Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

I-TAP, an approved apprenticeship program for Federal purposes, but not recognized by California as a state-approved apprenticeship program, filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on the ground that the CDIR's actions were inconsistent with the National Apprenticeship Act of 1937 (Fitzgerald Act). The court concluded that federal subject-matter jurisdiction existed in this case; the court declined to afford controlling deference to the DOL's new interpretation of the meaning of "Federal purposes" under 29 C.F.R. 29.2 under Auer v. Robbins, but nevertheless adopted that interpretation as the most persuasive construction of the regulation at issue; the court adopted the DOL's new interpretation of Federal purposes, which required of agreements, contracts, etc., that conformity with federal apprenticeship standards be a condition for the federal assistance at issue; plaintiffs' preemption claim failed where the three projects at issue did not qualify as Federal purposes, and it was not impermissible for the CDIR to require the contractors on the projects to comply with California's apprenticeship standards; and plaintiffs' dormant Commerce Clause, equal protection, and substantive due process challenges failed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Indep. Training v. Cal. Dep't Indus. Relations" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is a former prison gang member and police informant. Defendants are producers of the documentary television series, "Gangland." Plaintiff filed suit for various claims alleging that defendants' failure to conceal his identity in an episode of "Gangland" endangered his life and cost him his job as an informant. On interlocutory appeal, defendants challenged the district court's denial of their anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) motion to strike the complaint under California Code of Civil Procedure 425.16. The court concluded that defendants have met their initial burden under the anti-SLAPP statute where defendants' acts in furtherance of their right of free speech were in connection with issues of public interest. The court also concluded that, at this juncture, plaintiff's claims were not barred by the release he signed. It follows that plaintiff's statements were not barred by the parole evidence rule. The court further concluded that plaintiff met his burden of showing a probability of prevailing on his claims for (1) public disclosure of private fact; (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (3) false promise; and (4) declaratory relief. Plaintiff failed to establish a reasonable probability of prevailing on his claims for (1) appropriation of likeness and (2) negligent infliction of emotional distress. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Doe v. Gangland Productions, Inc." on Justia Law

The Warden appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In this instance, petitioner filed his federal petition well over one year after his conviction became final. However, the Supreme Court has long recognized, under Schlup v. Delo, that in a "narrow class of cases... implicating a fundamental miscarriage of justice," federal courts could hear the merits of a habeas petition despite an otherwise applicable procedural bar. Petitioner contended, and the district court concluded, that his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim should be considered on the merits despite its untimeliness because he is innocent. The court concluded that it was simply implausible that McQuiggin v. Perkins would alter the district court's conclusions about the credibility of petitioner's evidence, because the district court already undertook the precise analysis that Perkins prescribes. Because the court concluded that petitioner met the demanding Schlup standard, the court must exercise the "equitable discretion" of habeas courts to see that federal constitutional errors did not result in the incarceration of innocent persons. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment, concluding that petitioner had made the requisite showing that he is actually innocent. View "Larsen v. Soto" on Justia Law

This case arose out of the handcuffing and removal from school of then eleven-year-old C.B. by Sonora Police officers. The district court rendered a verdict ostensibly in favor of defendants, but the district court concluded that the verdict was incomplete and inconsistent and directed them to re-deliberate. On appeal, the court concluded that the unscripted supplemental jury instructions, together with the problematic verdict form, gave the jury the misimpression that its initial answers to Questions 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8 were internally inconsistent and needed to be revised. The court also concluded that Officers McIntosh and Prock were entitled to qualified immunity with regard to plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 because the law was, and still is, not "clearly established" that handcuffing and driving a juvenile from school to a relative's place of business implicated Fourth Amendment rights. Accordingly, the court vacated the verdict and judgments, remanding for further proceedings. The district court was instructed to enter judgment as a matter of law in favor of individual defendants McIntosh and Prock as to the 1983 claims. The court did not address whether defendants were entitled to an offset of the amount paid in settlement by the school district and one of the school's teachers. View "C. B. v. City of Sonora, et al." on Justia Law

The Conservancy alleged that the United States was improperly diverting water from Icicle Creek, a tributary of the Wenatchee River, to the Leavenworth National Fish Hatchery and otherwise violating Washington state law. The court dismissed the action, concluding that the Conservancy lacked prudential standing to bring its claim that the Hatchery operation violated the Washington water code, and that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the Conservancy's other claims because they either did not challenge final agency action or rested on provisions of Washington law that were not incorporated into federal reclamation law. View "Wild Fish Conservancy v. Jewell" on Justia Law

After plaintiff was disciplined for serving process on defendant, a prison official, plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging unconstitutional retaliation. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendant. The court concluded that plaintiff's acknowledgment that the disciplinary report was not issued because of his other litigation activities compelled the conclusion that defendant was entitled to summary judgment on the retaliation claim to the extent it was based on prior lawsuits. The court also concluded that plaintiff did not engage in protected conduct when he served process on another inmate's behalf; the court rejected defendant's access-to-courts arguments; and concluded that the First Amendment did not protect plaintiff's attempted service of process on defendant because of the general incompatibility between prison and free association and because there was no evidence of expressive association. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Blaisdell v. Frappiea" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, four landlords, challenged the constitutionality of the City's Rent Escrow Account Program (REAP). The Housing Department places property into REAP when a landlord fails to repair habitability violations and tenants pay a reduced rent. The court concluded that placing plaintiffs' property into REAP did not violate plaintiffs' substantive due process rights where REAP served legitimate governmental goals and was rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose; plaintiffs' procedural challenge could not support an as-applied substantive due process claim; and denial of leave to amend the complaint was not an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint. View "Sylvia Landfield Trust v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned a dispute over attorney's fees related to a settlement of numerous civil rights lawsuits against the City and others. The court held that several important principles bear on the district court's determination of a reasonable fee amount: (1) the court must compute the fee award using an hourly rate that is based on the "prevailing market rates in the relevant community;" (2) when a district court reduces either the number of hours or the lodestar by a certain percentage greater than 10%, it must provide a clear and concise explanation for why it chose the specific percentage to apply; and (3) it was not per se unreasonable for the prevailing party in a civil rights case to be awarded an amount of attorney's fees that exceeds the amount of money recovered by his or her client. In this instance, the court vacated and remanded because the district court did not apply these principles when determining the amount of plaintiffs' attorney's fee award. View "Gonzalez v. City of Maywood" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, former President of the United Steel Workers Local 12-369, filed suit against defendants alleging claims of discrimination on the basis of race and gender, and retaliation for having engaged in protected speech under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. 401 et seq. The court concluded that, because the alleged retaliatory actions directed toward plaintiff impinged only upon her status as a union officer, she could not seek redress for these actions under section 609. The court held that the district court did not clearly err in finding defendants did not discriminate or retaliate against plaintiff given the district court's analysis of plaintiff's allegations, both as discrete incidents and as part of a broader course of conduct. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "USW Local 12-369 v. USW Int'l" on Justia Law

Donald and Kristi Gravelet-Blondin filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the City and Sgt. Shelton for excessive force and unlawful arrest, as well as malicious prosecution for the tasing and arrest of Donald. Kristi also filed suit under state law for the harm she suffered watching her husband's tasing and being threatened with tasing herself. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants on all claims. The court concluded, inter alia, that Sgt. Shelton was not entitled to qualified immunity where it was clearly established as of 2008 that the use of a taser in dart mode against a passive bystander such as Donald amounted to unconstitutionally excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the court reversed the grant of qualified immunity to Sgt. Shelton and the grant of summary judgment to the City on plaintiffs' excessive force claim; reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment based on the determination that probable cause existed for Donald's arrest; remanded for further proceedings on the unlawful arrest claim; and reversed the grant of summary judgment on plaintiffs' common law claims. View "Gravelet-Blondin v. Shelton" on Justia Law