Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner appealed the district court's dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas corpus petition. The district court dismissed petitioner's pro se petition as untimely under the one-year statue of limitations set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1), and alternatively, as a "second or successive" petition under section 2244(b). The court concluded that the district court erred in sua sponte dismissing the petition as untimely without providing petitioner with prior notice and an opportunity to respond. The court also held that the petition was not "second or successive" under AEDPA because it was the first petition to challenge the amended judgment of conviction, which was entered after his initial petition.

Defendant was convicted of murder and subsequently appealed the denial of his request for an evidentiary hearing on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during the guilt phase of his bifurcated trial. Because the government did not argue that defendant's trial counsel was effective, the question shifted to prejudice. The court concluded that the district court did not err in declining to order an evidentiary hearing because defendant could not establish prejudice from counsel's failure to present a mental state defense during the guilt phase.

Petitioner, in his capacity as the State Director of the United Public Workers, AFSCME, Local 646, AFL-CIO (UPW), negotiated contracts with dental and health insurance providers, HDS and PGMA, on behalf of UPW members and their families. A jury subsequently convicted petitioner of fifty counts of "theft of honest services" from the UPW and its members, as well as conspiracy, embezzlement, money laundering, and health care fraud. At issue was the instructional omission to the jury regarding honest services fraud in light of the Supreme Court's holding in Skilling v. United States. The court held that the error had no "substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Accordingly, the court affirmed the theft of honest services, money laundering, and health care fraud judgments of conviction against petitioner and affirmed the judgment of the district court.

In consolidated appeals, Marcus Major and Jordan Huff appealed from their convictions under Title 18 U.S.C. 1951 and 924. They also appealed from their sentence pursuant to section 924(c). The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of other crimes and in admitting evidence of defendants' affiliation with the High Roller Boyz. The court also held that there was no constitutional error in the district court's effort to restrict defendants' contact with anyone other than their attorneys; section 924(c) did not violate the doctrine of separation of powers or violate the Eighth Amendment; and the district court was correct in concluding that section 924(c) required the court to determine the order in which a defendant received convictions, rather than the order in which offenses were committed. Applying the rule of lenity, when the district court did not have sufficient information to determine the order in which the jury made determinations of guilt during jury deliberations on multiple counts under section 924(c), it must order the convictions so that the mandatory minimum sentenced was minimized. In this case, application of the rule required the district court to deem one of the brandishing counts, rather than a discharging count, to be the first conviction.

Defendant was convicted of one count of obstruction of justice for failing to disclose the full extent of his knowledge regarding the mailing of a letter that could reasonably be believed to constitute an attempt at voter intimidation. Defendant, a Republican candidate for a seat in the U.S. House of Representatives at the time, contended that there was insufficient probable cause to support the issuance of the warrant and that, therefore, the evidence obtained pursuant to it should have been suppressed at his trial. The court held that there was sufficient probable cause to support the issuance of the warrant to search defendant's home and campaign headquarters. The court rejected defendant's First Amendment claim. Although defendant was never prosecuted for a violation of the election laws, in light of the contents of the letter and the facts surrounding its distribution, there was a fair probability that the campaign mailing constituted a tactic of intimidation intended to induce its recipients to refrain from voting. Accordingly, the order of the district court denying the motion to suppress was affirmed.

Plaintiff sued the University of Oregon, alleging that it prevented her from completing a Ph.D. program in retaliation for having complained of gender-based institutional bias in the University's Ph.D. program, and gender discrimination by her faculty dissertation committee chair. The court held that the facts were sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title IX. Because a reasonable jury could conclude from the evidence presented at summary judgment that the faculty chair's resignation was gender-based retaliation, the district court erred in granting summary judgment. The court also reversed the district court's award of costs because the University was no longer the prevailing party under Rule 54(d).

Two non-Indian entities brought this action to enjoin Navajo Nation tribal officials from applying tribal law to them in tribal courts. They claimed that both their contract with the tribe and federal law deprived tribal officials of authority to regulate them. At issue was whether the Navajo Nation itself was a necessary party under Rule 19. The court held that the tribe was not a necessary party because the tribal officials could be expected to adequately represent the tribe's interests in this action and because complete relief could be accorded among the existing parties without the tribe. Thus, this lawsuit for prospective injunctive relief could proceed against the officials under a routine application of Ex parte Young and should not be dismissed.

Plaintiff environmental groups sought to enjoin the implementation of a statute, Section 1713 of the 2011 Appropriations Act, that ordered the Secretary of the Interior to remove a portion of a distinct population of gray wolves from the Protections of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1531, without regard to any statute or regulation that might otherwise apply. Plaintiffs brought this action contending that Section 1713 violated the separation of powers. The district court rejected plaintiffs' claims on the grounds that Congress had acted within its constitutional authority to change the laws applicable to pending litigation. The court held that because this case was controlled by Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society, the court affirmed the judgment.

The Nevada Constitution authorized the citizens of Nevada to enact statutes and amend the Nevada Constitution through the initiative process. To place an initiative on the ballot, proponents must obtain signatures from a number of registered voters equal to 10 percent of the votes cast in the previous general election. This signature requirement was also subject to a geographic distribution requirement known as the All Districts Rule. Plaintiffs sought an order declaring the All Districts Rule unconstitutional and enjoining the state from enforcing it. The court held that plaintiffs have not demonstrated the existence of a genuine issue on their claims that the All Districts Rule violated either the Equal Protection Clause or the First Amendment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Defendants appealed their convictions for bulk cash smuggling and failure to file reports on exporting monetary instruments. Border agents found a bag containing $500,000 in cash in a box under a sheet in the back of defendants' van when they were making an early morning crossing. No declaration of possession had been made. Defendants appealed their convictions and sentences, contending that there was insufficient evidence to convict, that there was instructional error, that their convictions violated the double jeopardy clause, that the indictments should have been dismissed because the government had destroyed evidence, that prosecutorial misconduct and false comments in argument gave them a right to a new trial, that there was cumulative error, and that the district court misapplied the sentencing guidelines. The court rejected all these contentions and affirmed the judgment. The court remanded to the district court and ordered it to amend the judgments to remove references to 31 U.S.C. 5324(b)(1).