Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a self-described tax consultant, worked for the county board of review (property tax assessments) for 10 years, until 2002. In his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and RICO, 18 U.S.C. 1962c, he alleged that defendants, elected and appointed board employees, flagged his clients' files and ran the board as a "pay for play" racketeering enterprise to extort campaign donations and consulting work from him. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff did not identify any statute, regulation, or contract that suggests his work as a consultant for private clients might be a constitutionally protected property interest. His allegations of improper treatment were implausible, negating both constitutional and RICO claims.

An Illinois statute makes it a felony to audio record any part of any conversation unless all parties consent and applies regardless of whether the conversation was intended to be private. The offense is elevated to a class 1 felony, with a possible prison term of 4 to 15 years, if a recorded individual is performing duties as a law-enforcement officer. 720 ILCS 5/14-2(a)(1). Illinois does not prohibit taking silent video of officers performing duties in public. The ACLU has not implemented its planned Chicago police accountability program for fear of prosecution. The district court held that the First Amendment does not protect a right to audio record. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to enter a preliminary injunction blocking enforcement as applied to recording of the kind at issue. The statute restricts a medium commonly used for communication of information and ideas, triggering First Amendment scrutiny. Any governmental interest in protecting conversational privacy is not implicated when officers are performing duties in public places. Even under the more lenient intermediate standard of scrutiny applicable to content- neutral burdens on speech, this application of the statute "very likely flunks." The law restricts more speech than necessary to protect legitimate privacy interests.

Petitioner was arrested after a traffic stop and vehicle search. Charges were dropped when lab results revealed that plant material found in the vehicle was not marijuana. Petitioner filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming the officers lacked probable cause. The officers claimed to be following up on an anonymous tip. A jury returned a verdict in favor of the officers. The judge granted petitioner's motion for a new trial, without giving the officers an opportunity to respond. He ruled that the verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence, reasoning that the officer had fabricated the tip and that other officers offered false testimony to support this fabrication. The judge then recused himself and the case was reassigned. The judge granted reconsideration and reinstated the verdict. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The judge did not abuse his discretion by reconsidering the new trial grant, a non-final order, and determining that the verdict was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. There was no direct evidence contradicting testimony about the tip; the jury was able to weigh inconsistencies and make credibility determinations.

A former part-time police officer for a town of just over 400 people filed a complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1983 and 1988 against defendants who allegedly conspired to prosecute him for sexual offenses involving dancers at a strip club in retaliation for his cooperation with an FBI investigation. The defendants, characterized by the court as "a truly unique web of characters," were the first assistant state’s attorney, a deputy sheriff/investigator, the former owner of the now-defunct strip club, and plaintiff's brother, an occasional patron of the strip club. The district court dismissed for lack of evidence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The prosecutor "was far from a saint," but the evidence did not show that he deviated from his prosecutorial role, so he was entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity. Noting that plaintiff pled guilty to the sex offense charges, the court found no evidence of conspiracy.

Defendant, convicted of several serious drug and firearm charges, received a mandatory life sentence. His counsel appealed on evidentiary grounds, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Defendant then filed a habeas petition (18 U.S.C. 2255) asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. The government admitted failure to timely file notice of enhanced penalty. The district court set aside the mandatory life sentence and held a hearing on other issues, then imposed a sentence of 480 months. The Seventh Circuit declined to issue a certificate of appealability with respect to the conviction, and affirmed the revised sentence. The district court reasonably considered defendant’s routine drug purchases.

The prisoner's "skeletal" complaint alleged that, while escorting him down a hallway to segregation, guards instructed him to move against the wall. When he did not comply, a guard, “slammed” him against the wall, twisted his wrist, and caused pain that lasted for two months. The district court dismissed after preliminary screening under 28 U.S.C. 1915A. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. To be cruel and unusual punishment, conduct that does not purport to be punishment must involve more than ordinary lack of due care for prisoner safety. Infliction of pain in the course of a prison security measure does not amount to cruel and unusual punishment simply because it appears, in retrospect, that the degree of force was unreasonable, and unnecessary in the strict sense. In tort law, any unconsented and offensive touching is a battery. Imprisonment strips a prisoner of that right to be let alone, and many other interests as well. In this case, action of the guards was in response to defiant behavior.

The bar, popular with the college crowd, lost its liquor license after several altercations between employees and customers required police intervention. Wis. Stat. 125.12(2)(ag)(2), provides that a liquor license can be revoked or suspended if the holder "keeps or maintains a disorderly or riotous, indecent or improper house." The district court rejected an argument that the law was unconstitutionally vague. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. In light of the incidents that occurred at the bar, it was an "unlikely candidate" to bring a successful "as applied" challenge and the law is constitutional on its face.

A friend of defendant told Sergeant Wilson that he had seen sexual images of young girls on defendant's cell phone, and that defendant, 21 years old, had bragged about having sex with them. The friend later texted Wilson that he and defendant were together in a car. Wilson stopped the car and seized defendant's phone, but did not immediately apply for a search warrant. He sent a report to Detective Krug, who worked with the FBI Cyber Crimes Task Force. Krug tried to contact Wilson for more details, but shift differences and other delays resulted in a six-day gap before Krug obtained a federal warrant, searched the phone, and found the images. The district court denied a motion to suppress, finding the delay not unreasonable, and that, if were unreasonable, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule would apply. Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty to receiving child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2), and was sentenced to 210 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While the officers did not act with perfect diligence, the delay was not so egregious as to render the search and seizure unreasonable.

Plaintiff received 24 parking tickets over a 14-month period. All arrived by mail, typically in batches. All were written by Chicago Police Department Unit 253. Some were inconsistent, implying that the Toyota was in two places at once or was simultaneously double-parked and parked on the sidewalk. All 13 tickets attributed to one officer issued on four dates, had sequential numbers, and recorded the time as 10:00 p.m. Four issued after plaintiff sold the Toyota. Because none were legitimate, all were dismissed, but plaintiff had to go to court seven times. Plaintiff complained to the supervisor, the Internal Affairs Division, and Independent Police Review, then contacted the Chicago Tribune, which ran several stories. The Internal Affairs Division began an investigation that resulted in a recommendation to fire several officers. The district court dismissed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 case. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to a substantive due process claim, stating that plaintiff did not plead facts suggesting a deprivation that meets the high threshold for such claims. The court reversed dismissal of a class-of-one equal protection claim and related civil conspiracy claim, stating that the disturbing pattern, without reasonable explanation, adds up to deliberate and unjustified official harassment.

While on patrol, Officer Turner spoke to a man who reported that someone had just broken into his home and fondled his two daughters, who had been sleeping. A short time later, Turner interviewed the girls, who described the intruder as wearing camouflage cargo shorts and a dark baseball cap. Turner left the house and stopped a man walking a dog in an alleyway near the house (plaintiff). Plaintiff was wearing camouflage cargo shorts and a black baseball cap. No one else was in the area. Plaintiff agreed to stay in the police cruiser, Turner re-interviewed the girls, called the state's attorney's office for advice, arrested plaintiff, and conducted a "show-up," where the girls identified plaintiff as the intruder. The state court later dismissed charges for lack of evidence. The district court entered summary judgment for defendants in plaintiff’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and Illinois state law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to a false arrest claim against Turner and an indemnification claim against the county (Local Governmental Tort Immunity Act, 745 ILCS 10/1-101).