Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

An inmate sued, claiming that the prison medical director was deliberately indifferent to his need for eye surgery. He was diagnosed in 2001, with pterygia, a thin film covering the eye, which significantly obstructs his vision and apparently causes itching and irritation. The prison denied requests for surgery. The inmate alleged that there was an unofficial policy of denying off-site care to death row inmates. Medical recommendations were mixed; several doctors recommended the surgery. Following a remand of dismissal of his suit, the inmate got surgery in 2008, and filed a second suit, based on the delay The district court entered summary judgment, in favor of the doctor. The Seventh Circuit vacated, finding that the evidence remains insufficient to eliminate fact disputes. The medical recommendations are enough to create genuine fact disputes that the pterygia had become objectively serious and that the doctor intentionally or with deliberate indifference ignored the condition.

A gun was discovered on defendant's person after he was pulled over on suspicion of a burglary attempt and ordered out of his vehicle for a protective patdown. Defendant had prior felony convictions, and pled guilty as a felon-in-possession, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) but appealed denial of his motion to suppress. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Defendant did not dispute that officers had reasonable suspicion that he may have been involved in criminal activity, such that an investigative detention under Terry was warranted. The facts known to officers suggested burglary and burglary is the type of offense that likely involves a weapon; the decision to order defendant out of the truck for purposes of a protective frisk was reasonable despite the absence of additional facts suggesting that he in particular might be armed.

The inmate attended services until the prison cancelled African Hebrew Israelite services. The prison denied his grievance, blaming budget cuts. The Grievance Officer and Department Director upheld the denial on the merits. The inmate filed a pro se 42 U.S.C.1983 complaint against the chaplain and wardens, alleging violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000cc, and the Illinois Constitution. The district court dismissed restructured Counts 2 and 3 (discrimination in allocation of religious budget)and entered summary judgment for defendants on Counts 1 and 4 (failure to provide reasonable access to religious materials and to provide group worship services). The Seventh Circuit vacated in part. The grievance gave officials fair notice and an opportunity to address the complaint, so Count 4 should not have been dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The courtâs characterization of Counts 2 and 3 was too narrow a reading of the complaint and led to premature dismissal at the screening stage. Dismissal of Count 1 was appropriate because the inmate only complained of a failure to provide religious services in his grievance, not a failure to provide religious materials, and did not properly exhaust that claim.

Petitioner entered the U.S. from Mexico in 1971, and became a lawful permanent resident in 1977. In 2003, she was indicted for mail fraud in connection with a staged accident insurance scheme; loss to the victims exceeded $10,000. On advice of counsel, she pled guilty and was sentenced to four yearsâ probation. An alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony is deportable, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). The government initiated removal proceedings after petitioner unsuccessfully applied for citizenship. She sought to have her conviction overturned and filed a motion for a writ of coram nobis, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel because her attorney failed to inform her that a guilty plea could lead to removal. While the motion was pending, the Supreme Court decided Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010). The court concluded that Padilla did not announce a new rule and did apply to the case and vacated the conviction. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court has defined the concept of an old rule narrowly, limiting it to holdings so compelled by precedent that any contrary conclusion must be deemed unreasonable; Padilla announced a new rule. That numerous courts had failed to anticipate the holding, though not dispositive, is strong evidence that reasonable jurists could have debated the outcome.

A jury, composed entirely of women, acquitted petitioner on state law charges of second-degree sexual assault by sexual intercourse but found him guilty of unlawful sexual contact with a 15-year-old girl. After exhausting state remedies, he unsuccessfully petitioned for habeas corpus. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. On petitions for habeas corpus claiming ineffective assistance, federal courts defer to counsel's reasonable choices and to the state court's evaluation of that issue 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1). The state court found that the acquittal on one count demonstrated that defendant was not prejudiced by his lawyer's striking of male jurors and assumed that, because the lawyer had a strategic reason for his actions, his performance was not constitutionally inadequate. The Seventh Circuit disagreed, stating that "Intentionally violating the Constitution by discriminating against jurors on account of their sex is not consistent with, or reasonable under, prevailing professional norms," but concluded that the error did not merit reversal. It was not outside the boundaries of reasonable differences of opinion, given the state of the law at the time, for those courts to predict that the Supreme Court would apply a harmless-error standard even to intentional Batson violations like the one in this case.

Plaintiff filed suit (42 U.S.C. 1983) based on three arrests: one for disorderly conduct for his attempts to dissuade a city employee from towing his car; a second, months later, for theft of lost or mislaid property after he got into another spat with a city employee, who was trying to tow his vehicles; a third arrest, more than a year later, was for criminal trespass to state-supported land, and followed his release from police custody after another arrest, not challenged in this case. None of the challenged arrests resulted in prosecution. The district court rejected the claims on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that there was probable cause for the arrests, but stated that the Chicago police did not emerge "untarnished."

In 2002, state and federal authorities began investigation of gang violence in Aurora, Illinois. Defendants were convicted of conspiracy under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1962(d), and various combinations of related charges of murder, conspiracy to commit murder, assault with a dangerous weapon, drug distribution, conspiracy to distribute drugs, and unlawful possession of firearms. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first rejecting challenges to empanelment of an anonymous jury. The court erred under Rule 43 by barring two defendants from trial on the day before trial, rather than on the morning when jury selection began, but the error was harmless; removal was justified by defendants' disruptive behavior. During trial, the court repeatedly asked whether they were willing to attend; they refused to communicate with attorneys and did not watch the live video feed. The defendants knowingly waived their right to be present. The court also rejected challenges to admission of certain eyewitness testimony; to jury instructions on aiding and abetting and defining "pattern of activity;" to the judge's decision to give a Pinkerton instruction at the penalty phase, but not the guilt phase; to provision of partial transcripts to the jury; and to the impartiality of two jurors.

Plaintiff suffered a heart attack when police searched her apartment and arrested her during a drug raid. She claims that police unreasonably seized her by denying a request for aspirin and refusing to call an ambulance and conducted an unreasonable search by not giving her sufficient time to respond when they knocked and announced, but used a battering ram after 15 seconds. The district court granted summary judgment on the aspirin claim, citing qualified immunity, reasoning that there was no clearly established right to over-the-counter drugs during arrest. After trial on the ambulance and entry claims, the court entered directed verdict for the village; the jury delivered a verdict for the officer. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the aspirin and ambulance issues should have been treated as a single claim, but that the error was harmless. The request for aspirin was inconsequential, given that police called an ambulance promptly when notified that plaintiff was suffering chest pains. Without the aspirin claim, plaintiff had no evidence linking a municipal policy or custom to any constitutional violation. The judge acted within her discretion in barring expert testimony about the 15-second wait and testimony that a reasonable police officer would call an ambulance.

In 1997 petitioner shot and killed four men; he was sentenced to death. The Indiana Supreme Court vacated the sentence. On remand the court reimposed the death sentence; the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed. Petitioner waived state post-conviction relief after the court found him competent to forego further challenges to his sentence; the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed. He changed his mind. The trial court dismissed a petition for post-conviction relief as untimely; the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed. The federal district court granted habeas relief, holding that the prosecutor violated the Sixth Amendment by offering to forego the death penalty if petitioner would waive a jury trial, and ordered resentencing. The Seventh Circuit reversed without considering petitioner's additional claims. The U.S. Supreme Court twice vacated the Seventh Circuit's decisions. On remand, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district courtâs judgment granting habeas relief on the basis of the claimed Sixth Amendment violation; affirmed that Indiana courts did not mishandle the issue of competence to waive post-conviction remedies; and remanded for consideration of remaining grounds for habeas relief.

Plaintiff was convicted of sexual assault and sentenced to three consecutive 30-year terms to begin after a 28-year sentence for an unrelated conviction. Five years later, DNA testing revealed a match to plaintiff's uncle. Plaintiff's conviction was vacated. He sued the city and two officers, alleging malicious prosecution and due process violations (Brady v. Maryland) under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court entered summary judgment for the city. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. There was ample probable cause to commence proceedings against plaintiff, apart from the victim's identification: shoe prints in snow leading from the crime scene to plaintiffâs residence; wet shoes in the house; no other male present when police arrived; plaintiff behind the residence holding jeans that matched the victim's description; plaintiff's wallet in those jeans; and an alibi that did not check out. Plaintiff had no evidence of malice and the officers enjoy state-law immunity, because there was no willful and wanton conduct. Even if police failed to disclose "pressure" they put on the victim to identify plaintiff during a "show-up," there is no evidence that they coerced her to lie; it is unlikely that the result would have been different if the pressure had been disclosed.