Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs brought a putative class action against Bresnan alleging violations of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. 2520-21, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. 1030, and Montana state law for invasion of privacy and trespass to chattels in connection with targeted advertising they received while using Bresnan's Internet service. The district court declined to enforce a choice-of-law clause in the service subscriber agreement, provided to all Bresnan customers, specifying that New York law should apply, and an arbitration clause. The court held that AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion further limited the savings clause in the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1-2 et seq., and therefore, the court held that the FAA preempted Montana's reasonable expectations/fundamental rights rule and that the district court erred in not applying New York law because a state's preempted public policy was an impermissible basis on which to reject the parties' choice-of-law selection. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's denial of Bresnan's motion to compel arbitration and remanded to the district court with instructions to apply New York law to the arbitration agreement. View "Mortensen, et al. v. Bresnan Communications, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff challenged the Department of Labor's new regulations providing that a labor certification expired after 180 days unless a visa application was filed or, in this case, 180 days after the regulation became final. Plaintiff alleged that enforcing the 180-day rule without providing actual notice constituted an impermissible retroactive rule. The court agreed with the district court that publication of the proposed and final rules in the Federal Register afforded adequate notice of the revision, and that the regulation was not impermissibly retroactive. Further, the text of the statute did not foreclose the establishment of an expiration date for labor certifications. Because the regulation did not have retroactive effect, plaintiff's labor certifications expired when it did not take timely action after the effective date of the new regulation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the government. View "Elim Church of God v. Harris" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Postal Service for breach of prior settlement agreements, as well as various other claims related to her employment at the Postal Service. The district court dismissed plaintiff's breach of contract claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1491(a)(1), granted the Court of Federal Claims exclusive jurisdiction to hear breach of contract claims against the Postal Service that put more than $10,000 in controversy. The district court also dismissed seven of plaintiff's claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiff had not complied with the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2675(a), and held that plaintiff's three remaining claims were barred by res judicata. The court concluded that, even assuming that the Tucker Act conferred jurisdiction on the Court of Federal Claims to hear claims against the Postal Service, the Postal Reorganization Act (PRA), 39 U.S.C. 401 and 409, also vested the district court with independent jurisdiction over such claims. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's determination that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear plaintiff's breach of contract claim. Although the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to consider plaintiff's breach of contract claim, it did not err in dismissing it because she failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. None of her remaining claims were viable and, therefore, the court affirmed the dismissal of her complaint. View "Tritz v. U.S. Postal Service" on Justia Law

The Clinics filed suit challenging California Welfare and Institutions Code 14131.10, which eliminated certain Medi-Cal benefits that the state deemed optional, including adult dental, podiatry, optometry, and chiropractic services. The court reversed the district court's holding that the Clinics have a private right of action to challenge the Department's implementation of the state plan amendments (SPA) prior to obtaining approval; affirmed that the Clinics have a private right of action to bring a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 challenging the validity of section 14131.10; and reversed the district court's interpretation of the Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. 1396 et seq., holding that section 14131.10 impermissibly eliminated mandatory services from coverage. View "California Ass'n of Rural Health Clinics v. Douglas" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of certain sections of California Senate Bill 6 (SB 6). SB 6, implementing California's Proposition 14 (Prop. 14), fundamentally changes the California election system by eliminating party primaries and general elections with party-nominated candidates, and substituting a nonpartisan primary and a two-candidate runoff. The court concluded that it had jurisdiction over the appeal; Plaintiff Chamness' case was not moot where his claim was capable of repetition because future election administrators would deny him the ability to use the designation "Independent" on the primary ballot; Plaintiffs Frederick's and Wilson's appeal were moot because they only sought declaratory relief affecting future elections; and Intervenor Galacki's claims regarding his write-in candidacy and the vote he cast for himself in the general election were moot. In Case No. 11-56449, the court held that Chamness failed to establish that SB 6 severely burdened his rights, and upheld the constitutionality of the statute as reasonably related to furthering the state's important interest in efficiently regulating elections. In Case No. 56303, the court held that the trial court acted well within its discretion in concluding that allowing Galacki to intervene would entail substantial delays and inefficiencies resolving the case, and in therefore denying Galacki's motion as untimely. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's order granting defendants summary judgment and denying Galacki's motion to intervene. View "Chamness v. Maldonado" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued defendant and the Church in Japan, alleging that they had tortiously induced her to transfer nearly all of her assets to the Church. After the Japanese courts awarded plaintiff a tort judgment, the Church contended that the judgment imposed liability for its religious teachings in violation of its constitutional right to free exercise of religion. The court affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of plaintiff, holding that the district court's recognition and enforcement of the judgment did not constitute "state action" triggering direct constitutional scrutiny. The court also held that neither the Japanese judgment nor the cause of action on which it was based rose to the level of repugnance to the public policy of California or of the United States that would justify a refusal to enforce the judgment under California's Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 1713-1724. View "Ohno v. Yasuma" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued police officers for their alleged use of excessive force in violation of plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights. Plaintiff was awarded compensatory damages after a jury found that the officers' use of force was constitutionally excessive. Both parties cross-appealed. The court affirmed the district court's entry of judgment on the jury's verdict because the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity. The court held, however that the district court abused its discretion by failing to adequately explain its decision to reduce the amount awarded to plaintiff and in denying plaintiff pre-and post-judgment interest. Accordingly, the court reversed those portions of the district court's orders, remanding for further proceedings. View "Barnard v. Theobald" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from disputes over the estate of the late Texas oil magnate and billionaire J. Howard Marshall. J. Howard died in 1995, leaving nearly all his assets to his son, Pierce, but excluding his wife, Anna Nicole Smith (Vickie), and his other son, Howard, from receiving any part of his fortune. Howard and his Wife eventually filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and their case was assigned to Judge Bufford, who had previously presided over Vickie's Chapter 11 bankruptcy case. Judge Bufford published three separate opinions: (1) denying Pierce's motion for reassignment or recusal; (2) confirming the Plan and denying Pierce's motion to dismiss with respect to his constitutional arguments; and (3) confirming the Plan and denying Pierce's motion to dismiss with respect to his statutory arguments. Elaine, Pierce's widow, now appeals the district court's decision, contending that the district court erred in affirming the bankruptcy court's orders. The court addressed the various issues on appeal related to the motion for recusal or reassignment, constitutional issues, and non-constitutional issues, and ultimately affirmed the district court's decision. View "In the Matter of: Marshall" on Justia Law

Defendant moved to dismiss his federal grand jury indictment, charging him with one count of possessing child pornography, on double jeopardy grounds because he had been subject to nonjudicial proceedings (NJP) with the Coast Guard. At issue was whether the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibited civilian criminal prosecution of a servicemember who previously received NJP without being informed of or waiving his statutory right to reject such punishment and demand a court-martial instead. The court concluded that the inquiry for the Double Jeopardy Clause was whether the defendant actually was previously placed in jeopardy, not whether he might have been placed in jeopardy if other procedures had been followed. Therefore, the court held that defendant's prosecution did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. The court also rejected defendant's alternative argument, reversing and remanding for further proceedings. View "United States v. Stoltz" on Justia Law

This case arose when plaintiff filed a state-law wage-and-hour class action naming CHA as a defendant. On appeal, defendants challenged the district court's remand to state court under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 153(c)(1). At issue was whether the two thirty-day periods described in 28 U.S.C. 1446(b)(1) and (b)(3) were the only periods during which the defendant could remove, or if they were merely periods during which a defendant must remove if one of the thirty-day time limits was triggered. The court concluded that sections 1441 and 1446, read together, permitted a defendant to remove outside the thirty-day periods on the basis of its own information, provided that it had not run afoul of either of the thirty-day deadlines. Accordingly, the court held that removal was not barred in this case and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "Roth, et al. v. CHA Hollywood Medical Center, et al." on Justia Law