Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals
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Plaintiffs filed a class action against defendants, motor carriers, alleging that defendants routinely violate California's meal and rest break laws, Cal. Lab. Code 226.7, 512; Cal. Code Regs. tit.8, 11090. The district court held on summary judgment that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994, 49 U.S.C. 14501(c)(1), preempts those state laws as applied to motor carriers. The court concluded that the Act does not preempt California's meal and rest break laws as applied to defendants because those laws are not related to defendants' prices, routes, or services. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Dilts v. Penske Logistics, Inc." on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs, five individual "Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals" (DACA) recipients living in Arizona, sought a preliminary injunction prohibiting defendants from enforcing their policy that prevents DACA recipients from obtaining Arizona driver's licenses. The district court denied the preliminary injunction. The court concluded that plaintiffs' requested preliminary injunction was prohibitory, not mandatory; the court need not rely on plaintiffs' preemption claim to determine whether plaintiffs have established a likelihood of success on the merits of their challenge to defendants' policy; plaintiffs demonstrated a likelihood of success on their equal protection claim and the subsequent revision of defendants' policy did not undermine this conclusion where the current policy continues to permit the use of Employment Authorization Documents as proof of authorized presence for two sizeable groups of noncitizens similarly situated to DACA recipients and where there was no rational relationship between the policy and a legitimate state interest; plaintiffs have shown that, in the absence of a preliminary injunction, they are likely to suffer irreparable harm where, among other things, plaintiffs' inability to obtain driver's licenses limits their professional opportunities; and plaintiffs have established that both the public interest and the balance of the equities favor a preliminary injunction. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded with instructions to enter a preliminary injunction. View "Arizona Dream Act Coalition v. Brewer" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the County on their challenge to the SFSD's policy prohibiting male deputies from supervising female inmates in the housing units of SFSD's jails. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the County on plaintiffs' sex discrimination claims and derivative claims where the County was not entitled to summary judgment because it was unable to bear its burden of demonstrating that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether it was entitled to a "bona fide occupational qualification" (BFOQ) defense. On summary judgment, the County may not rely on deference to the Sheriff's judgment in order to meet its burden of proving that it was entitled to a BFOQ defense. In the absence of deference to the Sheriff's judgment, the County was also unable to meet its burden of proving that there was no issue of material fact as to whether its policy of excluding all male deputies from the female housing units was a legitimate proxy for excluding only those deputies that truly pose a threat to the important interests SFSD rightfully sought to protect. Because the district court's conclusion that the County was entitled to a BFOQ defense was also the basis for its denial of plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, the court also vacated the district court's denial of plaintiffs' motion. The court dismissed plaintiffs' evidentiary challenges; affirmed the district court's award of attorney's fees; and affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the County on Plaintiff Gray's retaliation claims. View "Ambat, et al. v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco" on Justia Law

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Police, on the lookout for two white males, mistook a teenaged boy and his friends, all Hispanic, for intruders in the boy's own home. The police pointed guns at the boys, entered the home without a warrant, handcuffed and detained the boys and others, and shot and killed the family dog. The boy's family, the Sandovals, filed suit alleging violations of their constitutional rights and related rights under state law. On appeal, the Sandovals challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment to the police department and the officers on all claims. The court concluded that Officer Dunn's warrantless entry into the home was not supported by probable cause and thus violated plaintiffs' rights; because it was clearly established Federal law that the warrantless search of a dwelling must be supported by probable cause and the existence of exigent circumstances or an emergency aid exception, the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity; the court reversed the grant of qualified immunity to the officers on plaintiffs' excessive force claims where the district court unfairly tipped the reasonableness inquiry in the officers' favor, rather than in the Sandovals' favor; the court rejected plaintiffs' familial association claim where the boy's father was separated from his son briefly and where the shooting of the family dog did not fall within the ambit of deprivation of familial relationship; the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the officers on the equal protection claim and municipal liability claim; the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the officers on the state law intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault and battery, and false imprisonment claims as they relate to Jesus Sandoval, and the handcuffing and detention of the boys once the officers knew no crime had been committed; and the court affirmed the dismissal of the remaining state law claims. The court reversed the district court's judgment as to the Fourth Amendment claims for excessive force and unlawful entry. View "Sandoval v. Las Vegas Metro Police Dep't" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that several correctional officers violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment. On appeal, defendant challenged the magistrate judge's grant of the officers' motion to dismiss and entry of judgment against plaintiff. The court concluded that the judgment was invalid where the magistrate judge entered judgment on behalf of the district court without the parties' consent, as required by 28 U.S.C. 636(c)(1). The court remanded to the district court with instructions to vacate the invalid judgment and to conduct further proceedings. View "Allen v. Meyer, et al." on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, challenging the constitutionality of Los Angeles Municipal Code Section 85.02, which prohibits use of a vehicle "as living quarters either overnight, day-by-day, or otherwise." The court concluded that section 85.02 provides inadequate notice of the unlawful conduct it proscribes, and opens the door to discriminatory enforcement against the homeless and poor. Accordingly, section 85.02 violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as an unconstitutionally vague statute. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants. View "Desertrain v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

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This case arose from a political battle concerning labor unions. Chula Vista Citizens and the Associations sought to place an initiative on the Chula Vista municipal ballot. The City of Chula Vista requires that initiative proponents be electors (the elector requirement). Because Cal. Elec. Code 9202(a) requires proponents to sign a notice of intent, the effect of Cal. Elec. Code 9207 is that the identities of official proponents are disclosed to would-be signatories of the petition (the petition-proponent disclosure requirement). Plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the elector and petition-proponent disclosure requirements, both facially and as applied, violated the First Amendment. Determining that the elector requirement was properly before the court because it implicated the chilling of expression and because the parties had not indicated that there were many pending actions in the California courts, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants as to the elector requirement where the Associations did not have a First Amendment right to serve as official proponents of local ballot initiatives. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants as to the petition-proponent disclosure requirement where the requirement was unconstitutional because they require official initiative proponents to identify themselves on the face of initiative petitions. View "Chula Vista Citizens v. Norris" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit against the City and the ECCC, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and various California statutes. Plaintiff tripped and fell as he tried to walk around a car show vendor's display blocking a curb ramp. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants. The court concluded that the district court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of the City because the district court relied on an inapplicable legal standard and because there was a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the City denied plaintiff access to a public service or otherwise discriminated against him under Title II. Because the City was not entitled to summary judgment on the ADA claim, the district court erred by granting summary judgment for the City on plaintiff's claims under the California statutes. The court took no position on whether the City did in fact deny plaintiff access to a public service or discriminate against him by reason of disability under 42 U.S.C. 12132. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Cohen v. City of Culver City" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of her action claiming that she was the rightful owner to two works of art my Lucas Cranach, "Adam" and "Eve." Plaintiff claimed that she is the rightful owner of the works, which the Nazis forcibly purchased from her deceased husband's family during World War II. The court reversed and concluded that plaintiff's claims for replevin and conversion, as well as the remedies she seeks, do not conflict with federal policy because the Cranachs were never subject to postwar internal restitution proceedings in the Netherlands. Allowing plaintiff's claim to go forward would not disturb the finality of any internal restitution proceedings - appropriate or not - in the Netherlands. Nor is this dispute of the sort found to involve the international problems evident in American Insurance Association v. Garamendi. The court was mindful that the litigation of this case may implicate the act of state doctrine, though the court could not decide that issue definitively on the record. The court remanded for further development of this issue. View "Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum" on Justia Law

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Defendants appealed an order certifying a class and a subclass of inmates in Arizona's prison system who claim that they are subject to systematic Eighth Amendment violations. Defendants argued that the district court abused its discretion in concluding that plaintiffs have demonstrated commonality and typicality under Rule 23(a). The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that plaintiffs' claims depend upon common questions of law or fact that are answerable in one stroke. Here, plaintiffs are all inmates in ADC custody and each declares that he or she is being exposed, like all other members of the putative class, to a substantial risk of serious harm by the challenged ADC policies. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court did not err in determining that plaintiffs have satisfied the commonality and typicality requirement of Rule 23(a). Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that a single injunction and declaratory judgment could provide relief to each member of the proposed class and subclass. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Parsons v. Ryan" on Justia Law