Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

CEF, a local chapter of an international non-profit organization that conducted weekly "good news clubs" (GNC) for children, appealed the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction against the district. Due to concerns about the "prayer and proselytizing," which occurred at GNC meetings, CEF was informed that it would be removed from the district's after-school enrichment program effective in the 2009-2010 school year. The court held that the district court abused its discretion in denying the preliminary injunction. CEF had a high likelihood of success on the merits of its First Amendment claim. The likely First Amendment violation further meant that the public interest and the balance of harms (including irreparable harm to CEF) favored granting the injunction. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff and his wife brought this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that a city police officer employed excessive force when he shot plaintiff eight times. The court held that the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the officer on plaintiff's 1983 claim where the officer acted objectively reasonable under the circumstances. The district court ruled that if plaintiff sought to hold the city liable for the officer's alleged state-law torts, then the officer was entitled to official immunity, and the city was thus entitled to vicarious official immunity. The court agreed with this conclusion and affirmed the judgment.

TYBE, a daycare center in St. Louis, Missouri, sued the Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services (DHS), alleging federal civil rights and state law violations because DHS denied TYBE's license renewal request. On appeal, TYBE challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment on its due process claims and its state-law tortious interference claim. The court held that TYBE had not demonstrated that it had a clearly established property interest in renewal of its license and therefore defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. The court also held that, if TYBE had a legitimate claim of entitlement to operate during the revocation review period, this right was not clearly established, and any injury to TYBE's reputation, by itself, would not trigger any protectable liberty interest. Therefore, defendants were entitled to qualified immunity regarding the challenged statements. The court rejected TYBE's claims that defendants deprived it of due process by failing to make an initial settlement offer to TYBE in conjunction with the license denial review proceedings. The court further held that TYBE was not deprived of any due process rights by a DHS employee's motion to dismiss TYBE's complaint. Finally, TYBE's tortious interference claim failed as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Plaintiffs, the husband and uncle of decedent, filed suit against defendants alleging state law tort claims and violations of decedent's federal constitutional rights. The court held that the district court properly dismissed plaintiffs' malpractice claim for failure to comply with Minnesota Statutes section 145.682 and that the magistrate judge did not abuse her discretion in denying plaintiffs' motion to extend deadlines to serve expert affidavits. The court also held that the district court properly dismissed plaintiffs' Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2401(b), claim for lack of jurisdiction and that plaintiffs have not alleged error in the district court's determinations in regards to the dismissal of their 42 U.S.C. 1983 cause of action. The court affirmed the district court's order dismissing the Bivens action against Federal defendants and affirmed the district court's dismissal of the equal protection claim. Finally, the court rejected challenges to discovery and pretrial rulings.

Plaintiff, a Missouri inmate, moved for leave to proceed in forma pauperis in his appeal of the district court's dismissal of his civil rights action before service of process, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915A, for failure to state a claim. The court concluded that plaintiff was ineligible under the "three strikes" provision in section 1915(g) to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal and denied the motion.

Plaintiffs brought this action against defendants, social service employees, alleging that they violated 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law by recommending that custody of their son be granted to his grandparents. According to plaintiffs, this recommendation resulted in the untimely death of their son. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the state employees after concluding that they were entitled to qualified immunity on the federal claims and official immunity on the state claims.

Defendant pled guilty to two counts of wire fraud in connection with a mortgage fraud scheme. At sentencing, the district court calculated an advisory sentencing guidelines range of thirty-three to forty-one months' imprisonment based on a total offense level of twenty and a criminal history category of I. The district court sentenced Defendant to a term of thirty-three months' imprisonment, and Defendant appealed the sentence. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Defendant to thirty-three months' imprisonment, as the sentence was substantively reasonable and the district court did not commit significant procedural error.

Defendant pled guilty to production of child pornography for photographs she took of her daughters at ages six and two. The district court sentenced Defendant to 216 months, departing and varying downward from Defendant's guideline sentence of 360 months. Defendant challenged her sentence on appeal as substantively unreasonable. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the record demonstrated that the district court carefully considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors in light of the mitigating evidence presented and the gravity of the offense; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the sentence and that Defendant's sentence was not unreasonable.

In 1994, Defendant was convicted of sex crimes in Kentucky. When Defendant moved to North Dakota in 2008, he was required to register as a sex offender. Because Defendant did not have a residence for a short while, he did not properly register. North Dakota then filed a criminal complaint against Defendant, charging him with failure to comply with registration requirements. The trial court convicted Defendant as charged. Defendant appealed, arguing that the state district court erred in interpreting N.D. Cent. Code 12.1-32-15(7) as requiring him to register within three days even though he had not obtained an address. The Supreme Court affirmed. Defendant subsequently filed a petition for relief under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) in federal court that included an amended claim arguing he was denied due process of law by the state's attorney interpreting the statute to include persons who have no residence to register. The district court granted the certificate of appealability on the amended claim. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, under the AEDPA and Bouie v. City of Columbia, the state court's interpretation of its own statute was not an unforeseeable and retroactive expansion of statutory language.

Nicole Walker and Bart Hyde pled guilty to conspiring to manufacture and distribute methamphetamine. Defendants appealed their respective sentences, arguing that the district court clearly erred in calculating the drug quantity attributable to each of them. Hyde also argued that the district court erred in imposing an obstruction of justice enhancement and failed to reduce Hyde's sentence for acceptance of responsibility. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not rely on unreliable evidence or apply an overly broad definition of conspiracy; (2) the district court did not clearly err in determining Defendants distributed "ice" as defined in the Sentencing Guidelines; (3) the district court did not err in applying an obstruction of justice enhancement based on the court's determination that Defendant intentionally gave false testimony; and (4) the district court did not err in denying a reduction for acceptance of responsibility.