Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Rufino Valdes-Vega appealed the district court's denial of his motion to suppress cocaine found in his truck. Defendant contended that the stop of his truck by border patrol agents seventy miles north of the U.S.-Mexico border violated the Fourth Amendment, and consequently, the cocaine found in his truck must be suppressed. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed and reversed the district court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress, holding that the totality of the circumstances in this case did not provide border patrol agents with reasonable suspicion to believe that Defendant was smuggling drugs or aliens.

Marc and Claire Headley were two former ministers of the Church of Scientology International. Marc sued the Church and Claire sued the Church and the Religious Technology Center under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (Act), making claims of forced labor and that the Church and Center psychologically coerced them to provide labor. Specifically, they contended that the Church and Center violated the Act by causing them to believe that they could not leave the ministry or that they would face serious harm in doing so. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding (1) Marc's allegations of instances of physical force against him did not raise a triable issue of material fact on his forced-labor claim; and (2) Marc's and Claire's claims of psychologically coerced labor were barred by the ministerial exception. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the Headleys did not establish a genuine issue of fact regarding whether they were victims of forced-labor violations; and (2) the record did not allow the conclusion that the Church or Center violated the Act.

Defendant pled guilty to mail fraud and money laundering. Based on the sentencing factors set out in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), the district court imposed a prison sentence longer than the one proposed by the parties in the plea agreement and also in excess of the range recommended by the advisory Sentencing Guidelines. Defendant appealed his sentence, claiming both procedural error and substantive unreasonableness. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) though it imposed a sentence outside of the Guidelines range, the district court did not err by failing to provide prior notice under Fed. R. Crim P. 32(h), as this notice was not required when varying a sentence based on section 3553(a) factors; and (2) the district court did not impermissibly rely on Defendant's inability to pay restitution by considering the financial impact his crimes had on his victims.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of drug-related crimes involving the distribution of methamphetmaine, cocaine, and marijuana. Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from a series of electronic surveillance orders authorizing interception of communications over cellular phones associated with him and his alleged co-conspirators. Defendant contended that these orders by their terms authorized more than standard intercepts, permitting more intrusive roving intercepts without meeting the statutory prerequisites of 18 U.S.C. 2518. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) if the government seeks authorization for the use of new technology to convert cellular phones into roving bugs, it must specifically request that authority, the court must scrutinize the need for such surveillance, and the authorization orders must be clear and unambiguous; but (2) in this case, the district court did not err in finding that the orders were intended only to authorize standard interception techniques and that the government did not do otherwise.

M.P., a student with disabilities, appealed the district court's ruling that the Anchorage School District (ASD) did not deny him a free and appropriate public education (FAPE) because the failure to develop an updated Individualized Education Program (IEP) was mostly attributable to his "parents' litigious approach." The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) mandates that public educational agencies review and revise annually an eligible child's IEP. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in part, holding (1) the district court relied on an improper basis when it declined to consider whether the ASD complied with the IDEA's substantive requirements; (2) the ASD deprived M.P. of a substantively adequate FAPE by relying on an outdated IEP to measure M.P.'s academic and functional performance and provide educational benefits to M.P.; and (3) M.P.'s parents were entitled to reimbursement for private tutoring expenses incurred in 2008 and review of the propriety of private tutoring expenses incurred in 2009. Remanded.

Sean Runningeagle and his cousin Corey Tilden were convicted of murdering two victims. The state trial court imposed a sentence of death upon Runningeagle but not upon Tilden. Runningeagle's direct and collateral appeals were rejected by the state courts. Runningeagle subsequently appealed the district court's denial of his federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus and request for an evidentiary hearing. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the state courts' denial of Runningeagle's claim that prosecutors withheld evidence obtained from a former cell-mate of Tilden's in violation of Brady v. Maryland was not an unreasonable application of or contrary to clearly established law; (2) the state Supreme Court's holding that counsel did not provide ineffective assistance was not an unreasonable application of the standard established in Strickland v. Washington; and (3) the state Supreme Court's determination that certain comments made by the prosecutor, while improper, did not amount to a due process violation was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

In 1993, James Alderson filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA) alleging Medicare fraud by Quorum Health Group, Inc., a hospital management company, and several related entities including the Hospital Corporation of America, Inc. (HCA). The United States intervened in 1998. The United States settled its FCA claims against HCA for $631 million in 2003. Alderson received sixteen percent of the settlement as his relator's share. Alderson and related taxpayers, Appellants, filed income tax returns for tax year 2003 reporting the relator's share as ordinary income. They later filed amended returns characterizing it as capital gain, seeking refunds of about $5 million. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) denied the refund claims. Appellants then filed suit in federal district court. The court granted summary judgment to the United States, holding that the relator's share was ordinary income. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Alderson's qui tam award under the FCA was ordinary income.

Plaintiff, who suffered from limb girdle muscular dystrophy, sued Walt Disney World Company under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), claiming that Disney denied her full and equal access to Disneyland by prohibiting her from using a Segway at Disneyland. Disney's policy was to allow wheelchairs and motorized scooters, but two-wheeled vehicles or devices were prohibited. The district court granted summary judgment for Disney, holding that Plaintiff was judicially estopped from claiming she couldn't use a motorized wheelchair, so there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether it was necessary for Plaintiff to use a Segway to visit Disneyland. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) Plaintiff was judicially estopped from claiming she couldn't use a motorized wheelchair or scooter; but (2) Disney must take reasonable steps to make Plaintiff's experience less onerous and more akin to that enjoyed by its able-bodied patrons under the ADA unless the device could not be operated in accordance with legitimate safety requirements.

Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence of his possession of marijuana. Defendant argued that an officer's two separate commands directing him to empty his pockets each constituted illegal searches in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed, holding (1) because Defendant did not comply with the officer's first command, the command did not cause an intrusion upon Defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of his pockets, and thus, it was not a search; and (2) the officer's second command, with which Defendant complied was a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, but the search was not illegal because it was supported by probable cause and because exigent circumstances justified searching Defendant without a warrant.

Plaintiffs were owners and operators of motels in Los Angeles. Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of Los Angeles Municipal Code (LAMC) 41.49, which requires operators of hotels in the City to maintain certain guest registry information and to make that information available to police officers on request. Appellants contended that LAMC 41.49 was facially unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment because it authorized unreasonable invasions of their private business records without a warrant or pursuant to any recognized warrant exception. Following a bench trial on stipulated evidence, the district court held that the ordinance was reasonable and granted judgment in favor of the City, concluding that the hotel operators did not establish that they had a privacy interest in the guest registry information. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs' facial challenge to the ordinance failed. That the ordinance might operate unconstitutionally under some circumstances was not enough to render it invalid against a facial challenge.