Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed her sentence of 37 months in custody, three years of supervised release, and restitution, imposed following her guilty plea to assault resulting in substantial bodily injury. The victim was defendant's daughter. The court held that the district court properly applied the four-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. 2A2.2(b)(2)(B) because the belt used by the victim's father to beat her with was employed as a "dangerous weapon." The court held that there was no abuse of discretion in adding the two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 3B1.4 because it was reasonably foreseeable to defendant that her husband would use K.H., a minor, to avoid being held responsible for the victim's murder. Because both enhancements were reasonable, the court rejected defendant's claim that her sentence was unreasonable under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). However, defendant's sentence for the misprision of felony offense exceeded the statutory minimum in 18 U.S.C. 4 and therefore, the court vacated the sentence in part. Nor did either party alert the court to another error that could have occurred in calculating the combined offense level under U.S.S.G. 3D1.4.

This case arose when the FCC found that Minority had "willfully and repeatedly" violated 47 U.S.C. 399b when it broadcasted paid promotional messages on its radio station from for-profit corporations. The statute was a a content-based ban on speech: public broadcasters could transmit many types of speech, but, unlike most other stations, they could not transmit three classes of advertising messages. Minority contended that section 399b was an unconstitutional content-based restriction on speech because it banned all paid public issue and political speech while permitting promotional messages by non-profits. The court applied intermediate scrutiny and upheld the ban on the transmission of advertisements for goods and services by for-profit entities, but the court struck down as unconstitutional the ban on public issue and political advertisements.

This case arose when plaintiff, a neo-natal intensive care unit (NICU) nurse, sought an accommodation from her employer that would have allowed her an unspecified number of unplanned absences from her job. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer on her reasonable accommodation claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12112(a), (b)(5)(A). The court held that plaintiff's performance was predicated on her attendance; reliable, dependable performance required reliable and dependable attendance. An employer need not provide accommodations that compromise performance quality. Because regular attendance was an essential function of a neo-natal nursing position, the court affirmed.

During the 2004 presidential campaign, plaintiffs, anti-Bush protestors, organized a demonstration at a campaign stop in Jacksonville, Oregon. Plaintiffs contended that Secret Service agents engaged in unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment by requiring that they demonstrate at a distance from the President because they were protesting - rather than supporting - his policies. In addition, plaintiffs maintained that the police officers who carried out the Secret Service agents' directions used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The court held that plaintiffs have stated a claim against the Secret Service agents for violation of the First Amendment. Plaintiffs have not, however, pleaded sufficient facts to sustain their Fourth Amendment claim against the police supervisors. Accordingly, the court held that the excessive force claim should be dismissed.

Plaintiffs appealed the district court's dismissal of their complaint and judgment in favor of defendants. Plaintiffs' action sought declaratory and injunctive relief barring the Government from enforcing the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 21 C.F.R. 1307.3, against them and for return or compensation for marijuana taken by the Government. Plaintiffs alleged that they consumed marijuana as a "sacrament/eucharist" in their religious ceremonies, and that their use was protected by the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),42 U.S.C. 2000bb-2000bb-4. The court held that plaintiffs' claims for prospective relief arising from the Government's seizure of marijuana met the constitutional requirements and prudential factors for ripeness, and plaintiffs have associational standing to assert their claims. Strictly construing the "appropriate relief" provision in favor of the Government, the court concluded that RFRA did not authorize suits for money damages. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claims for compensation for the seized marijuana.

Defendants were indicted, inter alia, for an eight-year conspiracy to violate the Contraband Cigarette Trafficking Act (CCTA), 18 U.S.C. 2341, by trafficking in "contraband cigarettes." Defendants moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the state of Washington retroceded its cigarette taxation to the Swinomish Tribe during the period of a cigarette tax contract it entered into with the Swinomish Tribe. The court agreed with defendants that during the period from 2003 to 2005, when they were licensed to sell tobacco by the Swinomish Tribe, there were no "applicable State or local cigarette taxes" under the CCTA. The court also agreed with defendants that the five-year statute of limitations for CCTA violations barred any charges based on activity from 1999-2003. The court concluded, however, that after their tribal tobacco license expired in 2005, defendants' activities ceased to be covered by the Swinomish cigarette tax contract (CTC) and that the state's retrocession therefore ceased to apply. The unstamped cigarettes that defendants transported and sold during this period were thus "contraband" under the CCTA. The court rejected defendants' due process and treaty arguments.

Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to vacate the sentences he received after his jury conviction of conspiracy to possess with intent to manufacture a controlled substance; his guilty plea to distribution of a controlled substance; and his guilty plea to a supervised release violation. The court reversed the district court's denial of defendant's section 2255 motion and remanded the matter to the district court with instructions to consider, for the purposes of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, whether defendant was prejudiced by his counsel's performance. If so, defendant's distribution conviction and sentence should be vacated, and if he wanted to take the attendant risks, he could go to trial on the distribution offense, and could appeal the manufacturing offense trial conviction, an appeal that was foreclosed by the plea agreement. If not, the court remanded for resentencing before a different district judge and ordered the government's specific performance of the terms of the plea agreement.

Petitioner sought review pursuant to a certificate of appealability of the denial of his petition for habeas corpus. Petitioner was found guilty of robbery with a deadly weapon, false imprisonment, battery with a deadly weapon, and battery causing substantial bodily harm. The court held that the Nevada Supreme Court's determination that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to declare a mistrial was not inconsistent with Dawson v. Delaware. Even if there was an error, that error would be harmless. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the petition on Ground 1. The court also affirmed the district court's holding that Grounds 3, 4, 5, and 6 of the amended petition did not relate back to the original petition and that petitioner's mental condition did not excuse his procedural default on Grounds 2 and 7. The court further held that petitioner had not made a substantial showing that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on Ground 1.

Defendant pled guilty to possession of stolen mail and access device fraud. This appeal addressed access device fraud under 18 U.S.C. 1029 and, specifically, whether the Government must prove the usability of an expired credit card number in order for a district court to enhance a sentence. The court held that, for an unauthorized access device whose usability was not readily apparent, such as an expired credit card number, some proof of usability was required when the defendant did not concede the fact or when the defendant challenged the enhancement. Therefore, the sentence was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiffs alleged that section 31 of article I of the California Constitution violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and caused the unfair exclusion of African American, Latino, and Native American students from higher education. They sought to enjoin the Governor and the President of the University of California, Mark Yudof, from enforcing section 31. Yudof asserted that he was immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment and that he was an improper defendant pursuant to Rule 21. Although the court held that plaintiffs' suit against Yudof was not barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity, the court held that plaintiffs' equal protection challenge to section 31 was precluded by Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, where the court previously upheld the constitutionality of section 31. Accordingly, the district court correctly dismissed the complaint against the Governor and Yudof for failure to state a claim.