Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, an inmate, worked as a library clerk. Defendant, the director of education, ordered plaintiff fired on the ground that, on the job, he had highlighted copies of opinions for personal use and had stolen an opinion from the library. A day after plaintiff told the librarian that he had filed a grievance, defendant filed a conduct report to justify ordering plaintiff fired. Plaintiff had a receipt showing that he had checked out the opinion and the theft charge was dropped. The hearing officer upheld the copying charge and ordered plaintiff confined to his cell for 14 days and the copies destroyed. After the state court ordered a new hearing, the prison expunged the disciplinary order from plaintiff's record; the order had already been carried out. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district judge granted summary judgment for defendants on the ground that plaintiff had not shown "that the challenged action would not have occurred but for the constitutionally protected conduct." The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to other defendants, but reversed with respect to the director of education, noting the timing of his conduct report and evidence of animus toward plaintiff.

Plaintiffs, members of a religious organization, demonstrated around the stadium at which the 2006 "Gay Games" were held, but were prohibited from demonstrating and preaching on the sidewalk. They stopped demonstrating on the sidewalk outside a major tourist attraction (Navy Pier) under threat of arrest. One plaintiff, who refused to move from his spot on a public sidewalk outside one of the game venues, was arrested for disorderly conduct. The district court ruled in favor of the city defendants on claims under the U.S. Constitution, the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration, and common law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, except with respect to the First Amendment claim dealing with a policy requiring a permit for even small-group demonstrations outside Navy Pier. The constitutionality of that policy must be evaluated in light of the unique features of the location. The city's legitimate concerns justify its actions with respect to the other locations.

Officers went to plaintiff's home to question her sons about a burglary. A confrontation ensued and escalated. One of the officers Tasered plaintiff three times, and the officers arrested her for obstruction and resisting arrest. Those charges were dropped, and plaintiff sued the officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging use of excessive force and false arrest. A jury returned a verdict for the officers on all counts. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff waived her most plausible claim of trial error, the decision to admit two of her criminal convictions, when she introduced evidence of the convictions herself, before the officers could do so. The court also rejected claims based on evidentiary rulings and jury instructions. The parties told dramatically different stories about the confrontation and the jury was entitled to believe the officersâ version.

Petitioner brought a "Bivens" action, claiming that prison officials provided him with limited, deficient access to the law library for four months while he was confined in a special unit. He claims that the prison switched to electronic research databases and did not provide instruction, causing him to miss filing dates for an appeal in a case he had filed under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Although the Seventh Circuit reinstated the appeal in that case, the district court dismissed the Bivens action. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that petitioner did not show any prejudice as a result of his limited library access.

Petitioner, convicted of one count of first-degree murder and two counts of attempted murder and sentenced to 90 years in prison, unsuccessfully sought relief in Illinois state courts then filed a federal habeas corpus petition (28 U.S.C. 2254). The district court held an evidentiary hearing and denied the petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Even if trial counsel was ineffective in impeaching a witness, petitioner was not prejudiced, in light of the substantial evidence of guilt. Petitioner could not prove his claim that the prosecution knowingly obtained his conviction on the basis of perjured testimony.

The inmate asked for a vegan diet, telling the chaplain that he adheres to the Moorish Science Temple. The chaplain rejected the request, observing that the tenets of Moorish Science require a non-pork diet, which can include dairy products and some meat and fish. The district court denied defendants' motion for summary judgment in the inmate's action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, but granted the motion with respect to claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C.2000cc to 2000ccâ5. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. The inmate is no longer at the prison, so damages would be the only potential relief. Money damages are not available in suits against states under RLUIPA and suits against state employees in their official capacity are treated as suits against the states. RLUIPA does not authorize any kind of relief against public employees in their private capacities. The warden was entitled to summary judgment under section 1983, which does not provide for "supervisory liability." To decide whether the chaplain has qualified immunity, the district judge must determine whether he reasonably attempted to determine whether the inmate had a sincere belief that his religion requires a vegan diet.

Plaintiff, publisher of a newsletter about the Wisconsin state prison system, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 after prison officials concluded that the March 2007 edition posed an unacceptable risk to inmate rehabilitation and prison security and refused to distribute the issue to inmates. The district court concluded that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and entered summary judgment in their favors. A second case was filed by a prisoner, against DOC employees, after they confiscated medical records and legal documents regarding other inmates, as well as copies of an article he published in the newsletter. The district court dismissed the claims on their merits. The Seventh Circuit affirmed both decisions. The publisher did not establish that confiscation of the newsletter was not reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. DOC's policy, restricting prisoners' access to third-party mail did not violate the inmate's First Amendment rights.

Petitioner, imprisoned in Wisconsin for a term of 60 years following a 1994 conviction for sexual assault and attempted homicide, sought a writ of habeas corpus (28 U.S.C. 2254). The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The case involved police misconduct in "doctoring" the crime scene to conceal evidence of prostitution, by withholding semen-stained sheets and towels from the massage parlor. The items were later tested and did not disclose petitioner's DNA. The court stated that the evidence was irrelevant, in that it could only be used to impeach the victim, given the other evidence and petitioner's own admissions. Rejecting a "Brady" claim concerning petitioner's gun, the court noted that nothing suggests that defense team was unaware of the gun, the state's possession of it, or the prosecution's theory of its role in the crime, or that the defense unsuccessfully requested access.

When he arrived at the prison, plaintiff told the prison clinical director that he had rheumatoid arthritis and asked for Enbrel, a medication successful in controlling the condition before his incarceration. Because Enbrel was not on the approved formulary, personnel had to seek prior approval from the Central Office of the Bureau of Prisons. The doctor submitted a request for Gabapentin, used to treat nerve pain, but not Enbrel, and approved a consultation with an outside rheumatologist. Despite the rheumatologistâs instruction and plaintiff's repeated requests and complaints of pain and swelling, he didnât receive Enbrel for 10 months. Because plaintiff sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the district court screened his "Bivens" complaint alleging cruel and unusual punishment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B), dismissed all defendants, except the clinical director, then entered summary judgment for the clinical director. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of the non-medical defendants on the pleadings, but held that the prisoner properly stated a claim against medical defendants. Affirming summary judgment in favor of of the clinical director, the court found that plaintiff failed to meet his burden to submit evidence upon which a reasonable jury could find deliberate indifference.

Plaintiffs alleged that the school district practice of holding high school graduation ceremonies and related events at a Christian church rented for the occasion violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and sought preliminary and permanent injunctions, a declaratory judgment and damages. After the district court entered summary judgment in favor of the district. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Use of the rented church space was neither impermissibly coercive nor an endorsement of religion on the part of the district. The Establishment Clause does not shield citizens from encountering the beliefs or symbols of any faith to which they do not subscribe and plaintiffs offered no evidence that the district has in any way associated itself with the symbols or with the beliefs expressed by the Church or that any of the religious messages, such as materials in the pews, were placed there especially for graduations rather than being standard fare for Church activities.