Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, disabled state prisoners and parolees, filed suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq., seeking disability accommodations. In these consolidated appeals, defendant challenged the scope of the district court's injunction in light of the amendments to California Penal Code 3056. The court concluded that the August 28 orders, which required California state officials to disseminate and implement a previously negotiated County Jail Plan for disabled persons and parolees, neither conflicted with section 3056 nor required more of defendants than was appropriate to assist in remedying the ADA and Rehabilitation Act violations for which they bear responsibility. Therefore, the court affirmed the remedial August 28 orders issued by the district court. Case No. 12-6018 was dismissed as moot and the court affirmed the district court's order in Case No. 12-17198. View "Armstrong v. Brown" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants seeking damages for his detention and treatment at Guantanamo Bay. At issue was whether the district court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action, given the jurisdiction-stripping provisions in 28 U.S.C. 2241(e). Looking to the plain language of section 2241(e)(2), it was clear that this provision applied to plaintiff's claims, and that, as a result, no court, justice, or judge had authority to hear his action. The court concluded that Boumediene v. Bush did not address section 2241(e)(2), let alone strike it down; because section 2241(e)(2) was capable of functioning independently, and was consistent with Congress's basic objectives in enacting the Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, the court concluded that it was severable from section 2241(e)(1), and remained in effect, provided that it was constitutional; and section 2241(e)(2) was not unconstitutional as applied to him. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's order dismissing plaintiff's claims and remanded. View "Hamad v. Gates, et al." on Justia Law

Loops, designer of a flexible toothbrush made for safe use in prisons, bid on a contract with the NYC-DOC. Amercare ultimately won the contract using a similar toothbrush. Amercare filed a defamation suit against Loops after Loops alleged that Amercare had engaged in procurement fraud. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by entertaining Washington's anti-SLAPP motion, Wash. Rev. Code 4.25.510; under section 4.25.510, Loops was immune for all statements made to government agencies; the statute of limitations barred claims regarding the product alteration and counterfeiting accusations; and Americare did not show a likelihood of satisfying the elements of defamation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Phoenix Trading, Inc. v. Loops LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff first applied for social security disability insurance (SSI) benefits ten years ago. When the benefits were denied, plaintiff requested a hearing but the SSA ruled that her request was untimely and denied a subsequent application on the ground of res judicata. The SSA never explained why it rejected plaintiff's facially valid excuse for the delay in her hearing request. The district court then dismissed her action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court reversed and remanded, concluding that the ALJ failed to consider whether plaintiff's facially valid reasons constituted good cause excusing the delay, and deprived plaintiff of her due process right to a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to seek reconsideration of an adverse benefits determination. View "Dexter v. Astrue" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, the crew of an Ecuadorian fishing boat, filed suit against the United States, alleging that the United States harmed plaintiffs and their property when the Coast Guard boarded the boat in search of drugs. The court held that, on the evidence submitted by the parties, reciprocity with Ecuador existed; the discretionary function exception applied generally to plaintiffs' claims because most of the actions by the Coast Guard were discretionary; the government could have violated its non-discretionary policy of paying damages to the owner of the boat; and to the extent that plaintiffs could establish that the United States violated that mandatory obligation, sovereign immunity did not bar this action. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Tobar v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former Arizona state prisoner, filed suit against defendants, alleging that they violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12131-12134, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (RA), 29 U.S.C. 794, by failing to reasonably accommodate his disability. Plaintiff picked tomatoes for Eurofresh as a part of a convict labor force. The court concluded that plaintiff's claims against Eurofresh were properly dismissed because plaintiff and Eurofresh were not in an employment relationship, and Eurofresh did not receive federal financial assistance. The court concluded, however, that judgment was improperly granted to the State Defendants where they were liable for disability discrimination committed by a contractor. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the district court to determine in the first instance whether such discrimination occurred. View "Castle v. Eurofresh, Inc." on Justia Law

After the Department denied Memorial's application for a Certificate of Need to perform elective percutaneous coronary interventions (PCIs), Memorial filed suit alleging that the PCI regulations were an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, and unreasonably discriminated against interstate commerce in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court concluded that the requirements did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause where the minimum procedure requirement did not burden interstate commerce and the minimum procedure requirement protected public safety. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of all of Memorial's remaining claims. View "Yakima Valley Mem'l Hosp. v. Dep't of Health" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the City's enactment of an ordinance which had the practical effect of prohibiting new group homes - i.e., homes in which recovering alcoholics and drug users live communally and mutually support each other's recovery - from opening in most residential zones. The court reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' disparate treatment claims; plaintiffs have created a triable fact that the ordinance was enacted in order to discriminate against them on the basis of disability, and that its enactment and enforcement harmed them; and the court reversed the district court's dismissal of all of plaintiffs' damages claims, except for its dismissal of Terri Bridgeman's claim for emotional distress. View "Pac. Shores Properties v. City of Newport Beach" on Justia Law

Rocky Mountain and American Fuels filed two separate actions against CARB, contending that the Low Carbon Fuel Standard, Cal. Code Regs. tit. 17, 95480-90, violated the dormant Commerce Clause and was preempted by Section 211(o) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7545(o), known as the federal Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS). The court held that the Fuel Standard's regulation of ethanol did not facially discriminate against out-of-state commerce, and its initial crude-oil provisions (2011 Provisions) did not discriminate against out-of-state crude oil in purpose or practical effect. The court also held that the Fuel Standard did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause's prohibition on extraterritorial regulation. The court vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded to the district court for further considerations under Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. View "Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey" on Justia Law

NRIC challenged the Sixth Northwest Power Plan (the Plan) that the Council adopted in May 2010. NRIC argued that the Plan failed to give due consideration for protection, mitigation, and enhancement of fish and wildlife as the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act (the Power Act), 16 U.S.C. 839-839h, required. The court concluded that the NRIC had not pointed to any part of the Power Act that required the Council to reconsider fish and wildlife measures in light of its evaluation of the regional power system from the subsequent power-planning process. Absent such a showing, the court would not second-guess the due consideration that the Council gave to fish and wildlife interests in the adoption of the Plan. Accordingly, the court affirmed the Plan with respect to NRIC's due-consideration challenge. The court remanded, however, the Plan to the Council for the limited purposes of (1) allowing public notice and comment on the proposed methodology for determining quantifiable environmental costs and benefits, and (2) reconsidering the inclusion in the Plan of the BPA's estimate of the 2009 Program's costs to hydrosystem operations. View "NW Res. Inf. Ctr. v. NW Power & Conserv. Council" on Justia Law