Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

While on probation for a state drug conviction, Defendant-Appellant Mashica Spann met Carlos Hoffman in court mandated group therapy and joined his heroin-distribution ring. She was indicted in federal court for her role in the operation and pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute heroin. After rejecting Defendant's argument that she was a minimal or minor participant in the crime, the district court calculated her guidelines imprisonment range as 57 to 71 months without the mandatory minimum, which made the applicable range 60 to 71 months. The government moved for a sentence below the mandatory minimum, citing Defendant's substantial assistance in the investigation of Hoffman and others. The court granted the motion and sentenced Spann to 24 months, less than half of the mandatory minimum and more than a year below the government's most favorable recommendation. Defendant filed a notice of appeal, but her appointed counsel has concluded that the appeal is frivolous and sought permission to withdraw. Upon review, the Seventh Circuit found "no basis to assail the reasonableness of the sentence," and accordingly, granted counsel's motion to withdraw.

Defendant-Appellee Ingrel Estiel Ortega-Galvan appealed his 41-month sentence for entering the United States without authorization after having been removed. The issue before the Seventh Circuit concerned whether and when a district judge could reduce a defendant's sentence after discovering an error in an earlier conviction, which left undisturbed, would support a higher sentence. The probation service calculated the defendant's criminal history as a category IV. The combination of a total offense level of 21 and a criminal history category of IV yielded a guidelines range of 57 to 71 months of imprisonment. Had it not been for a sexual felony Defendant committed as a teenager, his criminal history category would have been only II (based on a burglary and marijuana possession conviction), and his guidelines range (given his total offense level of 21) would have been 41 to 51 months instead of 57 to 71. Defendant should have been convicted of a misdemeanor, not a felony for the sex offense because he was 16. His lawyer asked the district judge to eliminate the 16-point felony enhancement from his total offense level and also eliminate the felony from his criminal history. These two adjustments would have brought his guidelines range from 57 to 71 months down to 0 to 6 months. The judge refused to make the first adjustment, but made the second, reducing the defendant's guidelines range to 41 to 51 months; and she sentenced him at the bottom of it. "Had the district judge in this case, in computing the defendant's total offense level, shaved points off because the felony conviction was erroneous, she would have been failing to treat the guidelines as 'the starting point and the initial benchmark,' because determining whether a conviction that affects the calculation of the total offense level is valid is not a permissible step in that computation." Upon review, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the district judge erred in "tinkering" with the guidelines range, but that the error was harmless. "[The judge gave Defendant the sentence she wanted to give him irrespective of the guidelines, and the sentence [was] consistent with sections 3553(a) and 3661 of the Criminal Code." Accordingly, the Court affirmed Defendant's sentence.

Plaintiff-Appellee Chaunte Ott was wrongly convicted and incarcerated for the 1995 murder of Jessica Payne. He brought a civil rights action against the City of Milwaukee and several police officers. This appeal was filed when Plaintiff served subpoenas on two non-party state agencies, the Wisconsin Crime Laboratory and the Wisconsin Department of Corrections. Rather than comply, the state agencies filed motions to quash. The district court denied those motions, at which point the state agencies filed this appeal, invoking jurisdiction under the collateral-order doctrine. Upon review, the Seventh Circuit concluded that this was not a proper case for that basis of jurisdiction, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in "Mohawk Industries, Inc. v.Carpenter," (130 S. Ct. 599 (2009)): "[the Court added] that even if [it] read "Mohawk Industries" too strictly and jurisdiction [was] proper, [the Court] would find that the state agencies' arguments lack[ed] merit."

Officers, responding to an assault in progress, saw defendant, who voluntarily submitted to a pat down. A pistol was found in his coat pocket. Charged possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), defendant insisted that the police had planted the gun. His lawyer believed that he could not argue that the firearm was the fruit of an unreasonable search. Following his conviction, defendant brought a collateral proceeding under 28 U.S.C. 2255, claiming ineffective assistance in that his attorney did not move to suppress the firearm as the product of an unreasonable and did not explain to defendant that his testimony at a suppression hearing could not be used at trial as evidence of his guilt. The district court rejected the petition. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Defendant’s insistence that the police planted the gun neither justified nor compelled counsel to refrain from challenging the search that produced the weapon. The court remanded for determination of whether defendant was prejudiced by that failure.

During his intake interview, King informed the jail’s nurse that he had asthma, diabetes, a heart problem, high blood pressure, seizures, and mental health problems. The jail contracted medical services from a private company. The doctor, 300 miles away, visited once a week. The doctor did not obtain details about King's existing prescriptions, but scheduled him to be quickly weaned off of a drug that was not on the company’s formulary. The drug that was substituted was not normally appropriate for King’s conditions. Although King suffered side effects and requested to see a doctor, he was not seen by the doctor for 10 days. Later, when he was convulsing on the floor, the nurse indicated that he was "faking" a seizure. He was left lying on the floor, then moved to a padded cell, where he later died. His widow brought an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court entered summary judgment for defendants. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. There was significant evidence that the jail’s policies violated King’s constitutional rights.

Defendant robbed a bank and pleaded guilty to bank robbery and brandishing a firearm during a bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a) and 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A). He received consecutive sentences of 36 months and 84 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that, during the sentencing hearing, the district court denied him his right of allocution under FRCP 32. The six-page transcript showed that defendant spoke at length on a variety of topics, including his troubled childhood, his relationships with various family members, and his time in the U.S. military, before the court interrupted in a way that was not intended to intimidate or terminate his allocution.

In 1984 petitioner was convicted of murder, attempted murder, aggravated battery, and attempted robbery. During six jury selection striking sessions, both sides used all 20 of their peremptory challenges; the state exercised 17 on African-Americans. Two African-Americans served on the jury and one was an alternate. Petitioner was sentenced to death. Following the decision Batson v. Kentucky, 1986, the Illinois Supreme Court remanded. The trial court accepted the state’s race-neutral reasons for the strikes. The Illinois Supreme Court vacated the death sentence and conditionally vacated the convictions, holding that petitioner established a prima facie case of discrimination. On remand the trial court found no Batson violation, again imposing the death penalty. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The trial court dismissed a postconviction petition, claiming ineffective-assistance-of-counsel in the Batson hearing and a Brady violation based on nondisclosure of medical records that would have impeached a witness. On remand from the supreme court, the trial court dismissed because Illinois Governor Ryan had commuted the death sentence. The appellate court affirmed; the supreme court denied review. The federal district court denied habeas relief, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Seventh Circuit reversed. It was unreasonable for the state courts to credit the prosecutor’s proffered reasons for several peremptory challenges.

Two officers stopped plaintiff’s adult son for a traffic violation and found crack cocaine in the car. Daniel attempted to flee, resulting in a physical altercation. Plaintiff, who lived close, was told by a neighbor, “you have to get down to the corner,” “they’re killing your son.” Plaintiff claims she was calmly asking about her son when she was accosted and arrested for no apparent reason. The officer testified that plaintiff was yelling, being aggressive, and leading the crowd in a charge, so they arrested her and placed her in the prisoner wagon for five to ten minutes before releasing her. In her suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court declined to exclude evidence of events that preceded her arrival and testimony that the events took place in a “high-crime area” and entered judgment for defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the case boils down to a credibility contest that was properly reserved for resolution by the jury and upholding in the district court’s balancing of the probative value and prejudicial effect of the challenged evidence.

The State of Illinois, facing a significant and unprecedented fiscal deficit, brokered a series of compensation agreements with the exclusive bargaining representative for 40,000 state employees. The parties trimmed several hundred million dollars in fiscal years 2011 and 2012 by deferring general wage increases and instituting a voluntary furlough program. Despite these measures, the fiscal year 2012 budget did not contain sufficient appropriations for deferred wage increases due employees of 14 state agencies. The state froze the pay of those employees, repudiating agreements with the union. The district court dismissed a suit that alleged violations of the Contracts Clause and the Equal Protection Clause and state law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding the Contracts Clause claim barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The court noted that the state’s actions did not bar a breach of contract suit. There was a rational relationship between those actions and a legitimate governmental purpose, precluding an equal protection claim.

Plaintiff, an inmate waiting to be keyed into his cell, was wounded by a pellet fired in an attempt to break up a fight. He showed his wound to an officer, who refused a medical technician's request to move plaintiff to the health care unit. The prison was on lockdown. The technician never returned with medical supplies. Plaintiff made additional requests, but claims that the technician stated that she was told by staff not to document any treatment for gunshot wounds and would not give her name. Plaintiff wrote an emergency grievance to the warden. Four days later, he was treated in the health care unit. The doctor expressed concern that plaintiff was not brought in on the day of his injury to prevent infection. Plaintiff claims that an internal affairs investigator was sent intimidate him into dropping his grievance. Plaintiff was placed on transfer to a facility where he had known enemies. The warden, grievance officer, and administrative officer determined that there was no emergency and no justification for compensation. His court-appointed attorney was allowed to withdraw and the district court dismissed plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaint. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, holding that his claim for retaliation was prematurely dismissed.