Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff is serving time in a state prison, but was transferred to county jail to attend court proceedings. During two stays, the jail applied a policy of making “nutriloaf” the exclusive diet of prisoners who had been in segregation at the time of transfer, regardless of behavior in the jail. After two days, plaintiff began vomiting and experiencing stomach pains and constipation. He stopped eating nutriloaf and subsisted for eight days on bread and water, losing 8.3 percent of his weight during two stays. A jail infirmary nurse gave him antacids and a stool softener. Upon return to prison he was diagnosed with an anal fissure. In response to his 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit, defendants submitted only a "preposterous affidavit from a sheriff's officer" indicating that nutriloaf is nutritious. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit reversed, in part, noting that defendants' decision "to defy rather than to defend" make it impossible to know the part diet played in making plaintiff sick. It is possible that jail officials were aware that nutriloaf was sickening him yet decided to do nothing, showing deliberate indifference to a serious health problem in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The court suggested sanctions against defendants.

Defendant discarded a loaded handgun during a foot chase with police and was arrested for unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon. He signed a Miranda waiver and began giving a statement, but soon invoked his right to counsel. Officers halted the interview and summoned a guard to take defendant to his cell. Defendant changed his mind and asked to speak without counsel present. The interview was recorded. After new Miranda warnings, officers asked if he wanted a lawyer. He replied, “Yeah, I do, but you ....” Officers reminded him that they could not talk if he was asking for counsel. After a long pause, defendant stated unambiguously that he wanted to continue without a lawyer and gave a statement. The district court denied a motion to suppress, defendant was convicted, and, based on designation as an armed career criminal because of three prior felony convictions, was sentenced to 252 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, but vacated the sentence. Officers did not violate the Miranda/Edwards rule. A conviction for the Illinois crime of making insulting or provoking physical contact with a peace officer is not a violent felony under the ACCA.

In 2006, plaintiff, then in ninth grade, was reported as having a knife. The school board held a hearing and entered an expulsion order. Plaintiff was conditionally reinstated for the next school year. In 2007 an administrator learned that the statement, "Only one bullet left, no one to kill but myself," appeared on plaintiff's backpack. Three more incidents involving threats or physical violence followed. Following meetings, he was permanently expelled and enrolled in private school. The state superintendent reversed the expulsion, but plaintiff remained in private school. Seen using the public school gym facilities, plaintiff was asked to leave; he became agitated and confrontational. The school barred him from the premises and he was subsequently cited for trespass. The district court entered summary judgment for the district with respect to his many claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. He appealed with respect to the ban on entering school grounds. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. As a member of the public, plaintiff does not have a protected liberty interest in accessing school grounds; defendants had no obligation to provide him with process in connection with the ban.

Petitioner, serving a 60-year sentence for attempted murder, burglary-battery, and bail jumping, received full collateral review by federal courts, and his first application under 28 U.S.C. 2244(b) for permission for a second collateral attack was denied. Intending to file a second 2244(b) application, he asked to be excused for untimely filing and for an order requiring the prison to allow him expanded use of the copier. The court rejected those claims, but exercised its discretion to excuse petitioner from compliance with Rule 22.2(a)(4) and (5), requiring submission of copies of documents from prior cases, and Appellate Rule 21(d), requiring submission of multiple copies of pleadings. Analysis of timeliness must wait for the papers to which the question applies. Petitioner adequately alleged that prison action frustrated his attempt to file an application, but did not identify underlying legal claims frustrated by the delay.

While the FBI executed a search warrant at his father’s business, officers looked for defendant at his father’s house. They climbed to the deck and, through a window, saw defendant asleep, with a pill bottle nearby. They telephoned the father and stated, incorrectly, that the bottle was next to defendant. The father gave permission to enter. Officers woke defendant and began questioning. He stated he had child pornography on a laptop in his car and agreed to provide evidence from his apartment, though agents told him that he did not have to do so. Driving to the apartment with officers, he used his cell phone. His father told him not to talk. After entering the apartment, agents read defendant his Miranda rights. He admitted operating a server for child pornography, having pornography on his computer, and transferring child pornography to an external drive. He signed consent forms, after being advised that he could refuse the search. The district court suppressed evidence and statements obtained in the father's home and car ride, but did not suppress evidence obtained at the apartment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Apartment evidence was sufficiently attenuated from the original illegal entry that it was purged of unconstitutional taint.

A fight broke out during a New Year's party at a pub. Several patrons were wounded and a security guard was killed. Plaintiff, an off-duty police officer whose wife was a manager at the pub, was present and was later arrested. After the charges were dropped, he sued for false arrest (42 U.S.C. 1983). The district court denied defendant's motion for a finding of qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit reversed. While there was not "arguable probable cause" for the murder charge, the charge of assisting a criminal was supported by the plaintiff's "hazy" and changing account of events and a videotape of events.

Defendant and fellow gang members were tried for racketeering conspiracy. The others were convicted, but the court declared a mistrial as to defendant. When his retrial case was given to the jury, the government submitted a redacted indictment, removing allegations against former co-defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction, rejecting an argument that the redacted indictment violated the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The redacted indictment did not broaden the possible bases for conviction nor did it remove any allegations needed for conviction.

Petitioner, serving a life sentence in Illinois, suffers a chronic medical condition and other ailments that require him to take several prescription drugs daily. After he became ill because someone accidentally gave him another inmate's medication, petitioner decided to educate himself. He ordered six books from a prison-approved bookstore, including: Carpe Diem: Put A Little Latin in Your Life; Diversity and Direction in Psychoanalytic Technique; and Neurodevelopmental Mechanisms in Psychopathology. After screening, a prison review officer decided that he could not have Physicians' Desk Reference and the Complete Guide to Prescription & Nonprescription Drugs 2009. The prison rejected a grievance and sent the books to petitioner's family. Petitioner's pro se 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaint was dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting the rational connection to legitimate prison interests and petitioner's lack of a property interest.

Defendants plotted with others to rob a cocaine stash house at gunpoint, but the stash house did not actually exist, and their partners were an undercover agent and a paid informant. The informant, Ringswald, generated most of the evidence against them and played a significant role at their trials, but, although available, was not called by prosecutors to testify. The government introduced his story through recordings and narrative from investigators. Prosecutors asserted that none of his out-of-court statements was offered for its truth. Defendants were convicted of drug and gun charges. Each was sentenced to 25 years' imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While the handling of Ringswald's statements, some of them "obvious hearsay," raise concerns about the Confrontation Clause, any error was harmless in light of "overwhelming evidence."

Officers obtained a warrant to search defendant's home, executed it five days later, arrested and charged defendant with possessing 100 or more marijuana plants with intent to distribute, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and maintaining a place for manufacture and distribution of marijuana. The district court rejected motions to suppress that challenged statements in the affidavit: about finding a marijuana stem during a "trash pull," about the existence of PVC piping at the house, that the affiant received information from the power company about power usage, and about defendant's criminal history. The Seventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction, without reaching arguments about electricity usage and criminal history. Remaining elements of the affidavit supported a finding of probable cause.