Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Medlock was a student at Indiana University, living in a single room in a dormitory. As part of a routine “health and safety inspection,” two University resident assistants searched Medlock’s dormitory room for safety hazards. Medlock was not present at the time. When the resident assistants entered the room, they discovered marijuana in plain sight, and notified University police, who later entered Medlock’s room and seized the drugs. The Dean summarily suspended Medlock for one year. After exhausting internal appeals, Medlock sought a preliminary injunction, citing violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court denied his motion. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal as moot because the suspension had expired.

An informant, endorsed as reliable, stated that he saw known meth cook Barttelt brew meth at a specific hunting cabin; that he had seen an anhydrous ammonia tank at the cabin within the week; that a locked cable blocked the drive; and that Barttelt drove a green Mercury Grand Marquis. At the property, the officer found a cable blocking a driveway; a vehicle approached the gate. Observing unusual movements, officers approached the maroon Chevrolet Beretta, recognized the driver but not the passenger, requested that they exit the car, learned that the passenger was Barttelt, and smelled anhydrous ammonia. The driver indicated that Barttelt was cooking meth. A search of the cabin, authorized by a warrant, based on information learned during the stop, revealed a lab. The district court denied a motion to suppress. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Stopping a car just to identify occupants is deliberate enough to justify suppression when there is neither probable cause to believe nor reasonable suspicion that the car is being driven contrary to laws governing operation of motor vehicles or that the car or occupants are subject to seizure or detention in connection with the violation of other law. The court did not address the sufficiency of Barttelt’s interest in the cabin.

A jury twice viewed a video of Wysinger’s interrogation by a Drug Enforcement Agencyagent. Wysinger challenged admission of the video on the grounds that the Miranda warning was inadequate and that the agent continued to interrogate him after he clearly and unequivocally invoked his right to counsel. He was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C.841(a)(1), 846 and 851 and aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 851, and 18 U.S.C. 2. The Seventh Circuit vacated, holding that the video should have been suppressed and that the error was not harmless. After Wysinger asked, in the first minute, if he should call a lawyer, the agent told him that they were “going to talk about that,” and then read a potentially misleading version, putting Wysinger to the false choice of talking to a lawyer before questioning or having a lawyer with him during questioning. The agent magnified the mistake by implying that “questioning” had not begun, then told him he had two choices: cooperating or being charged with conspiracy. The agent failed to mention the right to remain silent, or to consult a lawyer immediately and to have one with him during interrogation.

Tichenor pleaded guilty to armed robbery and discharging a firearm in connection with robbing a bank, retaining the right to appeal the applicability of the career offender sentencing guideline at U.S.S.G. 4B1.1. Although counsel initially objected to application of the guideline, he withdrew this objection at the sentencing hearing. The district court applied the enhancement, based on prior convictions for dealing hash oil and resisting law enforcement, and sentenced him to 300 months' imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the guideline is unconstitutionally vague and that the U.S. Sentencing Commission exceeded its authority in enacting the current definition of "crime of violence," U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a). The Sentencing Guidelines are not susceptible to vagueness challenges.

During a narcotics investigation, an informant (Tucker's brother-in-law) told the Task Force that Tucker was in possession of a stolen backhoe. Investigator Williams went to Tucker’s house, observed a backhoe, and asked Tucker about it. Tucker said that in the summer of 2000 or 2001, he bought it through a friend without any documentation. Williams took the serial number, told Tucker that it was not reported stolen, but asked Tucker not to move the backhoe. When Williams returned weeks later, neither Tucker nor the backhoe was present. Tucker later explained that he loaned it to Krulac. After tracing ownership, but without a warrant, Williams seized the backhoe from Krulac. Tucker never contacted the Task Force to object to the seizure or demand the backhoe be returned. The backhoe was returned to the titleholder. Tucker sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of Fourth Amendment and due process rights. The district court granted summary judgment, concluding that the initial seizure of the backhoe satisfied the Fourth Amendment and due process requirements; that the Task Force was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity; and that Williams was entitled to summary judgment on the post-seizure disposition due process claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.

Attorney Mehta was charged with converting escrow funds and lying to a state court. After a hearing, the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission recommended disbarment. While the recommendation was pending, the Illinois Supreme Court issued a ruled to show cause why he should not be suspended, rejected Mehta's arguments, and suspended his license. Mehta sued the court and the IARDC under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that the suspension violated his right to due process. The district court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. In the meantime, Mehta was disbarred. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal, rejecting Mehta's argument that the suspension was not a final order that was subject to the doctrine. Illinois law provides that an interim suspension order is a final judgment in the Rule 774 proceeding in which it is issued.

Christmas and Banks were acquitted of drug charges. Banks, on behalf of herself and her infant daughter sued the city and police officers, asserting violations of the Fourth Amendment (42 U.S.C. 1983) and state law claims for false arrest, unlawful search, conspiracy, malicious prosecution, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. After seven days of trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants. During trial, plaintiffs moved for a mistrial and, at the conclusion of the trial moved for a new trial. In both motions, plaintiffs argued that they were denied a fair trial due to defense counsel's repeated violations of evidentiary rulings and improper comments to the jury. The district court denied both motions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that it could not concluded that defense counsel's conduct had a substantial influence on the jury.

The Bald Knob Cross is a well-known Illinois tourist attraction, claiming to be the largest cross in the Western Hemisphere. It had fallen into disrepair. The non-profit group Friends of the Cross was formed to solicit donations. In 2008 Friends secured a $20,000 grant from the Illinois Department of Commerce and Economic Opportunity. Sherman, an atheist, filed suit, alleging violation of the Establishment Clause (42 U.S.C. 1983) and claiming standing as a taxpayer. A magistrate ruled that Sherman lacked standing and that his claim was moot. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. "Whatever may be lurking in the background of this appropriations legislation, the $20,000 grant to Friends was not the result of legislative action; rather, it can be traced at most to the initiative of a single legislator. The ultimate pool of $5 million was in the hands of an executive agency, which was formally responsible for the decision to hand out the $20,000 to Friends." Taxpayer standing is foreclosed under these circumstances.

Gay is a deeply disturbed Illinois inmate with a history of self-mutilation, scheduled for parole in 2095. Between 1996 and 2011, he filed more than 30 federal civil cases. Gay lost two at trial, settled two, and lost or withdrew the remainder. At least four were dismissed as frivolous, leading Gay to strike out under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). Unless he is under imminent danger of serious physical injury, Gay may not proceed in forma pauperis in federal court. He sued prison mental health professionals, alleging constitutionally inadequate treatment and retaliation for a prior lawsuit. The district court required him to post a $1,000 bond, which it knew he could not afford, to cover costs if this suit proved unsuccessful. The court required the bond without evaluating the merit of Gay’s claims. When Gay did not post the bond, the court dismissed the case with prejudice. The Seventh Circuit reversed. District courts have several tools for dealing with indigent litigants who abuse the court system. Requiring a party to post a cost bond that the court knows the party cannot afford, however, is not one of those available tools for dismissing or discouraging frivolous suits.

In 1986 two victims were found murdered in their home. They had been stabbed numerous times and their home had been set afire. Whitlock and Steidl were convicted in 1987. They spent the next 21 and 17 years in prison, respectively, before each obtained reversal on the basis of numerous Brady violations. Whitlock and Steidl brought suit against state officials for violations of their constitutional rights. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of a motion to dismiss some of the defendants. Following discovery the district court denied defendants' motions for summary judgment and set a trial date. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an interlocutory appeal. The prosecutor is not protected by immunity from liability for alleged fabrication of evidence; presentation of perjured testimony violates a clearly established right. The state police defendants were not entitled to summary judgment on a claim that they took affirmative steps to quash an investigation to further conceal the evidence. The court rejected claims of sovereign immunity.