Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of a drug offense and is in prison in Texas. The district court sentenced him to 262 months in prison as a career offender under USSG 4B1.1, assuming that a prior walkaway escape from a halfway house was a qualifying felony. Absent career offender status, the guidelines range would have been 120 to 150 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. His attorney failed to file a petition for certiorari. The Supreme Court later held, in another case, that walkaway escape is not a crime of violence. After a complicated series of motions under 28 U.S.C. 2255 and 28 U.S.C. 2241, involving a Texas district court and the Seventh Circuit, the Seventh Circuit denied pending motions. The court noted that defendant would not be sentenced as a career offender today and likely would receive a much lower sentence; taxpayers are footing the bill. There is no judicial procedure to remedy the situation; only the executive branch can grant relief. The court called the claims being "batted around" between circuits with differing views of how the merits may be heard "an untenable and unseemly waste of judicial resources."

Law enforcement authorities believed that defendant was a supplier of illegal drugs to another dealer, Cabrera, who was selling to a paid police informant. The informant, after ordering a pound of methamphetamine from Cabrera, overheard a phone conversation between Cabrera and defendant in which defendant said he would deliver the meth to a garage. Police were listening remotely and arrested Cabrera and defendant at the garage after they carried meth from a truck into the garage. Officers searched defendant and seized a cell phone, searched his truck and seized two more. Defendant denied ownership of the phones in the truck. Officers obtained the phone number, subpoenaed records, and used the call history of the phone found on defendant's person as evidence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that officers did not "search" the phone, but were content with obtaining its number.

Plaintiff, wrongly convicted of two murders in 1986, obtained a certificate of innocence in 2009 and sought damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983 from Illinois Assistant States Attorneys, Wharrie and Kelley, alleging that they induced false testimony during his trial and retrial and suppressed the compromised nature of the testimony and its acquisition, denying him due process. Defendants filed an interlocutory appeal, challenging denial of their claim of absolute immunity. They also claimed that Illinois sovereign immunity law precludes federal jurisdiction, and only the Illinois Court of Claims may hear the state-law claims. The Seventh Circuit reversed with respect to immunity and suggested that the district court consider relinquishing jurisdiction over state claims. Wharrie is entitled to absolute immunity for alleged solicitation of false testimony from a co-defendant/fellow gang member after the original trial, as well as for alleged suppression of its falsity. Plaintiff failed to state a claim against Kelley with respect to his alleged coercing testimony from an eyewitness.

Defendant pled guilty to possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B), contingent upon his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress the images underlying the charges. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Evidence that defendant sexually assaulted his old niece supported probable cause that he possessed child pornography and justified a search of his personal residence. Officers acted in good faith.

Defendant's stepmother was killed while he and others robbed his father's house to steal guns. A state court sentenced him to 71 years' imprisonment for murder and armed robbery. His conviction was affirmed. State courts rejected collateral attack. The district court rejected a petition for habeas corpus (28 U.S.C. 2254). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on the attorney's failure to object to defendant being required to wear a stun belt at trial. The court declined to address whether the prosecutor violated the due process clause by taking advantage of an error during defendant's testimony. The claim was adjudicated on the merits in state court, whose decision was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court decisions.

As Graham entered a public library, her purse, containing $5,000 in cash, was grabbed. She struggled with the snatcher. The robber shot Graham in the head and her mother in the chest, before fleeing. Graham described the attacker to police officers, but did not say that she knew her assailant. A neighbor, visiting the women in the hospital, told police that he had heard a rumor that Phillips, who lived in Graham's neighborhood, had been watching currency exchanges and robbing people who cashed tax-refund checks (as Graham had done). Graham later identified Phillips from a photo array and a lineup. Phillips had a strong alibi and there was no other evidence against him. After his acquittal, he filed suit (42 U.S.C. 1983) against the village and officers. The district court entered summary judgment for defendants, holding that the identification established probable cause. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Mentioning Phillips' name to the victim, who claimed she did not know him, did not taint the identification.

Indiana State Prison maintains an inmates' recreation fund, required by Ind. Code 4-24-6-6(a), to accrue money from sources outside the state budget, such as profits from a prison commissary. Prison officials are to use this money for the inmates' benefit by purchasing recreational items or using funds for a purpose not covered under existing state appropriations. Petitioner's pro se 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit claimed that for 10 years, prison officials have misappropriated proceeds by uses ranging from diverting money for personal uses, to using the fund for purposes already covered by existing allocations, such as purchase of devices enhancing security. The district court screened and dismissed under 28 U.S.C. 1915A (b)(1), finding that petitioner did not have a statutorily protected property interest in the fund. Neither the Constitution nor federal statutes mandate that state penal facilities maintain a recreation fund or dictate how money in such funds be spent, The state statute did not give inmates a property interest in the fund. The Seventh Circuit affirmed

Petitioner entered a blind plea of guilty with respect to gang-related murders in 1992 and a state court entered judgment on two counts of intentional murder. She was sentenced to life imprisonment, the mandatory minimum for double homicide. After exhausting state court remedies, she filed a petition for habeas relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court concluded that many of the claims were defaulted and that others failed on the merits. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Petitioner preserved only questions of whether her attorney was ineffective for failing to investigate a particular witness; failing to obtain psychological evidence to support an argument that her confession was involuntary; and failing to recognize that another witness had made inconsistent statements and had motive to lie. All fail on the merits; there was no reason to believe that any of the alleged deficiencies changed the outcome.

The city bought land with the intention of transferring it to an adjoining Catholic high school for an athletic complex. In exchange, the city was to have the right to use the complex at specified times. In response to opposition by residents, the district court granted a preliminary injunction. Rather than appeal, the city moved to modify the injunction to permit it to sell to the school at appraised value. The district court denied on the ground that by not opening bidding the city was sending a message of endorsement of Catholicism. The city then obtained modification to allow it to sell the property to the highest bidder, sold to the high school, and appealed. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot and untimely.

Plaintiff was terminated from his position as Senior Humane Officer for the city after refusing to support defendant's successful mayoral campaign and brought suit, claiming that the position of SHO was not subject to political termination and that his dismissal violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court, relying on an official job description, found that the SHO was a policy-making position, and that plaintiff could be dismissed for political reasons. The Seventh Circuit affirmed on the basis that city ordinances authorized the SHO to exercise policy-making discretion.