Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, employed by the department of public works since 1972, publicly criticized the city's decision to purchase a certain brand of tractor and indicated that board members were influenced to purchase the more-expensive tractors by having been taken on an expenses-paid visit to the company's plant. A letter was published in the local paper and the board ultimately changed its decision. After the debate, the plaintiff's subordinates were promoted over him and his applications for promotion were denied. The district court rejected First Amendment retaliation claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the plaintiff made his public comments in the context of performing his job. When public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.

The defendant entered a plea of guilty to bank robbery charges in 2003 and was sentenced to 170 months as a career criminal because of two prior escape convictions under Wisconsin law involving failure to return to custody. The district court denied a motion to vacate the sentence, holding that decisions by the Supreme Court in 2008 and 2009 did not apply retroactively to a petition for collateral relief. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that sentencing as a career criminal was improper and violated the defendant's due process rights. The predicate offenses did not constitute crimes of violence and the designation deprived the defendant of a protected liberty interest. The Supreme Court decisions were not just a change in the law, but addressed the fundamental legality of the sentence.

In 2008 the Supreme Court held that a federal enclaveâs ban on operable handguns in the home violates the Second Amendment. At the time, Chicago and Oak Park had ordinances similar to the one invalidated. The plaintiffs challenged those laws, and, in 2010, the Supreme Court reversed the district court and the Seventh Circuit and held that the Second Amendment applies to states and municipalities as a matter of due process. The municipalities repealed their ordinances within days and the district court dismissed the suit and held that the plaintiffs were not prevailing parties for purposes of attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. Plaintiffs achieved a decision that alters the legal relationship between the parties. Although the district court never entered judgment in their favor, the Supreme Court decision gave the plaintiffs "everything they needed."

The inmate, placed in the most restrictive disciplinary segment of the prison for 240 days due to misconduct in another segment, filed suit. On remand, after the Seventh Circuit held that the case did implicate a constitutional "liberty" interest, the inmate provided no evidence of how conditions in the disciplinary segment differ from conditions for the general population. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the inmate had the burden of proof in the civil proceedings.

The national organization, chartered by Congress (36 U.S.C. 80302), decided to reduce the number of local councils, which are, essentially, franchises. The plan called for dissolution of the plaintiff council and dividing its territory among other councils. The district court ruled in favor of the national organization, reasoning that to apply the Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law to the national organization would violate the organizationâs freedom of expression, guaranteed by the First Amendment. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. The fact that a law of general application might indirectly and unintentionally impede the organization's efforts to communicate its message is not enough to render the law inapplicable. The law, which forbids a franchisor to terminate or substantially change the competitive circumstances of a dealership agreement without good cause, applies to the nonprofit organization; the national organization "all but abandoned" its argument that it had good cause.

Following a shooting, an informant stated that he had seen defendant leave after being directed to get a weapon. Another confirmed telling defendant to get the weapon and seeing him with the weapon at some point. Another spoke about neighborhood talk about defendant's use of guns and seeing his car. A detective who planned the December 24 arrest did not get search warrants, because of time pressure and a belief that defendants would open the door. The detective told the on-scene officer that they had enough to get a warrant. Defendant answered the door and was arrested. Defendant's girlfriend told officers to get a warrant; the detective told her that they could get a warrant but that they believed there were guns in the house and that, if she cooperated, police would not destroy her house during the inevitable search. She gave verbal consent, but would not sign. Police found the guns. Following a remand the district court found that the threat to get a warrant was not pretextual and that the consent was voluntary. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The detective who planned the search had a reasonable factual basis for probable cause and took actions consistent with the mindset of someone who believed he could, if necessary, get a warrant.

At 3:30 a.m., a police officer observed the defendant walking on a sidewalk with a waistband bulge that resembled a gun. After he called the defendant over, the defendant passed newspaper stands and the bulge disappeared. The defendant gave a false name, resulting in a "no record found" report. Suspicious, the officer did a pat down and found a gun and ski mask; he then learned that there were warrants on the defendant. Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty as a felon in possession (18 U.S.C. 922(g)). The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of a motion to suppress, finding that the officer acted on reasonable suspicion.

The wife of a deceased coal miner argued that her claim for black lung benefits should be remanded to the administrative law judge (ALJ) because sect. 1556 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148 (2010) revived a presumption under the Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA), 30 U.S.C. 901, that was not available when the ALJ denied benefits. The presumption states that if a miner was employed for 15 years or more in underground coal mines and other evidence demonstrates the existence of a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment, there is a rebuttable presumption that such miner is totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis, that his death was due to pneumoconiosis, or that at the time of his death he was totally disabled by pneumoconiosis. The presumption did not apply to the miner's claim, filed in 2001. The Seventh Circuit remanded, rejecting the coal company's arguments concerning due, process, retroactive application and unconstitutional taking.

The defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court correctly conducted a "Batson" inquiry into the intent of the prosecution in using a peremptory challenge to strike an African-American potential juror. The government's assertions that the woman knew two potential witnesses; that her daughter's name was known to law enforcement; that she responded "not applicable" to a question on the juror questionnaire; and that she never looked the government attorneys in the eye included race-neutral justifications. Even if the court abused its discretion in allowing portions of an interview with a witness to be read into evidence, the error was harmless. The evidence was unnecessary to give the jury a complete view of the witnessâs testimony.

The defendant was outside his fenced yard when officers arrived to execute a warrant; a bystander yelled "police" and he ran. An officer used his taser and found a gun was found on the ground under the defendant. After accepting a conditional plea of guilty as felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. 922, 924), the defendant appealed denial of his motion to suppress. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the search was conducted pursuant to a valid warrant and that there was no need to address whether the defendant was within the curtilage of his home. The affidavit was based on statements from two informants, with whom the officer had worked in the past, that they had seen cocaine in the house; the officer personally observed activity consistent with drug trafficking. The execution was reasonable; there was no need to announce because the bystander had done so.