Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 2007, plaintiff applied for admission to the Indiana Bar. The Board of Law Examiners requested that he attend hearings to investigate his application and be evaluated by mental health professionals and ultimately denied the application. After exhausting appeals to the Indiana Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court, plaintiff brought suit, claiming that evaluation of his application focused on his religious beliefs (ostensibly Roman Catholic) and violated his constitutional rights. The district court dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and found that the defendants were immune from civil suit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the gravamen of the claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983 required review of a state court decision and could have been raised in his appeals.

Plaintiff, active in Wisconsin’s "open carry" movement, carried a holstered handgun into stores and was arrested for disorderly conduct. His gun was confiscated, but eventually returned. He was not prosecuted. He sued arresting officers and municipalities under 42 U .S.C. 1983, asserting false. He claimed retention of his guns was an unconstitutional seizure and violation of the Privacy Act because officers obtained his Social Security number during booking. The district court granted defendants summary judgment on all claims. In 2011, Wisconsin adopted a concealed-carry permitting regime and amended its statutes to clarify that openly carrying a firearm is not disorderly conduct absent circumstances indicating criminal or malicious intent. WIS. STAT. 947.01(2). Also in 2011, plaintiff was convicted of homicide, mooting his claim for prospective declaratory relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to damages claims. The officers are entitled to qualified immunity. At the time, the state constitutional right to bear arms was new, Wisconsin law was unclear, and the Supreme Court had not decided a case applying the Second Amendment to States. It was reasonable for officers to believe that the circumstances gave them probable cause for a disorderly conduct arrest. Delayed return of the handguns was not a "seizure."

Plaintiffs challenged the school district practice of giving preference to the boys' Friday and Saturday night basketball games, asserting that non-primetime games result in a loss of audience, conflict with homework, and foster feelings of inferiority. The district court dismissed the claims under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. 1681(a) and an equal protection claim, 42 U.S.C. 1983 on grounds of sovereign immunity. The Seventh Circuit vacated. Plaintiffs presented a genuine question of fact that such practices violate the statute. Defendants are "persons" within the meaning of section 1983, subject to suit under that statute.

Illinois law provides that workers at public works projects must be paid not less than general prevailing rate of hourly wages for work of a similar character on non-federal public works in the locality, 820 ILCS 130/3. The public body awarding the contract is required to determine prevailing wage, but the Department of Labor conducts annual investigations of prevailing wage for each type of construction and demolition work in each locality and, in practice, public bodies simply adopt that determination. Landscape contractors who do non-federal public works projects sued the Department, arguing that it violated the due process clause by delegating ascertainment of prevailing wage to private entities, namely a labor union and contractors with which it has a collective bargaining agreement. The district judge granted summary judgment in favor of the Department. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the contractors did not object to the prevailing wage determination.

Convicted of attempted murder, criminal confinement, domestic battery, and invasion of privacy, defendant was sentenced to 51 years in prison. He was unsuccessful at seeking post-conviction relief in Indiana state court and filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254, claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The district court denied the petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court looked at counsel's performance as a whole and deferred to the Indiana Court of Appeals conclusion that counsel's decisions to pursue alibi and misidentification defenses were strategic in nature and reasonable under the circumstances. Counsel's decision to lie, during opening statements about petitioner's whereabouts, was "troubling" but did not change the analysis. It is unlikely that a different result would be reached, absent counsel's errors.

Plaintiff was arrested for drinking on a public way. A search incident to arrest turned up a heroin packet and a baggie of crack cocaine, so drug possession charges were added. He was jailed for 12 days before bonding out. The drinking charge was dismissed and, at a preliminary hearing, a state judge concluded there was no probable cause for the drug charges. Plaintiff filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit against the officers. After the jury returned a verdict for defendants, plaintiff argued that the court erred in allowing an assistant prosecutor to testify that low-weight cases are routinely thrown out, as an expert, without proper disclosures and foundation. The district court rejected the argument, stating that the prosecutor never offered an opinion, but testified as to her experience on the narcotics call in the state court, offering factual statements based on her personal observations. The Seventh Circuit held that plaintiff was entitled to a new trial. The prosecutor testified based on her specialized knowledge and non-disclosure of her planned testimony as an expert was not harmless.

Plaintiff alleged that while he was a pretrial detainee, asleep in his cell, a guard opened the door, allowing another inmate to enter and attack him. He sustained injuries to his head and eyes. He requested medical attention, but received none for five days. He was locked down for 72 hours following the attack. The district court screened the 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915A and held a brief telephonic merit-review hearing, then dismissed. The Seventh Circuit vacated, reasoning that even if plaintiff's condition did not worsen from the delay, deliberate indifference to prolonged, unnecessary pain can itself be the basis for an Eighth Amendment claim. Although the evidence may not ultimately substantiate plaintiff's allegations, if proven the conditions are severe enough to have required more prompt attention. On remand the district court should give plaintiff, who was acting pro se, an opportunity to amend his complaint to name the officers who ignored his injuries.

The owner of retail liquor stores and two consumers challenged the constitutionality of an Indiana state law that prohibits shipment of wine to customers by motor carriers, such as UPS, Ind. Code. 7.1-3-15-3(d). The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's rejection of the challenges. The law may prevent the store from enlarging its sales area to encompass parts of Indiana remote from Fort Wayne; that is an effect on intrastate commerce, not interstate commerce. Plaintiffs did not establish even an incidental effect on interstate commerce The court also noted that the law is "within the Twenty-First Amendment's gravitational field," which includes matters relating to transportation of liquor.

The appellate court reversed plaintiff's murder conviction. He filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, accusing officers of violating his rights by influencing a witness to identify him as the killer. The Seventh Circuit affirmed judgment against him. Four years later, plaintiff filed a new suit against defendants he had sued before, plus prosecutors and the governmental entities that employed them. He had, in the meantime, obtained a "certificate of innocence," under 735 ILCS 5/2–702, enacted in 2008. The district court dismissed the claims against the original three defendants on the basis of claim preclusion and the claims against the others based on the two-year limitations period. The court also concluded that claims against the prosecutors under state law must be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, because federal courts follow state immunity rules and Illinois wants claims of this kind to be presented to its Court of Claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the state-issued certificate did not create a new claim, restarting the clock and overriding the rules of issue and claim preclusion.

A pretrial detainee in a maximum security area expressed concern for his safety and was moved to an area for detainees charged with possessing weapons in jail. He later reported that detainees were bringing weapons into particular cells, but a search uncovered no weapons. The following week he was falsely identified by an officer, within hearing of other detainees, as a gang leader. He was stabbed days later. An officer called for back-up immediately. While waiting, she stood in a secure area and did not try to stop the attack. Additional officers arrived 15 or 20 minutes later. The district court entered summary judgment for defendants in a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff failed to show that defendants were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk. A general risk of violence in a maximum security unit does not itself establish knowledge of a substantial risk; plaintiff did not report any problems with fellow detainees or fear of attacks after being moved. A prison guard, acting alone, is not required to take the unreasonable risk of attempting to break up a fight if circumstances indicate that such action would put her in significant jeopardy. The response delay is "most troubling," but insufficient to constitute deliberate indifference.