Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was operating a video camera in public park, perhaps because of the presence of a former domestic partner. An angry crowd accused him of videotaping their children in a public park and called police, who arrested him for disorderly conduct. The charges were eventually dropped and plaintiff sued the officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming they arrested him without probable cause in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the officers. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, on grounds of qualified immunity. While videotaping is not a crime in Illinois, one officer had probable cause to believe that plaintiff was guilty of disorderly conduct and the other could have reasonably believed there was probable cause.

Defendant participated in a number of drug transactions involving the sale of a total of 74.2 grams of crack cocaine and was convicted of conspiracy to distribute more than 50 grams of cocaine base, distribution of more than 50 grams of cocaine base, and possession of more than five grams of cocaine base with intent to distribute (21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1)). 846. Because he had two prior state felony drug convictions, he received a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Defendant did not establish that no jury could have found him guilty. The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), does not apply retroactively and the sentence does not violate defendant's equal protection or Eighth Amendment rights.

An Indiana inmate, alleging mistreatement during a shakedown, was denied permission to proceed in forma pauperis because his three previous suits had been dismissed (28 U.S.C. 1915(g)). The Seventh Circuit reversed dismissal of his suit for failure to pay fees. His previous filings had been dismissed for failure to prosecute, after the judge deemed his allegations unintelligible, and not as frivolous, malicious, or failing to state a claim. That they might have or even should have been dismissed on those grounds is irrelevant.

Because defendant, stopped for speeding, behaved oddly, the officer had a canine perform a free-air search. The dog alerted and defendant consented to a search of the car. During a pat-down, defendant tried to pull away, and, after feeling a hard object in defendant's pocket, the officer found a bundle of cash and a packet of cocaine. While being cuffed and while in the squad car, defendant made statements about being able to obtain additional cocaine. Convicted of possession with intent to distribute more than five grams of cocaine base (21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)), defendant was sentenced to 236 months, based on 24 prior convictions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of a motion to suppress. An officer who encounters a small, hard object during a pat-down may have reasonable suspicion to believe the object is a weapon. The court suppressed all of defendant's responses to questions, but his other statements were not coerced and police are not precluded from listening to voluntary statements.

Defendant, the master-mind of a mortgage fraud scheme, was convicted of wire fraud. She claimed that the 1,229-day delay between the date on which the last of her codefendants was arraigned and the start of her trial violated the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161 and the Sixth Amendment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a motion to dismiss. The Act's 70-day "clock" permits the court to exclude delays resulting from continuances granted on the basis of findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial and delays caused by absence or unavailability of an essential witness. The record indicated that the continuances and delays were justified and did not prejudice defendant.

Plaintiffs provide in-home care through Medicaid-waiver programs run by the Illinois Department of Human Services; some work through a Rehabilitation Program and others through a Disabilities Program. In 2003, the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act was amended to designate personal care attendants and personal assistants working under the Home Services Program as state employees for purposes of collective bargaining. 20 ILCS 2405/3. Rehabilitation Program assistants designated a union, which negotiated an agreement that includes a "fair share" provision, requiring assistants who are not members to pay their proportionate share of costs of collective bargaining. Disabilities Program assistants voted against unionization. Rehabilitation Program plaintiffs claim that fair share fees violate the First Amendment by compelling association with, and speech through, the union. Disabilities Program plaintiffs argue that they are harmed by the threat of fair share fees. The district court dismissed both. The Seventh Circuit affirmed and remanded for dismissal of the Disabilities plaintiffs' case without prejudice because it was unripe. Because of the significant control the state exercises over all aspects of personal assistants' jobs, the assistants are employees of the state. The state's interests in collective bargaining are such that fair share fees withstand First Amendment scrutiny in a facial challenge to the imposition of the fees.

A diabetic, suffering a hypoglycemic episode while driving, veered off the road. Officers believed he was intoxicated. When he did not comply with commands to step out of his car, they physically removed him, maced him two or three times, struck him four times with a baton to place handcuffs on him and prevent him from kicking his legs and flailing his arms, and kept him in the prone position until a paramedic arrived. The paramedic recognized the condition and took the patient to a hospital, where he died of natural causes roughly two weeks later. The district court entered summary judgment for defendants on 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims for wrongful arrest, excessive force, failure to train the officers, and condoning the use of excessive force. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The officers had probable cause to be believe the driver was intoxicated and the force was not excessive, under the circumstances.

As the governing body for middle and high school athletic programs, WIAA sponsors post-season tournaments. In 2005, WIAA gave a video production company exclusive rights to stream nearly all tournament events online; if the company elects not to stream a game, other broadcasters may do so after obtaining permission and paying a fee. The contract does not prohibit media coverage, photography, or interviews before or after games. Private media may also broadcast up to two minutes of a game, or write or blog about it, so long as they do not engage in "play-by-play." Defendant newspapers decided to stream four WIAA tournament games without obtaining consent or paying the fee. The district court entered declaratory judgment in favor of WIAA. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Streaming or broadcasting an event is not the same thing as reporting on or describing it. The court noted the distinction between state-as-regulator and state-as- proprietor, and that tournament games are a performance product of WIAA that it has the right to control.

City employees accepted early retirement incentives in 2004 while their unions were still negotiating new collective bargaining agreements for 2003-2007. In 2005, after two years of negotiations, the city and unions agreed to make raises retroactive to July 2003, but only for current employees, not for the plaintiff retirees. The district court granted the city summary judgment on federal due process and equal protection claims and a state law breach of express contract claim, but granted summary judgment to plaintiffs on their state law implied contract claim and awarded the class $1,773,502 in retroactive pay, plus attorney fees. The Seventh Circuit reversed on the implied contract claim and otherwise affirmed. Because express contracts, the 1999-2003 CBAs, governed wages, an implied contract claim cannot succeed. Plaintiffs hoped for wage increases, but had no right to them, and there was no evidence that the city made misrepresentations to induce early retirement.

Petitioner, convicted of causing great bodily harm by operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of cocaine (Wis. Stat. 940.25(1)(am) exhausted state appeals and filed an unsuccessful petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reasonably concluded that the state did not violate petitioner's right to due process when it destroyed the vehicle, which possessed no apparent exculpatory value, in good faith.