Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs alleged that the school district practice of holding high school graduation ceremonies and related events at a Christian church rented for the occasion violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and sought preliminary and permanent injunctions, a declaratory judgment and damages. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the district. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. On rehearing en banc, the court reversed in part. The public school graduation ceremonies in the sanctuary of a Christian church, violated the Constitution. The court noted that it was not making a broad statement about the propriety of governmental use of church-owned facilities, nor was it criticizing cases permitting governmental use, in the proper context, of certain church-owned facilities. When confronted with an Establishment Clause challenge of this nature, the Supreme Court requires examination of the context in which government interacts with a religious organization. Here, the involvement of minors, the significance of the graduation ceremony, and the conditions of extensive proselytization prove too much for the district’s actions to withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause.

Plaintiff sought to develop a rapid, self-administered test to determine a person’s HIV status. The development process included collection of human blood and saliva samples. Plaintiff sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act for the destruction of its blood and saliva specimens by the Food and Drug Administration. The specimens had been seized during a criminal investigation and the freezer in which they were stored broke down. The district court entered summary judgment that the suit arose from a law enforcement officer’s detention of property, excepting the claims from the FTCA waiver of sovereign immunity, 28 U.S.C. 2680(c). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The government presented uncontroverted evidence that the officer detained the specimens as a law enforcement officer

Kirkland was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, and based on a finding that he had five “violent felony” convictions, including two drunk driving offenses, the district court sentenced him under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e). After the Supreme Court determined in 2008 that drunk driving is not a “violent felony” as the term is defined in the ACCA, Kirkland filed a petition for relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255. Following remand by the Seventh Circuit, the district court concluded that an enhancement of Kirkland’s sentence under the ACCA was still appropriate based on his three remaining convictions for violent felonies. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The sparse record shed little light on whether two 1985 offenses that occurred on the same day occurred “on the same occasion.” If the “Shepard-approved” documents before a district court are equivocal as to whether the offenses occurred on the same occasion, the ACCA does not apply

Wheeler filed a complaint alleging that prison officials and the prison’s medical provider, Wexford, have refused to provide effective care for his golf-ball-size hemorrhoids, leaving him in excruciating pain, 42 U.S.C.1983. More than 10 months later, the district judge had not screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C.1915A(a) and has denied three motions filed by Wheeler. Defendants have not been served; the litigation is stalled. The Seventh Circuit ordered the district court to proceed. Ten months exceeds any understanding of “as soon as practicable”. Delay is especially hard to understand when the complaint plausibly alleges a serious ongoing injury. Prisoners are not invariably wrong. A district judge should be able to spot a complaint violating Rules 18 and 20 within days of its filing, and solve the problem by severance (creating multiple suits that can be separately screened) or dismissing excess defendants under Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. .

Plaintiffs Willis and Owens, 14 and 16 years old, respectively, were arrested outside of Willis’s home for allegedly dealing drugs. They claim that after being transported to the police station, they were subjected to a strip search before being confined for several hours. Willis and Owens were released to their families after being charged with conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance and were ordered to appear at juvenile court a few weeks later. The charges were eventually dropped. Willis and Owens filed suit against the two arresting officers, alleging false arrest and an illegal search under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and malicious prosecution under Illinois state law. The jury returned a verdict for defendants on all claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to evidentiary rulings concerning plaintiffs’ knowledge of suspicious activity and of drug sales and drug-selling techniques on the block.

Convicted of kidnapping, rape, and murder, Overstreet was sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of Indiana affirmed and denied a petition for post-conviction relief. The district court denied his habeas corpus petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges based on alleged ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty proceedings. Counsel did not ask the judge to require spectators who wore buttons or ribbons with the victim’s picture to remove the displays of sympathy. He claimed that his lawyers failed to convey “effectively” or “meaningfully” the prosecutor’s offer of a plea bargain. A third argument was based on Overstreet’s mental problems. Psychiatric evidence indicated that on some occasions Overstreet would have lacked the ability to evaluate his legal situation rationally, but the district judge concluded that he understood the offer and discussed it intelligently with his sister.

Mota was convicted of attempting to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine and of possessing with the intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 21 U.S.C. 846. At the start of his jury trial, Mota learned that a government agent had failed to record and relay exculpatory evidence regarding a conversation between the agent and co-defendant Ponce, during which conversation Ponce assumed complete responsibility for the crime and proclaimed Mota’s innocence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a “Brady” argument. While the failure to transmit exculpatory evidence was inexcusable, Mota learned of this evidence at the start of his trial and thoroughly presented it to the jury. He had opportunity to cross-examine the negligent agent and Ponce testified on his behalf; he was not denied a fair trial. There was sufficient evidence for the jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, including testimony from the government informant who met Ponce and Mota in order to conduct a drug deal and the audio recording of this sting operation.

Griffin was convicted of intentional possession of a firearm and ammunition as a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The Seventh Circuit reversed. Griffin was living with his parents and was, therefore, present in a home where firearms belonging to his father were present, but the government offered no evidence that would have allowed a reasonable jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he had constructive possession of the firearm and ammunition by intending to exercise control over them. The weapons were found during a SWAT team search for Griffin’s brother.

A former inmate sued under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C.794–94e, the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12111–213, and the Eighth Amendment, claiming that prison officials ignored his need for placement in an ADA-compliant facility, and refused to consider him for a work-release program solely because he walks with a cane. Imprisoned for driving on a suspended license, the inmate had advanced osteoarthritis and vascular necrosis in his hip. The prison declined his request for installation of grab bars or for a transfer. The district court screened the complaint before service and dismissed. The Seventh Circuit vacated. While the court correctly dismissed the Eighth Amendment count, the inmate adequately alleged that refusal to accommodate his disability kept him from accessing meals and showers on the same basis as other inmates.

An Illinois prisoner who alleges that he is confined to a wheelchair because of an unspecified “nerve condition” claimed that, by applying a quorum rule, prison officials subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment and violated his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Under the rule, under which outdoor recreation does not occur without participation by10 disabled individuals, defendants allegedly refused to allow him to engage in any physical outdoor recreational activity for seven weeks. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. Regardless of whether state officials are immune under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701, applies and the suit was dismissed prematurely.