Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 challenging the imposition and enforcement of two conditions of his parole: a residency restriction and a requirement that he submit to electronic monitoring using a GPS device. The district court dismissed the action under Rule 12(b)(6), concluding that habeas corpus provided the exclusive federal remedy for plaintiff's claims. The court held, however, that such an action was not barred by Heck v. Humphrey if it was not a collateral attack on either the fact of a parolee's confinement as a parolee or the parolee's underlying conviction or sentence. Because petitioner's action was such an attack, the court reversed and remanded . View "Thornton v. Brown" on Justia Law

Former starting quarterback for Arizona State University, Samuel Keller, filed a putative class action suit against EA, alleging that EA violated his right of publicity under California Civil Code 3344 and California common law by using Keller's likeness as part of the "NCAA Football" video game series. EA moved to strike the complaint as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) under California's anti-SLAPP statute, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 425.16. The court concluded that EA could not prevail as a matter of law based on the transformative use defense where EA's use did not qualify for First Amendment protection because it literally recreated Keller in the very setting in which he had achieved renown. The court also concluded that, although there was some overlap between the transformative use test and the Rogers v. Grimaldi test, the Rogers test should not be imported wholesale to the right-of-publicity claims. Finally, the court concluded that state law defenses for reporting of information did not protect EA's use. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the motion to strike the complaint. View "In re: NCAA Licensing Litig." on Justia Law

In these consolidated cases, plaintiffs filed shareholder derivative suits in California state court alleging that PICO's compensation policies violated state law. Defendants removed the cases to federal court, arguing that the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. 78n-1(a)(1), barred the suits. The court concluded that Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78aa(a), did not confer federal jurisdiction; defendants identified no significant federal issue that would confer jurisdiction; and the doctrine of complete preemption did not apply. Therefore, removal was improper and the district court lacked jurisdiction to do anything other than remand them to state court. Accordingly, the court vacated with instructions to remand the cases to state court. The court dismissed defendants' cross appeals for lack of jurisdiction. View "Dennis v. Hart" on Justia Law

Retired Hall of Fame football player, James "Jim" Brown, filed suit against EA, alleging that EA violated section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a), through the use of Brown's likeness in EA's "Madden NFL" series of football video games. The court rejected the "likelihood of confusion" test and the "alternative means" test, concluding that the only relevant legal framework for balancing the public's right to be free from consumer confusion about Brown's affiliation with "Madden NFL" and EA's First Amendment rights in the context of Brown's section 43(a) claim was the Rogers v. Grimaldi test. Applying the Rogers test, the court concluded that the use of Brown's likeness was artistically relevant to the "Madden NFL" games and that there were no alleged facts to support the claim that EA explicitly mislead consumers as to Brown's involvement with the games. In this case, the public interest in free expression outweighed the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of EA's motion to dismiss. View "Brown v. Electronic Arts, Inc." on Justia Law

These interlocutory appeals stemmed from an encounter between a group of young men and several BART officers that ended with the shooting and death of one of the men. The court concluded that Defendant Mehserle was not entitled to immunity from Oscar Grant, Jr.'s Fourteenth Amendment claim where there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Mehserle's action's were required by a legitimate law enforcement purpose; the court lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal asserting a right to federal law qualified immunity from a California state law (Civil Code 52.1) violation; Mehserle was entitled to qualified immunity from a claim that he unlawfully arrested Plaintiff Anicete; the district court failed to consider whether there was any evidence that Mehserle participated in the extended detentions of Plaintiffs Anicete, Reyes, or Nigel Bryson; the district court properly denied Mehserle qualified immunity from Plaintiff Jack Bryson's unlawful arrest claim; Defendant Pirone was properly denied qualified immunity for his initial detention of Reyes, the Brysons, and Greer; Pirone was not entitled to qualified immunity for conducting a de facto arrest of Reyes and the Brysons; Pirone was not entitled to qualified immunity from Greer's unlawful arrest claim; and to the extent the district court relied on Dubner v. City and County of San Francisco to deny Defendant Domenici immunity, its judgment was vacated. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, dismissed in part, and remanded. View "Johnson v. BART" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that deputies used excessive force against her late husband and that a deputy unreasonably seized her when he kept her from the crime scene. At issue was whether a reasonable jury could determine that the deputies violated the Constitution when they fatally shot the husband - an armed homeowner on his patio. In this instance, the court concluded that a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that the deputies' use of excessive force was constitutionally excessive where, among other things, the husband was not in the vicinity when the deputies arrived and plaintiff appeared unscathed and not in jeopardy. Accordingly, the court concluded that the deputies were not entitled to qualified immunity. The court dismissed plaintiff's cross-appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "George v. Morris, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that police officers used excessive force which resulted in her son's death. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of judgment as a matter of law to defendants under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a). The court held that the district court did not correctly conclude as a matter of law that the pre- and post-handcuffing conduct of defendants did not violate the son's constitutional rights and that no negligence occurred. The standard used by the district court was not correct where the district court judge's analysis was infected by impermissible credibility assessments. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. The court declined to reassign the case where, despite the district court judge's error of law, the court had no reason to believe that the judge would be unable fairly and correctly to apply the Rule 50(a) standard on remand. View "Krechman v. County of Riverside" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that her employer discriminated against her based upon her sex. While pursuing the discrimination action, plaintiff filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, failing to list the bankruptcy action in her bankruptcy schedules. The employer subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment in the discrimination action on the ground that judicial estoppel prohibited plaintiff from proceeding. The district court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the employer. However, the court vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the district court applied the wrong legal standard in determining whether plaintiff's bankruptcy omission was "mistaken" or "inadvertent." View "Quin v. County of Kauai Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a C-5 quadriplegic, filed suit alleging unlawful discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and related California disability laws, claiming that Peter Piper Pizza prevented him from moving around the restaurant. At issue was whether any barriers interfered with plaintiff's ability "to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations" of the restaurant. Plaintiff missed the period for disclosing his expert and, instead, incorporated the expert's pronouncements into his own presentation, putting forth the expert as a rebuttal expert. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, concluding that plaintiff lacked personal knowledge of the barriers he encountered and that his declaration was insufficient. The court reversed and remanded, concluding that the district court abused its discretion in discounting defendant's evidence as lacking personal knowledge and constituted improper expert testimony. The district court also erred in requiring a showing that removal of any barriers was "readily achievable." View "Strong v. Valdez Fine Foods, et al." on Justia Law

The parties dispute whether the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e(d)(2), limited the amount that plaintiff, a prisoner who qualified as a prevailing party who would ordinarily be entitled to an award of attorney's fees, could recover from defendant for attorney's fees incurred in defending his judgment on appeal to 150 percent of the monetary relief awarded to him at trial. The court held that the fee cap in section (d)(2) did not apply to attorney's fees earned in conjunction with an appeal in which prison officials sought unsuccessfully to reverse a verdict obtained by the prisoner before the district court. The court granted plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees on appeal and referred the matter to the Appellate Commissioner to determine the amount of such fees, as well as the amount of reimbursable costs. View "Woods v. Carey" on Justia Law