Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Mendoza convicted of drug conspiracy and other drug offenses, was sentenced to multiple terms of life imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Mendoza then petitioned for relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255, claiming that he was denied due process when the district court moved one of his Spanish-speaking interpreters from the defense table to interpret for a Spanish-speaking witness at trial and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to object to this interpreter arrangement and failing to translate discovery and adequately review it with him. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and took testimony from Mendoza, his trial counsel, and the three interpreters who participated in the trial, then denied the petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that none of the alleged errors changed the outcome of the trial. View "Mendoza v. United States" on Justia Law

A couple, driving through Madison, saw a man in a Jeep holding what appeared to be a handgun pointed at the ceiling of the Jeep. They called the police. Asked whether the driver was threatening anyone, the caller replied, “[N]o … we couldn’t tell if it was real.” She stated that the man had parked at Dexter’s Pub and that he had been driving “badly.” Officers Lomas, Chaney, and others arrived. As they approached the Jeep, Gibbs walked out of the bar. He matched a description that had been provided. Gibbs complied with instructions to put his hands on the wall. Lomas handcuffed Gibbs. Chaney frisked him. Gibbs stated that he was the driver of the Jeep. Lomas placed Gibbs in the squad car and explained that someone had seen him pointing a gun in the car. Gibbs stated that he had airsoft guns in his car and had been returning from an airsoft event where he had been a referee. Airsoft guns are replicas of firearms. Lomas claims that Gibbs consented to her looking in the Jeep. Gibbs testified that he had denied permission, but had offered to get the items for her. Lomas searched the Jeep and found airsoft guns and a plastic knife. The officers issued a misdemeanor citation for disorderly conduct, which was later dismissed. Gibbs sued Lomas under 42 U.S.C. 1983. He did not sue any of the other officers. The district court denied Lomas’s motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Even if Gibbs had a constitutional right to be free from this arrest and search, that right was not clearly established at the time of the incident. View "Gibbs v. Lomas" on Justia Law

Daoud, an 18-year-old American citizen, had an email conversation with undercover FBI employees posing as terrorists who responded to messages that he had posted online. Daoud planned “violent jihad” and discussed his interest in committing attacks in the U.S, using bomb-making instructions that he had read in Inspire magazine, an English-language organ of Al Qaeda, and online. Daoud selected a Chicago bar as the target of a bomb that the agent would supply. The agent told him the bomb would destroy the building and would kill “hundreds” of people. Daoud replied: “that’s the point.” On September 14, 2012, Daoud parked a Jeep containing the fake bomb in front of the bar. In an alley, in the presence of the agent, he tried to detonate the fake bomb and was arrested. In jail, he tried to solicit someone to murder the undercover agent with whom he had dealt. The government notified Daoud, under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C. 1801, that it intended to present evidence derived from electronic surveillance conducted under the Act. His attorney sought access to the classified materials submitted in support of the government’s FISA warrant applications. The government supplied a heavily redacted, unclassified response and a classified version, accessible only to the court with a statement that disclosure “would harm the national security.” The harm was detailed in a classified affidavit signed by the FBI’s Acting Assistant Director for Counterterrorism. The district judge ordered the materials sought by defense counsel turned over. In an interlocutory appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that in addition to having the requisite security clearance the seeker of such information must establish need to know. View "United States v. Daoud" on Justia Law

Petty was arrested on the suspicion that he, along with another person, shot and killed Counsel and wounded two others. Petty was identified as the shooter and was indicted for murder, but was found not guilty. After his acquittal, Petty filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the city and individual Chicago Police Department officers arguing that the officers violated his due process rights by intentionally mishandling the shooting investigation and prosecuting him for murder based on falsified evidence. Petty alleged that officers held a witness, Tarver, in a room for more than 13 hours without food, water, or access to a bathroom until he implicated him. He also alleged that they concealed evidence and failed to disclose their misconduct in violation of Brady v. Maryland. The district court rejected the claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that Petty was aware of the alleged misconduct before trial and had ample opportunity to make use of the information at trial. Petty’s “coerced evidence” claim was not cognizable under the Due Process Clause. Petty did not suffer a constitutional injury sufficient to support his claim that the city was liable for the officers’ conduct because it had a policy of detaining people believed to be witnesses for extended periods against their will. View "Petty v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

In 1971 Cannon was convicted of murder. He was paroled and was a general in the El Rukn street gang when he became involved in a second murder and was arrested by the Chicago Police Department’s Violent Crimes division. He was threatened and tortured until he confessed that he was driving the car in which the murder occurred. Immediately after leaving police custody, Cannon recanted his confession and complained to the Office of Professional Standards. The complaint was dismissed. Cannon's confession was used at his 1984 trial; he was convicted and sentenced to life in prison. In 1986, Cannon filed a federal complaint, asserting torture. By this time, there had been news reports of other incidents but it was not known that the abuse against African American men was pervasive and occurred with the complicity of then-commander Burge. In 1988, on his attorney’s advice, Cannon settled for the $3000 nuisance value offered by the defendants and signed a broad release of his claims. Cannon also appealed his conviction. By the time of a second remand, the judge who originally ruled on Cannon’s motion to suppress was caught accepting bribes and there was evidence that the officers who procured his confession regularly used torture. In 2001, Cannon agreed to plead guilty, without admitting guilt, to armed violence and conspiracy to commit murder, in exchange for a sentence of 40 years’ imprisonment. Ultimately, the state dismissed the 1983 murder charges solely because neither side anticipated the effect of the plea agreement on Cannon’s parole status for the 1971 conviction. By the time a court ordered a new hearing on that issue, Cannon had been in prison for 23 years for the 1983 murder. Cannon filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court dismissed, based on the release in the 1986 case. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, acknowledging that the case “casts a pall of shame” over the city, the officers, and the trial judge, but also on Cannon. Cannon settled knowing that the defendants were lying. There was no evidence that, at the time he settled, the purposefully concealed a broader scandal. View "Cannon v. Burge" on Justia Law

Defendant sold crack cocaine to his nephew, who was a paid DEA informant and who recorded the transaction and turned over 22 grams of crack purchased with $1250 of DEA money. Based on the recording, agents obtained a warrant, had the nephew execute another controlled buy, then search the house and found large quantities of drugs. Defendant acknowledged ownership of the drugs. The nephew later signed an affidavit and recorded a video, swearing that he had obtained the crack on the night of the search not from defendant, but from someone outside the house, and that he had lied in stating that defendant was a drug dealer. The nephew left the state and refused to cooperate. No party sought a material witness warrant. The judge rejected the recantation as hearsay. Convicted of possession of at least 280 grams of crack cocaine with intent to distribute, defendant was sentenced to 288 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that defendant’s statement about ownership should have been excluded because he had not received his Miranda warnings; that showing the videotape of the second buy to the jury, in the absence of the nephew, violated defendant’s constitutional right to confront witnesses against him; and of ineffective assistance. View "United States v. Wallace" on Justia Law

DEA task force members went to Beltran’s two-unit residence. Ramirez came to the front porch. He did not speak English well but had the building owner (Beltran) on the phone; he gave the phone to an agent. Beltran indicated that it would take him an hour to get home. Beltran and Ramirez agreed to a search if the officers waited until Beltran arrived. Ramirez remained on the porch with the officers. Ramirez placed several calls (speaking in Spanish). He appeared nervous. Ramirez said that there was no one in the building, but officers heard sounds of human movement. In garbage cans, outside of a fence and marked for Beltran’s building, an officer discovered packaging that looked like it had been used to wrap “bricks” of narcotics. Posted behind the residence, an officer saw Beltran emerge through the back door, stopped and frisked him, felt something in Beltran’s pocket, and confirmed that it was substantial cash. Beltran withdrew his consent for a search. A Spanish-speaking agent obtained Ramirez's consent to search. In the Ramirez apartment they found bins containing more than a million dollars, packaging material like in the garbage cans, nine kilograms of heroin, a loaded gun, and other items consistent with narcotics trafficking. Beltran stated that he would cooperate and agreed to a search, which produced a shotgun, scales, a heat sealer, drug-cutting agents, packaging material, and baggies. A drug-sniffing dog alerted to the baggies. A dryer on the second floor landing contained another large stash of money and three kilograms of cocaine. Beltran claimed that his consent was the product of coercion, as he was handcuffed. The district court denied his motion to suppress. He was convicted of possessing and conspiring to possess, with the intent to distribute, 500 grams or more of cocaine and one kilogram or more of heroin, 26 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846 and sentenced to 168 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "United States v. Beltran" on Justia Law

Campbell worked at the Forest Preserve District’s Cermak Family Aquatic Center. In 2010, a security camera recorded him having sex with a coworker in the center’s office. Weeks later, the FPD fired him. Nearly two and a half years later, Campbell sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1981, alleging that he was denied progressive discipline in violation of his right to due process; that he was fired because of his race in violation of his right to equal protection of the law; and that his termination violated that statute’s prohibition on racial discrimination in making and enforcing contracts. Campbell later conceded that his section 1983 claims were time‐barred. The district court dismissed, finding that section 1983 provides the exclusive remedy for violations of section 1981 committed by state actors. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 section 1981 provides a remedy against state actors independent of section 1983 and that if we were to allow his claim to proceed directly under section 1981, it would be timely because it would be governed by 28 U.S.C. 1658’s four‐year statute of limitations, rather than the two‐year statute of limitations governing section 1983 claims in Illinois. View "Campbell v. Forest Pres. Dist. of Cook Cnty." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged Wisconsin’s campaign-finance law in light of the Supreme Court decision, Citizens United (2010), alleging that laws concerning groups that spend money for political speech independently of candidates and parties are vague and overbroad and unjustifiably burden the free-speech rights of independent political speakers in violation of the First Amendment. The Seventh Circuit previously invalidated section 11.26(4), which capped at $10,000 the aggregate annual amount a donor could give to state and local candidates, political parties, and political committees. Remaining claims challenge a ban on political spending by corporations, interlocking definitions that determine “political committee” status, “noncoordination” oath and disclaimer requirements for independent political messages, among other provisions. The district court enjoined the ban on corporate political spending, partially enjoined a regulatory disclaimer rule, and denied an injunction on other challenges. The Seventh Circuit vacated with instructions to enter a new injunction to conform to the specificity requirements of FRCP Rule 65(d). On the merits, the court stated that the First Amendment requires a heightened degree of regulatory clarity and close fit between the government’s means and its end; some forms of regulation are categorically impermissible. Wisconsin Statutes Chapter 11 has not been updated to reflect new Supreme Court doctrine; administrative rules do not cohere with the statutes and the state elections agency has given conflicting signals about its intent to enforce some provisions. Certain provisions (the ban on corporate political spending and the cap on the amount a corporation may spend to raise money for an affiliated PAC) are obviously unconstitutional under Citizens. Others fail First Amendment standards as applied to independent political speakers. Some provisions are valid. View "WI Right to Life, Inc. v. Barland" on Justia Law

Avila pleaded guilty in Wisconsin state court repeated sexual assault of an eight-year-old child, producing child pornography and 16 counts of possessing child pornography and was sentenced to 35 years in prison. Avila’s appellate counsel identified only frivolous grounds for appeal and submitted a no-merit report to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals. Avila responded that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney told him that if he pleaded guilty, he would receive just five years of imprisonment and 10 years of supervision. Avila said he was never informed of the true severity of the sentence he faced and he would have refused to plead guilty on those terms. The state appellate court rejected the claims as waived by his guilty pleas. The federal district court denied Avila’s habeas petition and denied him a certificate of appealability. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the state court applied a rule of law directly contrary to controlling precedent of the Supreme Court (Williams v. Taylor (2000)). The general rule that a guilty plea waives the right to appeal is subject to an exception for ineffective assistance in deciding to enter the plea. View "Avila v. Pugh" on Justia Law