Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sued Kohl's Department Store claiming that he bought merchandise from Kohl's that he would not have purchased had he not been misled by advertisements stating that the merchandise was marked down from a fictitious "original" or "regular" price. At issue on appeal was whether plaintiff alleged that he "lost money or property" and, therefore, had statutory standing under California law to sue Kohl's to enforce California's prohibition on this deceptive marketing practice. In Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court held that all a consumer needed to allege to establish standing to bring an Unfair Competition Law (UCL), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 17200, et seq., or Fair Advertising Law (FAL), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 17500, et seq., claim was that (1) the defendant made a false representation about a product, (2) the consumer purchased the product in reliance on the misrepresentation, and (3) he would not have purchased the product otherwise. The court rejected defendant's argument that Kwikset was distinguishable because it involved a different type of unlawful misrepresentation than the one at issue here. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's UCL and FAL claims. For nearly identical reasons, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), Cal. Civ. Code 1750, et seq., claims. The court also denied defendant's motion to certify both on the merits and because of the circumstances attendant to its filing. View "Hinojos v. Kohl's Corp., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, father of Adolf Anthony Sanchez Gonzalez, sued officers and the City of Anaheim under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violation of his Fourth Amendment right of familial association and Gonzalez's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable and excessive force. Gonzalez's daughter and successor-in-interest then brought a separate suit raising similar federal claims and various state law claims. The district court consolidated both actions and granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that striking Gonzalez in the arm with a flashlight was not excessive force given his stubborn refusal to follow the officers' commands; because all three Graham v. Connor factors supported the officers, they were justified in applying significant force; because the officers' prior conduct never amounted to a constitutional violation, the shooting was not unreasonable as a result; and plaintiffs presented no evidence to suggest that the officers, at any point, had a purpose to cause harm unrelated to the legitimate object of arrest or self-protection and, therefore, plaintiffs' claim that the officers' conduct violated their due process right to familial association failed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Gonzalez v. City of Anaheim" on Justia Law

Plaintiff spent 24 years in prison after being convicted for murder based largely upon the perjured testimony of an unreliable jailhouse informant, Edward Fink. Plaintiff filed this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that the District Attorney's Office failed to create any system for the Deputy District Attorneys handling criminal cases to access information pertaining to the benefits provided to jailhouse informants and other impeachment information, and failed to train Deputy District Attorneys to disseminate this information. At issue on appeal was whether a district attorney acted as a local or a state official when establishing policy and training related to the use of jailhouse informants. The court concluded that the policies challenged by plaintiff were distinct from the acts the district attorney undertook on behalf of the state. Even taking into account the control and supervisory powers of the Attorney General, the District Attorney represented the county when establishing policy and training related to the use of jailhouse informants. Therefore, a cause of action could lie against the county under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the pleadings. View "Goldstein v. City of Long Beach" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim against correctional officials at the Saguaro Correctional Center (SCC), asserting that the decision to house him in the same cell with a member of a rival gang after he had fought with another member of that same gang violated his Eight Amendment rights. The district court rejected defendant's claims that defendants were deliberately indifferent to the risk he faced from the cell assignment. The court concluded that, despite the late Rand v. Rowland notice, plaintiff did not suffer a deprivation of substantial rights when the district court decided the summary judgment motion on the merits. Plaintiff's response demonstrated that he understood the nature of summary judgment and complied with the requirements of Rule 56. Thus, reversal and remand of the district court was not required. Further, the undisputed evidence in the record showed that defendants were not deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of an attack if the rival gang member and plaintiff were placed in a cell together. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants. View "Labatad v. CCA, et al" on Justia Law

This dispute involved a revenue-sharing agreement between GCSD and SNW to build the Skywalk over the Grand Canyon on remote tribal land. GCSD filed suit against SNW seeking declaratory judgment that the Hualapai Tribe lacked the authority to condemn its intangible property rights and injunctive relief. After multiple hearings, the district court denied GCSD's temporary restraining order to enjoin SNW based on the principles of comity and ordered GCSD to exhaust tribal court remedies prior to review in federal court. The court affirmed and held that where, as here, a tribal court has asserted jurisdiction and was entertaining a suit, the tribal court must have acted in bad faith for exhaustion to be excused. The facts of this case did not support a finding of bad faith on the part of the tribal court. The submitted evidence supported the district court's finding that the tribal court operated independently from the tribal council and the evidence presented did not meet the narrow futility exception. The tribal court did not plainly lack jurisdiction because Montana v. United States's main rule was unlikely to apply to the facts of this case. Furthermore, the district court correctly relied on Water Wheel Camp Recreation Area, Inc. v. LaRance, which provided for tribal jurisdiction without even reaching the application of Montana. Even if the tribal consensual relationship with SNW or the financial implications of the agreement likely placed it squarely within one of Montana's exceptions and allowed for tribal jurisdiction. View "Grand Canyon Skywalk Dev. v. 'Sa' Nyu Wa Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought suit against Boeing and BISS alleging breach of contract as well as several statutory and common law claims. At issue was the enforceability of a forum selection clause. The court held that the evidence submitted and the allegations made by plaintiff were more than sufficient to create a triable issue of fact as to whether the forum selection clause at issue here was enforceable under M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shores Co. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion by granting BISS's motion to dismiss without convening an evidentiary hearing. The district court also abused its discretion in denying plaintiff leave to amend his pleadings. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. The court did, however, grant Boeing's and BISS's joint motion to strike the portions of plaintiff's reply brief that included new evidence or alleged new facts not in the record before the district court. View "Petersen v. Boeing Co." on Justia Law

In this appeal, the court considered whether San Rafael's mobilehome rent regulation violated the park owners' substantive due process rights, constituted a regulatory taking under Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, or ran afoul of the public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment under the standards articulated in Kelo v. City of New London. The court concluded that the district court properly rejected the City's arguments that MHC's claims were barred by the statute of limitations and precluded by res judicata, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing MHC to amend its complaint. The court also concluded that the regulation did not constitute either a Penn Central or a private taking. Because the court reached the merits of the takings issue, the court need not resolve the question of ripeness. The court further concluded that the district court did not err in granting judgment on MHC's substantive due process claims; the district court did not err in submitting the breach of settlement contract claims to the jury, denying the motion for a directed verdict on that question, denying the motion for a new trial, or awarding attorneys' fees; and in its original lawsuit, MHC waived its claim for damages in order to have a bench trial on the constitutional claims. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's holding as to the Penn Central and private takings, but affirmed the judgment in all other respects. View "MHC Limited Financing v. City of San Rafael" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Trump University for, among other things, deceptive business practices. Trump University counterclaimed against plaintiff for defamation based on the statements in letters and Internet postings plaintiff had made. Plaintiff then moved under California's "anti-SLAPP" (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation) law, California Code of Civil Procedure 425.16, to strike the defamation claim. At issue on appeal was whether Trump University, a private, for-profit entity purporting to teach Trump's "insider success secrets," was itself a public or limited public figure so as to implicate the First Amendment. The court concluded that Trump University was a limited public figure for the limited purpose of the public controversy over the quality of the education it purported to provide, and to prevail here, must demonstrate that plaintiff acted with actual malice. Because the district court erred by failing to recognize Trump University's status as a limited public figure, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Makaeff, et al v. Trump University" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the County Defendants. Plaintiff claimed, among other things, that the County Defendants conspired to violate, and did violate, her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when they unlawfully searched her home pursuant to an invalid search warrant, used excessive force in the execution of that warrant, and arrested her without probable cause. Because there was probable cause to search plaintiff's residence and to arrest her, the court affirmed the district court's entry of judgment with respect to those claims. Because disputed issues of material fact remained regarding plaintiff's excessive force and conspiracy claims, however, the court reversed and remanded those claims to the district court for further proceedings. View "Cameron v. Craig" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued several police officers and their employer, the City of Los Angeles, for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. Plaintiff was charged with attempted murder and was eventually acquitted. At issue was whether plaintiff's action was barred by the doctrine of issue preclusion. The court concluded that plaintiff raised a genuine dispute as to whether an officer fabricated evidence at the preliminary hearing by falsely testifying that the victim had identified plaintiff as the shooter. That alleged fabrication plainly met the materiality threshold for defeating summary judgment on the merits. In this case, the state court never purported to find either that the officer's testimony was credible or that the victim's testimony was not. Accordingly, plaintiff was not barred by the doctrine of issue preclusion and, therefore, the court reversed and remanded. View "Wige v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law