Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Hernandez picked up a red bag in an alley. Chicago Officers Varchetto and Pierri, patrolling in an unmarked car, saw him pick up the bag and run up the alley. He saw the officers and dropped the bag. As the officers approached, he volunteered, “I just have some dope.” Hernandez handed a key holder to Varchetto, who found five small bags of heroin inside. The officers arrested Hernandez. Pierri asked him what was in the red bag. Hernandez replied that he had “ripped the guys around the corner for dope and a gun.” Pierri opened the bag and found a loaded gun, 61 small bags of crack cocaine, and 55 small bags of marijuana. The officers then gave Hernandez Miranda warnings and took him to the station. During the ride, without prompting, Hernandez volunteered that he had received fake drugs from the owners of the red bag and was beaten when he complained; taking it was retaliation. At the station, Hernandez was again given Miranda warnings. He repeated his story with more detail. Hernandez unsuccessfully moved to suppress his post-Miranda confession on the ground that it was a product of having confessed during a pre-Miranda interrogation. He was convicted of possessing a gun as a felon. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the single question asked before Hernandez was given Miranda warnings falls within the “public safety” exception to Miranda.View "United States v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

After drinking vodka, Ford rode with Grace to Ford’s home. The men passed 15-year-old Hodge, sitting next door. Ford and Hodge greeted each other. Inside Ford’s house, Ford said, “I can’t stand that mother fucker. I’ll be back.” Ford left the house; Grace soon heard a popping sound. He looked out and saw Hodge lying in the street. Ford came inside and said, “I got to get the fuck out of here … meet me … and pick me up.” Grace located a police officer and led him to the crime scene. Hodge, shot in the back of his head, died the next day. Gary Police Officer Quasney immediately spoke with witness Simmons, who stated that he had seen the victim talking to a black male in a black hooded sweatshirt, who shot Hodge. At a second trial, following a mistrial, Simmons was unavailable. The trial court denied the state’s request for admission of prior testimony, but admitted Quasney’s testimony recounting Simmons’s statements under the excited utterance exception. During closing arguments, Ford’s attorney argued that the state had failed to explain why Ford would shoot Hodge. In response, the prosecutor asserted that motive could not be known because the victim was dead and “If that person who committed the offense don’t talk, how would we ever know?” Convicted, Ford was sentenced to 50 years. Direct appeals and petitions for state post-conviction relief were unsuccessful. The federal district court dismissed his habeas corpus petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object when the prosecutor commented on his failure to testify. Even assuming that an objection would have been sustained, Ford failed to show prejudice.View "Ford v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Olson shared a cell with Russell for about a week in 2007. Olson approached Sergeant Schneider and stated: “[M]y celly, Russell, has twice tried to swing off on me and I want him moved … I fear he’s gonna try to do it again … he isn’t taking his meds and hears voices that tell him to attack people.” Schneider asked other officers about Russell, but nobody had heard of any problems or of any issues with Russell’s medication. Schneider asked the officer supervising distribution to be sure Russell took his medication. The next evening Russell attacked Olson, damaging one of Olson’s teeth. The nurse on duty recommended that the tooth be pulled, but about a month passed before Olson saw a dentist. Olson filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 lawsuit, alleging deliberate indifference to the risk of an attack by Russell and to his dental needs. The district court declined to appoint counsel, finding that Olson was a competent pro se litigant and that his claims were not complex, and ultimately granted summary judgment against Olson on all counts. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that there was no evidence that Schneider was subjectively aware that Russell was dangerous or that the staff failed to act promptly once aware of Olson’s serious medical needs.View "Olson v. Morgan" on Justia Law

Lee was convicted of first-degree reckless homicide plus two counts of armed robbery, based on evidence that he and Thomas traveled to Meyers’s residence in Oshkosh, to collect a drug debt. Four people were present when they arrived: Meyers’s half-brother Johnston, Meyers’s friend Paez and her two-year-old daughter, and Meyers. A fight broke out; Lee pulled a gun and fatally shot Meyers in the abdomen. Lee and Thomas left the apartment and drove to Milwaukee where they met with Johnson. Johnson drove them to a gas station and then dropped Lee off at a street corner. Shortly thereafter, Johnson and Thomas were pulled over by Milwaukee police and arrested. Lee was apprehended in Chicago a month later. Lee’s conviction was affirmed by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals. State courts denied post-conviction relief. The federal district court denied habeas corpus relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that an in-court identification of Lee violated his rights to due process and that admission of an out-of-court statement at trial violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses. An adequate and independent state ground precluded consideration of Lee’s claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. View "Lee v. Baenen" on Justia Law

Candidates for Chicago mayor, city treasurer, or city clerk must submit signatures from 12,500 “legal voters of the city” to have their name printed on the ballot, 65 ILCS 20/21-28(b). This number is just under 1% of the 1.3 million registered Chicago voters. As a proportion of active voters, the number is higher. Candidates are advised to allow some margin for error, in case of challenges. They have 90 days in which to gather signatures. Voters may not sign more than one nominating petition for the same office in a single election cycle. Chicago’s most recent general election took place in February 2011; 20 candidates submitted petitions to run for mayor, including four of the plaintiffs. Only Walls gathered enough signatures to appear on the ballot. The plaintiffs challenged the 12,500-signature requirement. The district court denied their motion for a preliminary injunction. While an interlocutory appeal was pending Rahm Emanuel was elected mayor. Walls came in sixth. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot. The plaintiffs amended their complaint to also challenge the 90-day limitation and the rule that a voter cannot sign more than one candidate’s petition in any election cycle. The district court concluded that their claims had been “soundly rejected by extensive Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit precedent” and dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Stone v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs for the City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Chicago police officers arrested Venson for possession of a controlled substance and solicitation of an unlawful act, and he spent 19 days in jail. After a preliminary hearing resulted in the dismissal of charges for want of probable cause, Venson sued the officers involved in his arrest for false arrest, illegal search, and malicious prosecution pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983. The parties had differing accounts of the events that resulted in the arrest, which apparently involved someone in the vicinity yelling “rocks.” A jury found in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. “This was a swearing contest, and nothing precluded the jury from crediting the defendants’ account of what occurred.” View "Venson v. Altamirano" on Justia Law

Wisconsin’s Act 10 significantly changed Wisconsin public‐sector labor law: it prohibited government employers from collectively bargaining with their general employees (not public safety employees) over anything except base wages and precluded general‐employee unions from using automatic payroll deductions and fair‐share agreements. Act 10 mandated that general‐employee unions submit to a recertification election every year (instead of remaining certified indefinitely) and certification requires affirmative votes from an absolute majority of the bargaining unit, not just those voting. Public‐employee unions and an individual union member sued, claiming that these changes infringe their First Amendment petition and association rights and deny union members the equal protection of the laws. The district court rejected the challenges. The Seventh Circuit, having previously held that Act 10’s prohibition on payroll deductions did not violate the First Amendment and that Act 10’s distinction between public safety and general employees was viewpoint‐neutral, affirmed. The court concluded that the law does not implicate the First Amendment and applied rational basis review. Its limitations on the scope of statutory collective bargaining are rationally related to a legitimate government interest: promoting flexibility in state and local government budgets by providing public employers more leverage in negotiations. View "Laborers Local 236, AFLO-CIO v. Walker" on Justia Law

In 1998 Ambrose was charged with predatory criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12-14.1(a)(1)), based on his alleged sexual penetration of his five-year-old daughter and her friend. In 1999, the state successfully sought civil commitment of Ambrose under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act, 725 ILCS 205/0.01-205/12, which allows for the indefinite commitment of a person who had not yet been convicted of a sexual offense by establishing that the person has a mental disorder that renders him sexually dangerous. Ambrose sought release by filing a recovery application in 2005. The state court denied that application in 2008. Ambrose filed a federal petition for habeas relief in 2010, alleging that his due process rights were violated when, at the hearing on his recovery application, evidence was admitted of allegations of abuse made against him in Arizona and Indiana, and that the ruling compromised his right to a fundamentally fair trial. The district court denied relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Given that Ambrose failed to acknowledge the history that formed the basis for the commitment, and refused to participate in treatment for that disorder, there was no basis to conclude that, absent the reference to the out-of-state abuse allegations, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. View "Ambrose v. Roeckeman" on Justia Law

South Bend police responded to a report that Davis was being held against her will at the Henderson house. Winfield showed Sergeant Wolff text messages from Davis. Wolff confirmed that the woman sending the texts was in Henderson’s house, called the SWAT team, and set up a perimeter of officers and spotlights. Winfield got a text: “he’s got the door bolted, I can’t get out.” The officers did not attempt direct contact, but set up a loudspeaker and demanded that Henderson exit the house. Several minutes later, Davis came out and stated that all the exits had keyed deadbolts and the keys were in Henderson’s possession and that Henderson threatened her with a handgun. About 30 minutes later, Henderson voluntarily left the house, locking the door behind him. Officers did not find any weapons in his possession. Unable to unlock the door, officers forced entry and conducted a five-minute protective sweep. They did not find anyone else in the house, but saw remnants of a marijuana growing operation and firearms in plain view. Police then obtained a warrant and found crack cocaine, powder cocaine, marijuana, and five firearms. Charged as a drug user in possession of firearms, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(3), Henderson unsuccessfully moved to suppress the firearms. Convicted, he was sentenced to 39 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Henderson" on Justia Law

Bryn Mawr Chicago nursing home, a Medicaid provider, is subject to Illinois Department of Public Health (IDPH) inspections. In 2010, IDPH inspected the facility following allegations that a resident had been sexually assaulted. Bryn Mawr was eventually cited for three deficiencies, 42 C.F.R. 488.301, two based on sexual abuse and one based on failure to sufficiently monitor a resident. Bryn Mawr challenged the findings by Informal Dispute Resolution, which involved exchange of written information without a live hearing. IDPH simultaneously conducted internal review and found that the deficiencies based on allegations of sexual abuse were not sufficiently supported by credible evidence, but the third party upheld the deficiency findings. Ultimately IDPH maintained the deficiency findings. Meanwhile, Bryn Mawr also engaged in a parallel process to “correct” deficiencies. At the follow-up inspection, IDPH determined that the deficiencies had been corrected, so that remedies would not be imposed. IDPH passed the deficiency findings on to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, which published them on its website and factored them into its 5-Star Rating System. Bryn Mawr’s rating was supposed to fall from five to four stars because of the deficiencies, but CMS mistakenly reduced it to two stars. Regardless of a partial correction, Bryn Mawr was displeased that it had not had the opportunity to challenge the findings at a hearing and sued to compel a hearing. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Bryn Mawr Care, Inc. v. Sebelius" on Justia Law