Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Chi Mak appealed his jury conviction of conspiring to violate export control laws and attempting to export a defense article to the People's Republic of China in violation of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA). The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the AECA and its implementing regulations do not violate Mak's First Amendment rights since the AECA is substantially related to the protection of an important governmental interest; (2) the court's instructions to the jury concerning technical data did not violate Mak's Due Process rights because they expressly required the government to prove that the documents at issue were not in the public domain; (3) the court's instructions to the jury on willfulness did not violate Mak's Sixth Amendment rights because they did not prevent the jury from fully deliberating as to whether Mak acted willfully, as required by the AECA; and (4) the documents at issue were covered by the United States Munitions List at the time Mak attempted to export them, and therefore, Mak's conviction did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.

Defendant appealed from his conviction and sentence for illegally re-entering the United States after previously having been deported. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's prior conviction for burglary under Cal. Penal Code 459 qualified as a crime of violence under the immigration laws and for sentencing purposes; (2) the district court did not err in denying Defendant a two-level downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility under the sentencing guidelines. The Court distinguished the district court's denial of an acceptance of responsibility adjustment here from cases in which district courts interpreted the guidelines to forbid the award of such an adjustment to any defendant who forces the government to prove his guilt at trial.

Michelle Wing appealed the district court's revocation of her second term of supervised release, which had not yet commenced, based on newly discovered violations of conditions of her previously revoked first term of supervised release. Wing contended that the district court lacked jurisdiction to revoke her second term of supervised release. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that, under its interpretation of 18 U.S.C. 3583(e)(3), the district court did not have jurisdiction under section 3583(e)(3) to revoke King's second term of supervised release based on newly discovered violations of conditions of her revoked term of supervised release, as subsection (e)(3) requires that the court find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a condition of the term of supervised release that is being revoked.

Plaintiffs, operators of a shuttle service between Sesabe and Tucson, Arizona, alleged that Border Patrol agents stopped their shuttle repeatedly and in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. Plaintiffs brought claims against the Border Patrol agents as well as the agents' supervisors, who they claimed reviewed and directed the stops. The court held that plaintiffs' complaint failed to state a claim against any supervisory defendant other than Ralph Hunt, who directly participated in the alleged underlying violations. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's ruling with respect to Hunt, but reversed and directed the entry of final judgment with respect to the remaining supervisors.

Defendant pled guilty to knowingly taking or receiving obscene matters from an interactive computer service, a crime that did not categorically constitute a "sex offense" as defined by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 42 U.S.C. 16911(5)(A). Defendant subsequently appealed the district court's imposition of supervised release conditions. Because defendant was a sex offender under SORNA, the district court was required to impose the registration condition. Even if the district court were not required to impose SORNA registration as a mandatory condition of supervised release, the district court did not commit plain error by imposing registration as a discretionary condition. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant appealed the 16-level enhancement of his sentence due to his prior 1985 conviction for kidnapping under Arizona Revised Statute 13-1304. Defendant argued that ARS 13-1304 did not meet the generic definition of kidnapping and therefore did not qualify as a "crime of violence" under either the categorical or modified categorical approach. In light of United States v. Gonzalez-Perez, the court held that ARS 13-1304 categorically met the generic definition of kidnapping and affirmed the sentence.

Petitioners were statutorily eligible for early release from prison in exchange for the successful completion of a residential drug abuse treatment program (RDAP). The Bureau of Prisons (BOP), however, enacted a regulation disqualifying them from the early release incentive on the basis of their current convictions. Petitioners each filed for a writ of habeas corpus asking the district court to invalidate the regulation under section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706. The court affirmed and held that the BOP did not violate the APA in excluding inmates from consideration for early release who have a current conviction for felon in possession or a past conviction for homicide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, arson, kidnapping, or child sexual abuse.

Petitioner was charged with two counts of interference with interstate commerce by threat or violence and use of a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence. Several months after petitioner appealed the dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion as untimely, petitioner filed a pro se habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2241 in the jurisdiction in which he was then incarcerated. Concluding that petitioner had failed to make an adequate claim of actual innocence, the district court construed the petition as a section 2255 motion and dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner timely appealed. Because petitioner failed to meet the escape hatch criteria, he could not bring his claims in a section 2241 petition. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.

Plaintiffs filed suit in federal court seeking damages for the 31 months during which they were barred from improving their shoreline property by the moratorium imposed by local officials on new projects. Plaintiffs asserted that the moratorium violated their substantive and procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, and sought damages against the city under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court concluded that the moratorium ordinances were validly enacted, nonarbitrary, and manifestly related to the city's legitimate municipal interests. Accordingly, the court held that the city did not violate plaintiffs' constitutional rights.

Petitioner appealed the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas petition challenging his jury conviction for one count of committing a forcible lewd act upon a child under 14 years of age; eight counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child under 14 years of age; and first-degree burglary. Petitioner argued that the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to strike three African-American prospective jurors violated his rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The trial court credited the prosecutor's justifications, and the California Court of Appeal found that substantial evidence supported the determination. Both the district court's and the court's own review of the record failed to show purposeful discrimination on the part of the prosecutor. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment and held that petitioner did not suffer any violation of his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.