Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a class action lawsuit against defendant, a prosecuting attorney, charging, among other things, that Idaho Code 18-606 violated various provisions of the U.S. Constitution. The prosecuting attorney had previously filed a felony criminal complaint against plaintiff, charging her with "the public offense of Unlawful Abortion" pursuant to section 18-606. The Idaho state district court subsequently dismissed the criminal complaint without prejudice and the prosecuting attorney had not determined whether he would re-file the criminal complaint. In the class action suit, the district court issued a preliminary injunction, restraining the prosecuting attorney from enforcing section 18-606 and 18-608(1). Both parties appealed, raising several challenges. The court affirmed the district court's determination that plaintiff would likely succeed with her facial constitutional challenges to sections 18-606 and 18-609(1); affirmed the district court's conclusion that plaintiff lacked standing to seek pre-enforcement relief against the enforcement of the Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act (PUCPA), Idaho Code 18-505; reversed the scope of the injunction to the extent that it granted relief beyond plaintiff; and reversed the district court's determination that plaintiff did not have standing to enjoin enforcement of section 18-608(2) in conjunction with section 18-606.

Plaintiffs brought suit against the manufacturer of an electronic control device - commonly known as a "taser" - and sued police officers for excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state-law wrongful death. At issue was whether a police officer had used constitutionally excessive force by repeatedly deploying a taser against a combative suspect and whether the manufacturer of that device had provided sufficient warning that its repeated use could lead to death. The deceased suspect had gouged out the eye of a family member, attempting to exorcize her demons, when police officers arrived at the scene. The court held that the taser provided sufficient warning as a matter of law. The court also held that, although the officers used significant force in this case, it was justified by the considerable government interests at stake. Because the court concluded that the officers acted reasonably in using force, plaintiffs' state law claims against the officers for wrongful death could not succeed unless the use of the taser constituted deadly force and the use of the deadly force was not justified. The court concluded that it was not convinced that the use of the taser involved deadly force, but even if the taser qualified as deadly force, no reasonable jury could find that the circumstances here failed to justify the use of deadly force.

In this appeal involving parental rights, the court previously published an opinion on a related issue in Mueller v. Auker and that opinion has the facts giving rise to this case. Here, the court held that Detective Rogers, along with Officers Snyder and Green, were entitled to qualified immunity from this lawsuit; the officers were entitled to qualified immunity with regard to the Fourth Amendment claim; the district court did not err or abuse its discretion in admitting the proffered testimony of Dr. Peter Rosen pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 or in denying the Muellers' motion on this issue for a new trial; and the district court did not err in dismissing the Muellers' 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against St. Luke's without leave to amend, because it was clear that amendment would be futile. The court addressed the remaining challenges and subsequently affirmed the judgment.

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that she broke an unwritten rule and suffered the consequences when she challenged a sitting superior court judge for his seat in a local election while she was serving as a temporary superior court commissioner. The court concluded that, while the timing and targeted effect of the superior court's policy were suspicious, the court did not reach the merits of plaintiff's federal or state law retaliation claims because the judges of the superior court's Executive Committee enjoyed legislative immunity for their decision to alter the minimum qualifications to serve as a temporary commissioner. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants.

Plaintiffs, nine homeless individuals living in the "Skid Row" district of Los Angeles, charged that the City violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by seizing and immediately destroying their unabandoned personal possessions, temporarily left on public sidewalks while plaintiffs attended to necessary tasks such as eating, showering, and using restrooms. Finding a strong likelihood of success on the merits, the district court enjoined the City from confiscating and summarily destroying unabandoned property in Skid Row. On appeal, the City argued that the district court applied the wrong legal standard in evaluating plaintiffs' claims. The court concluded that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments protected homeless persons from government seizure and summary destruction of their unabandoned, but momentarily unattended, personal property. Accordingly, the court denied the City's appeal.

Plaintiff was removed from the Costa Mesa City Council meeting for an alleged violation of Costa Mesa Municipal Code 2-61, which made it a misdemeanor for members of the public who speak at City Council meetings to engage in "disorderly, insolent, or disruptive behavior." On appeal, plaintiff challenged, among other things, the district court's dismissal of his First Amendment facial challenge to the ordinance. Because section 2-61 failed to limit proscribed activity to only actual disturbances, the court reversed the district court's constitutionality ruling and found the statute facially invalid. However, the word "insolent" was easily removed from the ordinance without detriment to the purpose of section 2-61 and it need not be wholly invalidated since it was properly applied to plaintiff's disruptive behavior. The court affirmed the remainder of the district court's determinations.

Plaintiff, a state prisoner, allegedly engaged in a romantic, but not sexual, relationship with a female prison guard. Plaintiff alleged that both during and after the relationship, the guard perpetrated sexual acts on him without his consent. He filed a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging constitutional violations of the First, Fourth, and Eighth Amendments. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment on his Eighth Amendment sexual harassment claim and failure to protect claim, and his First Amendment retaliation claim. The court held that plaintiff's allegations were sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim and reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on this claim. The court affirmed the district court's decision to grant summary judgment on the remaining claims at issue.

CTTA filed this action seeking to invalidate two ordinances where the City and County of San Francisco required tow truck drivers to obtain permits to operate in San Francisco and towing firms to obtain permits to conduct business within San Francisco. CTTA primarily argued that the entire "permit scheme" (as it called both ordinances) was preempted by federal law. The district court upheld the permit scheme for "non-consensual" towing, but enjoined enforcement against those doing exclusively "consensual" towing and against tow truck drivers simply "passing through" San Francisco. Both parties cross-appealed. The CTTA's challenge to the entire permit scheme necessarily encompassed all of the permit scheme's components - each of which could be preempted. The district court analyzed the permit scheme in a way the parties presented the scheme, as a whole, but without specifically addressing its individual provisions. In doing so, however, the district court ran afoul of American Trucking Associations v. City of Los Angeles, which required "examining the specific provisions" of the permit scheme. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings.

The Commonwealth appealed the district court's judgment in favor of plaintiff. Plaintiff alleged that she was terminated without cause from her position as Special Assistant to the Governor for Women's Affairs in violation of Article III, section 22 of the Commonwealth Constitution. Based on the meaning of Article III, section 22 determined by the final arbiter of Commonwealth law, the court held that plaintiff did not have a protected interest in continued employment beyond the term of the governor who appointed her. Therefore, plaintiff's termination without cause did not violate the Due Process Clause, and the district court's judgment was vacated and the case remanded.

These consolidated appeals arose from a two-day execution of a search warrant by the Guam Police Department's (GPD) SWAT team in coordination with federal DEA and ATF agents. The search resulted in one of the largest busts of stolen items in Guam's history. The search took place on Raymond (Ray) and Lourdes (Lou) Duenas's compound. The district court denied Ray's and Lou's motions to suppress evidence of the drugs and stolen goods seized in the raid and their statements. A jury convicted Ray and Lou on multiple counts. The Ninth Circuit Court (1) reversed Ray's conviction, holding that the district court abused its discretion by admitting the former testimony of by-then-deceased Officer Smith under Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(1) because it incorrectly concluded that defense counsel had a similar motive to cross-examine Officer Smith when it questioned him at the suppression hearing as it would have had at the trial; (2) affirmed Lou's conviction, as it was supported by sufficient evidence; and (3) held that the district court did not err by deciding not to exclude the stolen items, drugs, and other paraphernalia found in the compound.