Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a police officer, filed suit after he was terminated following severe interpersonal problems between him and other police officers. Plaintiff contended that these interpersonal problems resulted from his attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and that the police department discharged him based on his disability, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. The jury returned a general verdict for plaintiff, finding that he was disabled and that the City had discharged him because of his disability. The court reversed, holding that, based on the evidence presented, the jury could not have found plaintiff disabled under the ADA. Plaintiff's ADHD did not substantially limit plaintiff's ability to work or to interact with others. Therefore, the district court erred in denying the City's motion for judgment as a matter of law. View "Weaving v. City of Hillsboro" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an inmate, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights when prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in refusing him cataract surgery to restore his vision. The court held that blindness in one eye caused by a cataract is a serious condition. The court also held that the blanket, categorical denial of medically indicated surgery solely on the basis of an administrative policy that "one eye is good enough for prison inmates" is the paradigm of deliberate indifference. Accordingly, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of prison officials and remanded for trial. View "Colwell v. Bannister, et al." on Justia Law

ATC filed suit challenging the City's denial of its Conditional Use Permit (CUP) applications for three of its San Diego telecommunications facilities. ATC raised claims under, among other provisions, the California Permit Streamlining Act (PSA), Cal. Gov't Code 65956(b); the Federal Telecommunications Act (TCA), 47 U.S.C. 332; California Code of Civil Procedure 1094.5; and the Equal Protection Clause. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of ATC on the PSA claim because the court concluded that the CUP applications were not deemed approved before the City denied them. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the TCA claim where the City evaluated the CUP applications under the proper provision of the Land Development Code and supported its decision to deny them with substantial evidence; the City did not unreasonably discriminate among providers of functionally equivalent services because ATC and the City are not "similarly situated" providers; and ATC has failed to show effective prohibition because it has not demonstrated that its proposals were the least intrusive means of filling a significant gap in coverage. ATC could not prevail on California Code of Civil Procedure 1094.5 because it does not have a fundamental vested right to the continued use of the Verus, Border, and Mission Valley Facilities. There was no violation of the Equal Protection Clause because the City's decision to deny the CUP applications was rationally related to the City's legitimate interest in minimizing the aesthetic impact of wireless facilities and in providing public communications services. Accordingly, the court reversed in part and affirmed in part. View "American Tower Corp. v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a death row prisoner, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Department of Corrections officials and a prison guard, alleging that the prison guard read a confidential letter he sent to his attorney, rather than merely scanning it to inspect the letter for contraband. The court concluded that plaintiff stated a Sixth Amendment claim when he alleged that prison officials read his legal mail, that they claim entitlement to do so, and that his right to private consultation with counsel has been chilled; plaintiff's allegations also support a claim for injunctive relief; and, therefore, the court reversed the district court's dismissal for failure to state a claim and remanded for further proceedings. View "Nordstrom v. Ryan" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Coons and Novack filed suit challenging the constitutionality of two provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, as amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (Affordable Care Act): the individual mandate and the establishment of the Independent Payment Advisory Board (IPAB). Plaintiffs also sought a declaration that the Arizona Health Care Freedom Act, Ariz. Const. art. XXVII, section 2, is not preempted by the Affordable Care Act. The court affirmed the district court's holding that the individual mandate does not violate Coons' substantive due process right to medical autonomy; affirmed the dismissal of Coons' challenge, based on lack of ripeness, to the individual mandate for violation of his substantive due process right to informational privacy; affirmed the district court's holding that the Affordable Care Act preempts the Arizona Act; and, with respect to Novack's challenge to IPAB, the court vacated the district court's decision on the merits of the claim and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. View "Coons v. Lew" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Ringgold and Ringgold-Lockhart appealed the district court's vexatious litigant order. The court concluded that the district court provided proper notice and an opportunity to be heard, in accordance with the court's case law's first procedural requirement and due process; the district court compiled an adequate record to permit the court to review the basis of its order; the district court failed to consider alternative sanctions before issuing this injunction; the district court erred by issuing an order against Ringgold-Lockhart on the basis of state litigation in which he played no part; and the scope of the order is too broad in several respects. Accordingly, the court vacated the order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ringgold-Lockhart v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

The Hawaii AG filed suit in state court against six credit card providers, alleging that each violated state law by deceptively marketing and improperly enrolling cardholders in add-on credit card products. The card providers removed to federal court and the AG moved to remand. The district court denied the motion to remand. The court concluded that the state law claims were not preempted by the National Bank Act of 1864, 12 U.S.C. 85-86. The court joined the Fifth Circuit in holding that sections 85 and 86 did not completely preempt the claims, as there is a difference between alleging that certain customers are being charged too much, and alleging that they should have never been charged for the service in the first place. Therefore, the AG did not plead a completely preempted claim and the district court erred in finding federal question jurisdiction. The court agreed with its sister circuits in holding that the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d), does not completely preempt state law. Because the complaints unambiguously disclaimed class status, these actions cannot be removed under CAFA. There is no basis for federal jurisdiction and the cases should have been remanded to state court. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "State of Hawaii v. HSBC Bank of Nevada" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who is disabled and uses a wheelchair for mobility, filed suit against the District, contending that he could not fully enjoy football games because of the unavailability of wheelchair accessible seating. The court concluded that Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12131-12165, does not a require a public entity to structurally alter public seating at a high school football field, where the seating was constructed prior to the ADA's enactment, and the school district provides program access to individuals who use wheelchairs. In this case, the District provided plaintiff with program access to the football games and plaintiff failed to establish that the District excluded him from a public program. Accordingly, plaintiff's claim failed under Title II of the ADA and the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the District. View "Daubert v. Lindsay USD" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's holding that he was prohibited by federal law from possessing or receiving a firearm by virtue of his restriction on obtaining a Montana concealed weapon permit and that plaintiff, because of his prior felony conviction, had no federal constitutional right to possess a firearm. The court held that Montana's prohibition on plaintiff's obtaining a permit to carry a concealed weapon is a sufficient restriction of his firearm rights to trigger the "unless clause" of 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(20). Accordingly, plaintiff is forbidden to receive or possess a firearm under federal law and that ban does not violate his Second Amendment rights. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Van der hule v. Holder" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the County and the Sheriff, alleging that she was sexually assaulted by a deputy sheriff when she went to the County vehicle inspection site to clear a traffic ticket. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims for failure to state a claim for relief where her allegations did not establish that the County or the Sheriff were deliberately indifferent to the risk of sexual assault by deputies on members of the public, nor that the assault on plaintiff was a known or obvious consequence of the alleged lack of training of deputies. In view of California Penal Code 243.4(e)(1), which already prohibited such assault and which the deputies were sworn to uphold, and in the absence of any pattern of sexual assaults by deputies, plaintiff failed to allege facts sufficient to state a claim, plausible on its face, that the alleged failure to train officers not to commit sexual assault constituted deliberate indifference. View "Flores v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law