Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

At issue here was whether a court should apply the exclusionary rule where law enforcement agents attached mobile tracking devices to the underside of a defendant's car and used those devices to track the car's movements. Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiring to manufacture marijuana but reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the installation and use of the tracking devices was not a Fourth Amendment search. Subsequent to the Ninth Circuit's decision, the U.S. Supreme Court decided United States v. Jones, which holds that the government's installation of a GPS tracking device on a target's vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle's movements, constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court then granted Defendant's certiorari petition, vacated the Ninth Circuit's judgment, and remanded for consideration in light of Jones. The Ninth Circuit then affirmed, holding that pursuant to the Supreme Court's holding in Davis v. United States, suppression was not warranted here because the agents objectively relied on then-existing binding precedent when they attached tracking devices to Defendant's vehicle and used those devices to monitor the vehicle's movements.

Plaintiff played professional football for nineteen years. When he retired in 2002, he was employed by the Tennessee Titans. In 2008, he filed a workers' compensation claim in California, alleging that he suffered pain and disability from injuries incurred during his career. Plaintiff asked the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to vacate an arbitration award that prohibited him from pursuing workers' compensation benefits under California law, arguing (1) the award violated California public policy and federal labor policy, and (2) the award was in disregard of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. The district court confirmed the arbitration award. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff did not allege sufficient contacts with California to show his workers' compensation claim came within the scope of California's workers' compensation regime, and therefore, he did not establish that the arbitration award violated California public policy; (2) because Plaintiff did not show that the award deprived him of something to which he was entitled under state law, he did not show it violated federal labor policy; and (3) Plaintiff did not establish that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the Full Faith and Credit Clause.

Defendant was charged with six counts related to the sexual assault of his girlfriend (Girlfriend). Defendant denied than an assault occurred and claimed that he and Girlfriend had consensual sex. At trial, the court prevented Defendant from (1) presenting testimony from police witnesses to support his defense that Defendant made false claims against him in the past alleging physical or sexual assault, and (2) cross-examining Girlfriend about prior acts of prostitution. Defendant was convicted. Defendant appealed, contending that the trial court's rulings denied him his constitutional right to present a complete defense and to confront the complaining witness under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Defendant's right to present a defense was unconstitutionally abridged, and the state court's conclusion to the contrary was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Remanded.

Petitioner, an Arizona state prisoner, appealed the district court's denial of his habeas corpus petition. Petitioner was sentenced to death on each of two counts of felony murder. In this petition, Petitioner challenged his capital sentences, arguing that (1) the Arizona Supreme Court's application of Enmund v. Florida and Tison v. Arizona was unreasonable; (2) the Supreme Court based its decision on an unreasonable determination of the facts; and (3) his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. The Ninth Circuit (1) affirmed the Arizona Supreme Court's application of Enmund and Tison to the facts of the case, holding it was not objectively unreasonable; (2) held the Supreme Court did not base its decision on an unreasonable determination of the facts; and (3) vacated the district court's judgment on Petitioner's third argument, holding that the district court did not err in finding Petitioner defaulted on his ineffective assistance claim by failing to fairly present the claim to the Arizona courts but remanding to allow the district court reassess whether Petitioner established cause and prejudice for the procedural default under Martinez v. Ryan.

This opinion was a revised version of an earlier opinion issued by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on May 24, 2012. In that opinion, the Ninth Circuit held that, although the police did not have reasonable suspicion to search Defendant's room, they needed no such suspicion because Defendant was subject to suspicionless search as a condition of his probation. The holding in this case was based on United States v. Baker, in which the Ninth Circuit held that such searches did not violate the Fourth Amendment. In this revision, the Ninth Circuit overruled Motley v. Parks and later cases that relied on it, including Baker, to the extent they held that there was no constitutional difference between probation and parole for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. The Court held that these cases conflict with the Supreme Court's holding in Samson v. California that parolees have fewer expectations of privacy than probationers. United States v. King, therefore, was vacated, and the case was referred to the original panel for disposition consistent with this opinion.

Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and kidnapping. Defendant was sentenced to death. Defendant subsequently petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. The district court denied the appeal. On remand to the district court from a prior decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Defendant contended his counsel was ineffective for presenting evidence at his sentencing hearing that he had suffered four head injuries and that these injuries affected his mental functions at the time of the murder. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order denying Defendant's petition for writ of habeas corpus, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Defendant was not prejudiced by his counsel's failure to submit this additional evidence.

Defendant, Law Offices of Sidney Mickell, sent a debt collection letter addressed to Plaintiff, Catherine Evon, in "care of" her employer. Evon filed a class action lawsuit alleging (1) Mickell's act of sending letters "care of" the class members' employers violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act's prohibition on communication with third parties, and (2) the contents of the letter violated the Act's prohibition against false, deceptive, or misleading misrepresentations. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (1) held Mickell's act of sending "care of" letters constituted a per se violation of the Act, and reversed the district court's denial of Evon's class certification motion on that issue; and (2) held that the contents of the letter did not violate the Act, and therefore affirmed the district court's denial of Evon's class certification motion in that regard. Remanded.

Several Alaskan native villages (Villages) claimed they possessed non-exclusive aboriginal hunting and fishing rights in areas of the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) in the Gulf of Alaska. The Secretary of Commerce promulgated regulations limiting access to the halibut and sablefish fisheries. The Villages claimed that the regulations failed to account for the Villages' non-exclusive aboriginal hunting and fishing rights, without Congress's consent in violation of the federal common law and the Indian Non-Intercourse Act. The district court dismissed their complaint. The Supreme Court remanded to the district court for the purpose of determining what aboriginal rights, if any, the Villages had on the OCS. The district court held that the Villages had no nonexclusive right to hunt and fish in the OCS. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) based on the uncontested factual findings of the district court, the court did not err in concluding that the Villages failed to establish an entitlement to non-exclusive aboriginal rights on the OCS; and (2) because the Villages had not established aboriginal rights on the OCS, the Court had no occasion to consider whether there was a conflict with the federal paramountcy doctrine or whether the Secretary's actions violated the Indian Non-Intercourse Act.

Plaintiff, a former employee of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) who suffered from multiple sclerosis and systemic lupus, filed an administrative complaint based on alleged violations of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The complaint was adjudicated by an ALJ, who denied relief in part. Plaintiff then filed an optional administrative appeal with the EEOC. Plaintiff withdrew her appeal without waiting 180 days as specified in 29 C.F.R. 1614.407(d) and filed suit in district court based on the same claims she asserted in her administrative complaint. The district court dismissed Plaintiff's complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, holding that under Rivera v. USPS, it lacked jurisdiction because Plaintiff had not waited 180 days after filing her administrative appeal. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that based on Bankston v. White and on post-Rivera regulation, Bullock had exhausted her administrative remedies. Remanded.

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of two counts of first-degree murder. This case was the second time Defendant sought habeas review in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. In 2008, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Defendant's first habeas petition. The State of Arizona subsequently issued a death warrant and set August 8, 2012 as Cook's execution date. Here Defendant asserted that his pretrial was ineffective and that his postconviction relief (PCR) counsel was ineffective. Defendant argued that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Martinez v. Ryan required the district court to excuse his procedural default because of ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) in his state PCR proceedings. Defendant also asked the Court to stay his execution so he could further pursue his underlying pretrial IAC claim. The Ninth Circuit (1) affirmed the district court's decision to deny Defendant's Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) motion for relief for judgment under Martinez, holding that Martinez does not apply to this case; and (2) denied Defendant's motion for a stay of execution, as Defendant's pretrial IAC claim lacked merit.