in state court arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney did not seek to suppress incriminating evidence in the form of digital images obtained without a warrant from a zip drive and a camera memory card. The district court denied his petition for habeas corpus. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Rann’s challenge to the warrantless search of digital media devices brought to police by his victim (his 15-year-old biological daughter) and his victim’s mother was without merit. Because he cannot prevail on his Fourth Amendment argument, Rann’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim under Strickland fails.

West was convicted of second degree sexual assault of a child (Wis. Stat. 948.02(2)) and sentenced to three years’ imprisonment followed by six years’ extended supervision. He claimed that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated by a 14-month delay between the filing of charges against him and the scheduled start of his trial. This delay prejudiced him, he claims, because his allegedly key alibi witness, Robinson, died in the interim. The state court rejected his constitutional claim and summarily affirmed his conviction. West sought habeas corpus relief in the district court, which denied his petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The record contained ample evidence supporting the state court conclusion that West was not prejudiced by the delay. Robinson did not die anywhere close to the “presumptively prejudicial” 12-month mark; rather, he passed away six months after the state filed its complaint.

Guzman, seven-and-a-half months pregnant, home alone, in bed, heard the doorbell and knocking. She walked toward the door. Sergeant Bonnstetter of the Chicago Police Department burst through the door. Officers wearing body armor rushed in, many with guns drawn. Guzman, fearful and crying, was ordered to lie face down on the floor. When she tried to position herself more comfortably, Rojas forced her down, pressing her pregnant belly against the floor. The Joint Gang Task Force executed a warrant, searching the apartment for about an hour. Guzman sued. The district court entered summary judgment in her favor, finding Bonnstetter and Rojas liable. At a damages-only trial, Guzman proved medical expenses. The court allowed defendants to testify that the search was legal and reasonable and that others might have caused Guzman’s injuries. The court instructed the jury that Guzman had to prove that Bonnstetter and Rojas were “personally involved” and could not be held “liable” for the conduct of “other employees.” The court instructed the jury to award nominal damages if Guzman failed to prove that her damages were the direct result of defendants’ conduct. Guzman was awarded $1. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Defendants’ theory of the case and evidence and the instruction likely confused the jury.

A Wisconsin inmate checked out two books from the prison library, and purchased, with the prison’s permission, a copy of To Die for the People: The Writings of Huey P. Newton (the founder of the Black Panthers). Plaintiff copied on a sheet of paper the Panthers’ “Ten-Point Program,” which appears in all three books. He put the sheet in the footlocker in his cell. A guard discovered the sheet in a random search of the cell. Plaintiff was found guilty, in a prison disciplinary proceeding, of possession of “gang literature” in violation of Wis. Admin. Code DOC 303.20(3). He was given 90 days of confinement in segregation. The prison also destroyed the sheet of paper on which he’d copied the Ten-Point Program. The district court rejected his free speech and due process claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to the free speech claim, but vacated with respect to due process. “Freedom of speech is not absolute, and the curtailment challenged in this case is slight and the justification adequate, though not ample.” The court made no findings that would enable an inference that plaintiff’s 90-day sentence to segregation was, or was not, a deprivation of liberty.

While officers were following a vehicle in which Jones was riding as a passenger, Jones threw a handgun out the window. The driver pulled over and officers obtained consent to search from both Jones and the driver. Jones had an empty handgun holster around his waist and 18 grams of marijuana in his shoe. The officers then retraced their route and retrieved the handgun from a driveway a few blocks away. Jones admitted the gun was his. He was convicted of unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon and was sentenced as an armed career criminal based in part on a prior Illinois conviction for vehicular fleeing, which the judge counted as a third violent felony under the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), triggering a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years to life. The judge sentenced Jones to 184 months, just above the mandatory minimum. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a vagueness challenge to the residual clause. The court noted that a majority of the Supreme Court has rejected the argument, albeit only in response to dissents, not in the more formal sense of deciding an explicit void-for-vagueness challenge.

Mortier was a major marijuana distributer with a network of street-level sellers around Madison, Wisconsin. He disappeared in 2004, and the District Attorney’s Office opened a John Doe proceeding to determine whether a crime had been committed. Prosecutors subpoenaed Mortier’s known drug associates, including Stadfeld. Rather than assert his right to remain silent and follow the steps necessary to obtain formal immunity, he talked to investigators informally in exchange for an oral nonprosecution agreement. Stadfeld’s counsel mistakenly advised him that this nonprosecution agreement immunized him against the use of his statements by state or federal prosecutors. Almost four years later, based in part on his statements to the investigators, Stadfeld was indicted by a federal grand jury for conspiracy to distribute marijuana. The district court denied a motion to suppress. Stadfeld was convicted. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Stadfeld’s statements were not the product of law-enforcement coercion, and the erroneous advice from his lawyers did not make his statements involuntary or inadmissible based on ineffective assistance of counsel. To the extent that Stadfeld thought he had a comprehensive immunity agreement, it was conditioned on his telling the truth and he breach it by lying to investigators.