Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Davis, in prison following a guilty plea, sought federal collateral relief more than a year had expired, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d) had expired. He claimed equitable tolling, asserting that his mental limitations excused untimely filing. A magistrate judge found that ability to make such a motion indicated mental competence. The Seventh Circuit vacated, referring to “Catch 22” reasoning and noting that someone else may have drafted and mailed the motion. Davis claimed that a fellow prisoner had done so. Mental incompetence can support tolling of federal statutes of limitations; the likelihood that mentally marginal prisoners will lack the assistance of guardians or lawyers means that, for them, such tolling is especially important. Something more than general inability to cope with legal matters is required, such as inability to understand the charges and assist in one’s own defense. The court declined to limit the range of possibilities, but noted that a report prepared by Wisconsin’s prison system concluded that he has an IQ of 49, is illiterate and uneducable, and cannot cope with any legal subject. The court remanded to allow the district court can take evidence and determine Davis’s abilities. View "Davis v. Foster" on Justia Law

Carmody worked for the University of Illinois for 25 years until he was fired for reasons involving a security breach of the university’s email system. The breach was connected to a state court lawsuit Carmody was pursuing against a university professor, alleging that the professor had assaulted him. Carmody says that he discovered several printed emails, contradicting affidavits filed in the case, in the newspaper box outside his home. Carmody gave the emails to his lawyer. After unsuccessfully appealing his discharge, Carmody filed, claiming violations of the Due Process Clause and an Illinois statute designed to protect whistle-blowers. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, stating that Carmody has plausibly alleged that his pre-termination opportunity to be heard was meaningless because he could not answer the university’s crucial questions or respond to its accusations without violating a state court order that required him not to discuss the subject. The university fired Carmody on the same day the state court modified its order to allow him to respond to the charges. Carmody also alleged that he was actually fired based in part on a charge for which he had no prior notice and opportunity to be heard. View "Carmody v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of IL" on Justia Law

The major political parties in Marion County, Indiana followed a tradition of “slating” candidates that have the financial and organizational backing of party leadership in the primaries. Indiana enacted an “anti-slating” statute, prohibiting distribution of a list endorsing multiple political candidates during a primary election unless all such candidates have given written consent, Ind. Code 3-14-1-2(a). More than 10 years ago, that law was challenged as violating the First Amendment, resulting in a federal injunction against its future enforcement and a consent decree in which all parties stipulated and the court declared that the law was facially unconstitutional. The Marion County Election Board was a defendant, but nonetheless enforced the statute against a candidate running for state representative in the 2012 primary. That candidate sought an injunction. The district court dismissed the case under the “Younger” abstention doctrine, citing a still-ongoing Election Board investigation. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The Election Board’s investigation is too preliminary a proceeding to warrant Younger abstention, at least in light of the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision, Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs. Even if Younger abstention were theoretically available, the previous final federal judgment against the Election Board would amount to an extraordinary circumstance making Younger abstention inappropriate. View "Mulholland v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd." on Justia Law

Thomas, an Indiana prisoner, sued prison officials and medical personnel at the Pendleton Correctional Facility under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for deliberate indifference to his epilepsy in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court dismissed without prejudice because Thomas did not pay the initial partial filing fee of $8.40, assessed under 28 U.S.C. 1915(b)(1) in response to his motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Thomas claimed that when his payment came due he had no money or income, and that any money he does receive is immediately and automatically deducted by the prison to pay for debts he incurred by printing copies of his complaint. The judge did not respond to Thomas’s letter, but later allowed an appeal. After determining that it had jurisdiction, the Seventh Circuit vacated the dismissal because the judge dismissed the suit without determining if Thomas was at fault for not paying. View "Thomas v. Butts" on Justia Law

In 2008, Shields, an Illinois prisoner was lifting weights and ruptured the pectoralis tendon in his left shoulder. Although he received some medical attention, he did not receive the prompt surgery needed for effective treatment. Due to oversights and delays by those responsible for his medical care, too much time passed for surgery to do any good. He has serious and permanent impairment that could have been avoided. After his release from prison, Shields filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that several defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs and violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that Shields was the victim not of any one person’s deliberate indifference, but of a system of medical care that diffused responsibility for his care to the point that no single individual was responsible for seeing that he timely received the care he needed. As a result, no one person can be held liable for any constitutional violation. Shields’ efforts to rely on state medical malpractice law against certain private defendants also failed. View "Shields v. IL Dep't of Corrs." on Justia Law

In 1984, Richardson was convicted of armed robbery and murder. A Chicago Police Department firearms examiner testified that rounds fired at the scenes of two 1980 Chicago shootings came from the same gun, and eyewitnesses from both scenes identified Richardson as the gunman. The court sentenced Richardson to death. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed without addressing any jury selection issues, although the U.S. Supreme Court had decided Batson in the interim. In post-conviction proceedings, the state lower court found that Richardson had not made out a prima facie case of discriminatory jury selection and that counsel was not ineffective. The Illinois Supreme Court found that Richardson had waived the Batson claim. After a remand, the federal district court granted habeas corpus on the Batson claim. “Other crimes evidence” and ineffective-assistance claims were denied. The Seventh Circuit reversed with respect to the state’s use of peremptory strikes, finding the claim had been waived. Richardson’s judge conducted voir dire and did not allow the parties to question members of the venire. The judge excused, for cause, 24 of 61 persons questioned. Richardson used 20 peremptory challenges. The state used 16. Richardson did not object to the prosecution’s use of peremptories. The court affirmed rejection of the ineffective assistance claim.View "Richardson v. Hardy" on Justia Law

Snyder was involved in a fistfight with another town council member. He was convicted of battery. The court imposed a sentence of six months suspended and six months of home detention, but later determined that Snyder had violated probation. Snyder served the remainder of his sentence at the county jail. While Snyder was incarcerated, the County Voter Registration Board informed him that his voter registration had been cancelled under Ind. Code 3-7-46. Snyder knew that Indiana law permits him to reregister to vote at any time following release from jail. Snyder refused to re-register. He was turned away from voting in a special election. He sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of the National Voter Registration Act, 42 U.S.C. 1973gg; the Help America Vote Act, 42 U.S.C. 15301; the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1971; and the U.S. and Indiana Constitutions. On certification, the Indiana Supreme Court held that the Indiana Constitution authorized temporary disenfranchisement of any incarcerated convict. The district court dismissed the state defendants on sovereign immunity grounds; held that a county cannot be held liable under Section 1983 for acts done under state or federal law; and held that claims to enjoin de-registration or require reinstatement were not justiciable. Despite all parties arguing to the contrary, the Seventh Circuit found the case moot. Snyder waived any challenge to dismissal of the state defendants and failed to state a Monell claim against the county defendants. View "Snyder v. King" on Justia Law

While at Big Muddy, inmate Roberts broke his hand in a fight. He claims that he received inadequate treatment and that he filed an “emergency” grievance and received no response. Defendants claim there was no grievance. He was transferred to Pinckneyville. He says he told the receiving officer (Alvis) that Big Muddy staff had authorized him to be assigned to the bottom bunk, but that Alvis said to work it out with his cellmate. He claims to have filed a grievance, but Pinckneyville officials deny receiving it. The district court dismissed his pro se 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part. Roberts forfeited claims against Alvis; his grievance neither mentioned a name nor provided information that should have identified Alvis. Dismissal of the hand-injury claim was too abrupt, absent inquiry into what Roberts could reasonably know about how to proceed against a prison employee in a different prison through the Administrative Review Board, but that grievance was also defective. Regarding other Big Muddy defendants, it was unclear whether Roberts’s emergency grievance, which would bypass normal procedures, was in records that were searched, so the untimely filing with the Review Board is irrelevant. If the defendants want to contest whether the grievance was filed, an evidentiary hearing will be necessary. View "Roberts v. Neal" on Justia Law

Deputy Stanley pulled over Hille for an expired vehicle registration sticker. The Secretary of State’s record was different than the date on the sticker. Stanley was unable to resolve the discrepancy at that time and let Hille go. The Secretary of State’s office later notified her that the sticker was stolen. Possession of a stolen sticker is a felony in Illinois. Stanley proceeded to Hille’s registered address to arrest her, arranging for Deputy Morrison to meet her there. The deputies knocked on the door. Iit was answered by White, Hille’s boyfriend, who owned and lived in the house. White refused to allow them entry without a warrant. Stanley and Morrison claim to have smelled burning marijuana from inside the house. Hille had been smoking marijuana and was later found in the house with a half‐burned joint. White attempted to close the door and retreated into the house and up the stairs. Stanley blocked the door. The deputies tackled him on the stairs. Morrison forced White’s arm behind his back and told White to stop resisting. White claims to have suffered a shoulder injury. The deputies arrested White for resisting or obstructing a peace officer, a charge later dismissed. White filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit, claiming false arrest and excessive force. The court found that there was no exigency and that the deputies were not entitled to qualified immunity because they violated a clearly established right. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting “fractured case law” concerning entry after smelling marijuana. View "White v. Stanley" on Justia Law

Huff was driving and Seaton was the passenger in a car with Ohio license plates that was stopped in Illinois, as recorded by Officer Reichert’s dashboard camera. Huff provided his driver’s license, insurance, and registration. Reichert explained that Huff crossed the center line without using a signal and then moved back into his own lane. Dispatch related that Huff had been arrested for battery and for marijuana cultivation in 2001, but had no convictions. Seaton had no criminal history. Reichert requested backup, but told Huff that he was letting him go with a warning. Seaton seemed nervous, so Reichert then asked if Huff objected to a search. Huff replied that he would “like to go.” Reichert said that he wanted to walk his drug‐sniffing dog around the car. Huff asked Reichert if he was free to go. Reichert responded, “not in the car.” Huff stated that he felt he had no choice but to consent and that Reichert could use the dog but could not search the car. Reichert repeatedly said, “show me! Find it!” The dog barked. Reichert replied, repeatedly, “good boy!” Reichert later admitted that he was trained not to say these things to his dog. Reichert told Huff that he was going to search his car. Huff responded, “do what you gotta do.” Reichert searched the car, but did not document the presence of drugs nor collect any evidence. About 50 minutes after the stop Reichert told them that they were free to leave. In their suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the court denied Reichert’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Huff v. Reichert" on Justia Law