Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Convicted of conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine, and distribution of five grams or more of methamphetamine, defendant was sentenced to 292 months imprisonment for each count, set to run concurrently. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court properly admitted cell phone evidence. Evidence obtained from a warrantless search of the phone was ignored until two years later when it was obtained from an independent source, subpoenaed cell phone records. There was no evidence that the initial search had any bearing on the issuance of the subpoena.

In anticipation of 2010 elections, the group challenged Wisconsin's "total of $10,000 in any calendar year" limit on individual contributions to state and local candidates, political parties, and political committees. WIS. STAT. 11.26(4). They sought an injunction. The district court held that abstention was appropriate pending resolution a state supreme court case concerning campaign-finance rule GAB 1.28, which expanded the scope of political speech subject to Wisconsin’s regulatory regime. After the November 2010 elections nine state senators faced recall elections. The district court again denied an injunction that would have allowed the group to raise unlimited funds during the recalls. A motions panel held that the First Amendment challenge was likely to succeed and issued an injunction pending appeal. The Seventh Circuit vacated the abstention order, and remanded for entry of a permanent injunction. The constitutionality of section 11.26(4) does not depend on whether GAB 1.28 survives review; it is unconstitutional to the extent that it limits contributions to committees engaged solely in independent spending for political speech. Independent expenditures do not pose a threat of actual or apparent quid pro quo corruption, the only governmental interest strong enough to justify restrictions on political speech.

Unable to maintain a satisfactory academic record in a state dental school, plaintiff was dismissed. He unsuccessfully petitioned school committees and administrators to overturn the decision, then filed a complaint alleging First Amendment, equal protection, and procedural due process violations. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that petitioner received ample process. He had ample notice, having been on academic probation, he was given several opportunities to remediate, and was allowed to appeal.

Plaintiff resigned from her probationary employment with the department of corrections after she was charged, by the state's attorney, with failure to cooperate in an investigation. She had been a witness in a criminal investigation; she sued the detective conducting the investigation, alleging that when she refused to lie to further the investigation, he tortiously interfered with her employment. She sued the sheriff and the director of personnel, claiming First Amendment retaliation, retaliatory discharge, and violation of procedural due process rights. Claims against the detective were dismissed for failure to state a claim; the court granted the county summary judgment on all remaining claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. There was no evidence that the detective had anything to do with the charge against plaintiff. There was no evidence that the investigation of plaintiff or the charges were in retaliation for refusal to lie. Because she was in her probationary period, plaintiff had no property interest in her position.

In 2006 petitioner was sentenced as a career offender for conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine. His appeals were unsuccessful; the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Defendant was engaged in litigation with the state, seeking to vacate one of the convictions used as a basis for career offender status. He was ultimately successful. In the meantime, the district court denied a motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence and, on remand, denied it twice again. The court declined to stay with respect to the challenged state conviction. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. Petitioner was diligent in pursuing remedies and the district court should have stayed the then-unripe petition while the state challenge was pending, to enable petitioner to comply with the requirements for a timely habeas petition.

Plaintiff was banned from the senior center because she repeatedly violated the code of conduct by yelling, making threats, and making frivolous complaints to police. She sued the city under 42 U.S.C. 1983 claiming violation of free-speech and due-process rights and that the code is facially unconstitutional. A magistrate judge granted summary judgment for the city. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the director and board of the center are not final policymakers for purposes of enforcing the code of conduct. Under state and local law, plaintiff could ask the city council to overturn the expulsion. She had been informed of her right to appeal and failure to do so precludes municipal liability to the extent that claimed constitutional violations stem from the ban. The court stated that it was not imposing a requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies under Section 1983, but recognizing the council's role as policymaker. The board has authority to make rules for the center, so the code of conduct itself is city policy. The court rejected a facial challenge to the code, which consists of reasonable "time, place, or manner" restrictions and is neither unconstitutionally vague nor overbroad.

Plaintiff, a correctional officer, is a veteran of the Persian Gulf War, and suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder for years. After an argument with his wife, plaintiff left his home and drove around the area, frequently calling his wife and at least once suggesting to her that he might commit suicide. His wife called the police; the dispatcher put out a report that plaintiff was suicidal, was on medication, and had access to weapons. Plaintiff was asleep in his car when officers found him. After two hours of surveillance, officers called in a specialized team, CIERT. A CIERT armored vehicle was moved into position, spike strips were put behind the parked car, and an officer shot "pepper balls" into the car, before officers removed plaintiff. Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 claiming excessive force and brought state law claims for battery, false arrest, and willful and wanton misconduct. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, none of whom had authority over CIERT. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.

In pleading guilty to four felony charges, defendant admitted that he had forcibly detained a 17-year-old boy, threatening to kill him if he resisted or tried to escape, and raped him. Charges that defendant had raped a 13-year-old boy were dismissed. The Indiana state judge imposed a sentence of 50 years in prison in light of defendant’s prior felony convictions. Direct appeal and collateral attack in state court were unsuccessful. Defendant claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, in that his attorney did not explain the possible sentence before he accepted a plea. A federal district judge denied habeas corpus. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although defendant may have established prejudice by claiming that he would have demanded a trial, if correctly informed, the state judge gave him the information allegedly omitted by defense counsel.

Petitioner entered the U.S. from Mexico illegally and married another undocumented alien. Their three children are U.S. citizens. Removal proceedings began after he was convicted for DUI at least four times, for driving without a license three times, and for other driving offenses. An immigration judge denied a petition for cancellation of removal, finding that petitioner lacked the requisite "good moral character." The Board of Immigration Appeals agreed. The Seventh Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, noting its bewilderment at an attempt to argue due process. Aliens do not have a liberty or property right in cancellation of removal; it is a discretionary matter. The determination of good moral character is not a matter of law, but an administrative decision not subject to judicial review.

Defendant left his seriously dysfunctional home at age 14 and began living with an adult who sold him to older men for sex. They were joined by two young girls. The four engaged in group sex. Defendant was convicted of first degree sexual assault of a child, based on oral sex performed on defendant (then age 15) by a 12-year-old, and sentenced to 40 years. Wisconsin state courts rejected his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied a petition for habeas corpus. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that defendant received constitutionally ineffective assistance from his trial counsel, who failed to request a jury instruction including the statutory words defining the charged offense: "either by the defendant or upon the defendant's instruction." The state court determination that any error was not prejudicial was not unreasonable, in light of the circumstances surrounding the incident and the possibility that the statutory language court be read as covering situations in which a defendant allowed the sexual conduct. The court noted that it was not unmindful of the circumstances that led defendant to the situation and that it trusted the parole board to take those circumstances into account.