Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm. He challenged the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a warrantless probation search of his room. The court held that, although the police did not have reasonable suspicion to search defendant's room, they needed no such suspicion because defendant was subject to suspicionless search as condition of his probation. Under United States v. Baker, such searches did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the district court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress.

Plaintiff sued two Nevada Gaming Control Board agents under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that the agents violated his Fourth Amendment rights by arresting him without probable cause to believe he had committed a crime. The court held that the district court erred when it reserved the issue of whether the agents had qualified immunity for the jury even though the parties did not materially dispute what facts the agents knew when they arrested plaintiff. The court also held that the agents did not violate clearly established rights by arresting plaintiff. Accordingly, the agents were entitled to qualified immunity and the court reversed the district court's denial of their motion for summary judgment.

Petitioner was convicted of two counts of murder in the first degree, two counts of felony murder, one count of robbery, and one count of grand theft in 1986. Petitioner requested permission to file a second or successive application for writ of habeas corpus in the District of Idaho under 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(3)(A). The court held that petitioner's claims did not satisfy the requirements of section 2244(b)(2). Therefore, petitioner's motion was denied.

Plaintiff, as the personal representative of the estate of her brother Eric, appealed the judgment of the district court in favor of defendants. The complaint asserted a claim against defendants for violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983 by subjecting Eric to an unreasonable search and seizure and denying due process and the equal protection of the laws. A claim was also asserted under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12131, et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 794, as well as several claims under Arizona law. The court reviewed the district court's evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion and held, among other things, that the exclusion of testimony showing plaintiff's state of mind was both error and prejudicial and the exclusion of experts' opinions based on that testimony was equally error and prejudicial. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.

Defendant appealed his 87-month sentence on a guilty plea to one count of conspiracy to defraud the government by filing false claims. Defendant contended that the U.S. Attorney breached the parties' plea agreement by disclosing admissions made by defendant while cooperating with the government, and by urging imposition of a sentence above the low end of the Sentencing Guidelines. Defendant also contended that the district court erred by improperly imposing a two-level leadership enhancement. The court held that the breach of plea agreement by the U.S. Attorney resulted in plain error that affected defendant's substantial rights. The court also held that the district court committed clear error when it imposed the enhancement under U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(c). Accordingly, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing before a different judge.

Defendant stands accused of multiple murders and attempted murders, including the attempted murder of U.S. Representative Gabrielle Giffords. While defendant was in custody, the Bureau of Prisons determined that defendant was a danger to himself or others and conducted hearings pursuant to 28 C.F.R. 549.46(a), Harper hearings, to determine if he could be involuntarily medicated. Defendant subsequently appealed the district court's denial of an emergency motion to enjoin the involuntary medication decision of June 14, 2011 (No. 11-10339); the denial of his emergency motion for a prompt post-deprivation judicial hearing (No. 11-10432); and the denial of his emergency motion to enjoin the involuntary medication decision of September 15, 2011 and the subsequent extension of the commitment order (No. 11-10504). The court concluded that defendant was provided with the substance and procedure demanded by the Due Process Clause before the government involuntarily medicated him; it was clear that defendant had a severe mental illness, that he represented a danger to himself or others, and that the prescribed medication was appropriate and in his medical interest; and there was no arbitrariness in the district court's order denying the motion to enjoin defendant's emergency treatment and he could be involuntarily medicated. The court also concluded that the district court did not commit legal error in its commitment rulings; its finding that there was substantial probability that defendant would be restored to competency in the foreseeable future was supported by the evidence and not clearly erroneous; and defendant could be committed pursuant to the district court's order and subject to its supervision. Therefore, judgment in No. 11-10504 was affirmed. Because the Harper III hearing superseded the Harper hearings and the emergency medication orders, appeals No. 11-10339 and No. 11-10432 were dismissed as moot.

In this case, an insurance agency had a contract with an insurance company that allowed the agency to commingle collected insurance premiums with its other funds in its general operating account. The government contended that the premiums collected by the agency were the property of the insurance company and held "in trust" by the agency; it alleged that when the funds were not remitted but used for other purposes, they were embezzled by the agency's treasurer, defendant. Defendant was charged with ten counts of embezzlement of insurance premiums in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1033(b)(1) and one count of conspiracy to commit embezzlement. The court held that under long-standing Arizona law, the contract between the agency and the company, which permitted agency commingling, required monthly agency payments whether premiums were collected or not, and created a right of interest on late payments, created a creditor-debtor relationship, not a trust. The agency had contractual and fiduciary duties to the company, but was not a trustee. Because the funds in question were not held "in trust" by the agency as a matter of law, an essential element of embezzlement was lacking. Therefore, the court reversed the denial of defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal.

Plaintiff represented a class of legal immigrants in the state of Washington adversely affected by its recent termination of a state-funded food assistance program for legal immigrants, which exclusively benefitted Washington resident aliens who became ineligible for federal food stamps following the enactment of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 8 U.S.C. 1601 et seq. Plaintiff contended that the state, by eliminating food assistance to class members while continuing to administer federal food assistance to U.S. citizens and certain qualified aliens, violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause and, by failing to provide class members adequate pre-deprivation notice and opportunity to be heard, also violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Because plaintiff failed even to allege that the State treated her less favorably than a similarly situated citizen of the State, her claim of alienage discrimination failed on the merits. The court agreed with the State that plaintiff lacked the concrete and particularized interest required for standing to claim a procedural due process violation. Consequently, plaintiff either lacked standing or would not succeed on the merits of her claims. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's order granting the motion for a preliminary injunction, vacated the injunction, and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a probation search. Following the court's holding in United States v. Davis, the district court held that, to support the search, the officers needed only a "reasonable suspicion" to conclude that the probationer owned, controlled, or possessed an item within the probationer's residence. Defendant contended that the greater standard of "probable cause" applied in these circumstances. Because the court's holding in Davis had not been overruled and was not clearly irreconcilable with any intervening case law, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant appealed from his conviction for conducting the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity, conspiring to commit those acts, and committing violent crimes in aid of racketeering. Defendant contended that the district court erred when it failed to hold a competency hearing, sua sponte, to determine whether he was competent to stand trial. Based on the evidence before the district judge, including more than four years' experience with defendant, a reasonable judge in the district judge's position would not necessarily have entertained a bona fide doubt as to whether defendant had the ability to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him and had the ability to assist in his defense. Therefore, the decision not to order a second competency hearing was within the district court's sound discretion and that discretion was not abused. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.