Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In this criminal pre-trial matter, a magistrate judge recommended denying a motion to suppress, but the district judge reversed that determination because he was inclined to disbelieve the testimony of government officials but did so without holding a de novo evidentiary hearing to hear any live testimony. At issue on appeal was whether the government's right to a de novo hearing before a district judge when the district judge departs from credibility findings of a magistrate judge is identical to that of defendants, even though the government cannot directly invoke the protections of the Due Process Clause. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district court, holding that a district court abuses its discretion when it reverses a magistrate judge's credibility determinations, made after receiving testimony that is live and favorable to the government, without viewing key demeanor evidence, except where the district judge finds the magistrate judge's credibility determinations had no legally sufficient evidentiary basis, so that, were they jury determinations, judgment as a matter of law would issue for the defendant.

At issue in this case was the appropriate venue for continuing crimes, like conspiracy, where the conspirators' activities have a ripple-like effect that may involve numerous districts. Here the district court determined that venue for a drug-sale conspiracy was proper in the North District of California based on two telephone calls initiated by a government informant, who was in the district, to Defendant, who was located outside of the district. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) by using those calls to negotiate the terms of a drug deal to be completed in the Eastern District of California, Defendant propelled the conspiracy into the Northern District of California; and (2) therefore, venue on the conspiracy charge was proper in the Northern District of California.

Plaintiff Paul Braunstein, the owner and operator of an Arizona engineering and land surveying firm that previously performed work for the Arizona Department of Transportation, sought damages based on Arizona's use of an affirmative action program in its award of a 2005 transportation engineering contract. The district court concluded that Braunstein lacked standing to seek damages in this equal protection suit because he never demonstrated that the challenged affirmative action program affected him personally or impeded his ability to compete for subcontracting work. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the district court correctly concluded that Braunstein lacked standing; but (2) the district court erred in awarding Defendants attorneys' fees and imposing sanctions against Braunstein's attorneys for unreasonably prolonging the proceedings.

Appellants, three individuals who participated in businesses that helped customers evade federal and state income taxes, were convicted for conspiracy to defraud the United States, mail fraud, false representation of a Social Security number, passport fraud, and failure to file income tax returns. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences for all Appellants with the exception of one Appellant (Giordano)'s restitution order, which was vacated and remanded for recalculation, holding (1) Appellants' convictions did not violate the First Amendment, as Appellants did far more than advocate tax evasion and instead developed a vast enterprise that helped clients hide their income from federal and state tax authorities; (2) the indictment did not erroneously include misdemeanor crimes among the eighty-one objects of the felony conspiracy count; (3) the district court did not err in instructing the jury on the crime of failure to file income taxes; but (4) the district court failed to consider evidence that Giordano presented at sentencing.

Petitioner Andrew Mackey was convicted several crimes in California. Retained attorney Le Rue Grim represented Mackey in post-trial and post-conviction proceedings. Grim subsequently filed a timely petition in the United States district court asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. Respondent filed a response to the district court's order to show cause, but Grim did not file a traverse by the due date. Grim then withdrew from the case but failed to notify the court of his intention to withdraw. Consequently, Mackey was unaware that the district court denied his petition and did not have the opportunity to proceed pro se. Mackey then filed a motion to have the district court vacate its judgment and reopen the case. The court denied the motion, determining that it lacked discretion to vacate the judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the district court would possess the discretion to vacate and reenter the judgment in order to allow Mackey the opportunity to appeal if it were to find that Grim effectively abandoned Mackey, causing Mackey to fail to file a timely notice of appeal. Remanded for findings as to whether Grim's action or inaction constituted abandonment.

This case was a challenge to the State of Washington's Building Code brought by the Building Industry Association of Washington (BIAW) along with individual builders and contractors. The impetus for this challenge was the State's 2009 requirement that new building construction must meet heightened energy conservation goals. At issue was the Energy Policy and Conservation Act's (EPCA) preemption-exemption provision, which expressly preempts state standards requiring greater efficiency than federal standards but exempts from preemption state building codes promoting energy efficiency, so long as those codes meet statutory conditions. Plaintiffs argued that the Building Code did not satisfy EPCA's conditions for exemption. The district court held that Washington had satisfied EPCA's conditions and therefore was not preempted. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Building Code satisfied the conditions Congress set forth in the EPCA for exemption from federal preemption.

Defendant Rodolfo Suarez appealed his conviction for conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Defendant contended that the guilty verdict on that charge was fatally inconsistent with the jury's decision to acquit him on a charge of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Defendant also appealed his sentence of 240 months' imprisonment, which the district court imposed based on the twenty-year mandatory minimum, contending that his 2003 guilty plea to felony drug possession in California state court did not qualify as a "prior conviction" that "has become final" within the meaning of 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A). The Ninth Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction but vacated his sentence, holding that because Defendant's 2003 guilty plea and participation in a drug rehabilitation program resulted in neither a formal entry of judgment by the state court nor a sentence of imprisonment or probation, the district court erred in applying the twenty-year mandatory minimum sentence under section 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A) to Defendant.

Defendant was convicted of possessing with intent to distribute 214.4 grams of actual methamphetamine. Defense counsel indicated that Defendant wanted his family members, including his wife and young son, present at the sentencing hearing. The district court, however, ordered that Defendant's family members be excluded from the sentencing proceedings after expressing displeasure at what it perceived as the manipulative use of Rivera's young son as a sentencing "prop." The Ninth Circuit vacated Defendant's sentence, holding that Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was violated by the district court's exclusion of his family members from the sentencing proceedings. Remanded for re-sentencing.

Defendant appealed his conviction and imposition of a sixty-month sentence following his entry of a plea of guilty to a single charge of possessing child pornography that had been shipped in interstate commerce. The Ninth Circuit (1) affirmed Defendant's conviction, holding that the district court did not err in accepting Defendant's guilty plea, and Defendant's challenges to the grand jury instructions were untimely and therefore waived; but (2) vacated the supervised release portion of Defendant's sentence, holding that the district court committed procedural error by failing to provide adequate analysis for the imposition of the residency restrictions in Defendant's lifetime term of supervised release. Remanded for resentencing.

Kennard Johnson was sentenced to eleven years, four months in the superior court of California following his entry of a plea of guilty to four theft-related counts for defrauding an auto dealership and stealing a vehicle. Johnson petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court, which the district court granted. Johnson appealed, challenging the adequacy of the district court's chosen remedy for the violation of Johnson's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel and claiming that it was error for the district court to grant the writ subject to imposing a new sentence within the lawful maximum range. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of Johnson's habeas petition but vacated the district court's remedy, holding (1) the district court's decision to grant the writ subject to the state court resentencing Johnson failed adequately to remedy the constitutional violation, as the ineffective assistance of counsel Johnson received affected the entire plea negotiation stage of the proceedings in the superior court; and (2) the district court should grant a conditional writ of habeas corpus, subject to the state court vacating Johnson's conviction and granting him a new trial.