Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sued defendants, employees of the State of Washington's State Operated Living Alternative (SOLA) program, on behalf of herself and her daughter's estate under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that defendants deprived her daughter of her Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right to safe physical conditions while in involuntary state custody. Plaintiff subsequently appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants. The court held that defendants had no constitutionally required duty of care towards plaintiff's daughter because there was no special relationship between her daughter and the state and there was no state-created danger. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and requested that the district court recommend a southern California housing designation to the Bureau of Prisons. At the sentencing hearing, neither the district court nor counsel addressed this request. Defendant and the government subsequently filed a joint stipulation asking the court to revise the Judgment and Commitment Order to include the designation recommendation. The district court denied the request. Defendant appealed, asserting jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291 and/or 18 U.S.C. 3742. The court held that because it lacked jurisdiction to review a district court's non-binding housing recommendation, the appeal was dismissed.

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, county officers and the county, alleging a state law wrongful death claim and a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim for excessive force under the Fourth Amendment when her 18-year-old son was shot and killed in his driveway by the officers. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants after concluding there was no constitutional violation. The court held that there were material questions of fact about plaintiff's son's and the officers' actions that precluded a conclusion that the officers' rapid resort to deadly force was reasonable as a matter of law. The court concluded that resolution of these issues was critical to a proper determination of the officers' entitlement to qualified immunity. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's summary judgment on the use of lethal force. The court also reversed and remanded for reconsideration of whether plaintiff's state law wrongful death claim could properly be resolved on summary judgment.

Plaintiffs, both women who were tased during an encounter with officers, filed a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 seeking damages for the alleged violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. At issue was whether the use of a taser to subdue a suspect resulted in the excessive use of force and whether the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. The court held that, although plaintiffs in both cases have alleged constitutional violations because a reasonable fact finder could conclude that the officers' use of a taser was unconstitutionally excessive, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiffs' section 1983 claims because the law was not clearly established at the time of the incidents. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's denial of qualified immunity on these claims. In Brooks, however, the court affirmed the district court's denial of qualified immunity on her state law assault and battery claims against the officers.

Defendant appealed his sentence of three years' imprisonment for unlawfully exporting PVS-14 Gen 3 night-vision devices in violation of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), 22 U.S.C. 2778. These devices, designed for military use, enabled users to see at greater distances in low light and dark conditions. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by following the Sentencing Guidelines where the sentence was substantively reasonable because the district court explained that it had considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and the district court had granted a downward departure.

Defendant was convicted of robbery and aiding and abetting robbery in Indian country in violation of U.S.C. 1153(a) and 2111. On appeal, defendant contended that the government did not present sufficient evidence to establish that he was an "Indian" for purposes of prosecution under section 1153. The court disagreed and held that, in light of all the evidence presented at trial, a reasonable trier of fact could have found that defendant was an Indian. Therefore, the court affirmed defendant's conviction.

Defendant was convicted, on a plea of guilty, of serving as an airman without an airman's certificate. Defendant appealed from his sentence on the ground that the district court procedurally erred by sentencing him pursuant to U.S.S.G. 2A5.2 rather than U.S.S.G. 2B1.1. The court held that, by relying on defendant's uncharged relevant conduct in selecting the applicable guidelines, the district court incorrectly calculated defendant's guidelines range. In doing so, the district court committed procedural error in sentencing him and therefore, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing under the correct guideline.

Defendant, the former Chief Executive Officer of Brocade Communications (Brocade or the Company), a company the developed and sold data switches for networks, appealed his conviction in a second criminal trial for securities fraud and making false filings; falsifying corporate books and records; and making false statements to auditors in violation of securities laws. Defendant was previously convicted of violating the securities laws but the court vacated that conviction because of prosecutorial misconduct and remanded for a new trial. In this appeal, the court held that there was no evidence of sufficient facts in the record to support any allegation of prosecutorial misconduct. The court also held that there was sufficient evidence of materiality to support defendant's conviction. The court further held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by not giving defendant's proposed jury instruction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant appealed his jury conviction for assault with a dangerous weapon and possession of a contraband in prison. On appeal, defendant argued that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to instruct the jury on his theory that he acted in self-defense; the district court violated his Confrontation Clause rights by refusing to allow him to cross-examine the treating physician about the cause of the victim's injuries; the district court erred by refusing to let him designate the treating physician as his expert witness on causation during trial; and his sentence was substantively unreasonable because his guidelines range sentence included "recency points," which were removed from the guidelines after he was sentenced. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that defendant's evidence was mere speculation and that a jury could not rationally sustain the defense based on the evidence presented. The court also held that the district court did not err in limiting cross examination of the treating physician and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to permit defendant to add the treating physician as a defense witness on the causation issue during trial. The court further held that defendant's sentence was reasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Petitioner, a death row inmate, appealed the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner raised three grounds for relief: (1) petitioner claimed that the state failed to disclose an oral agreement with a co-defendant, in violation of Brady v. Maryland and Giglio v. United States; (2) petitioner claimed that the state failed to correct the co-defendant's false testimony denying the existence of this agreement, in violation of Napue v. Illinois; and (3) petitioner claimed that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance at the penalty phase in violation of Strickland v. Washington. The court affirmed the denial of relief with respect to petitioner's guilt-phase claims based on Brady, Giglio, and Napue. However, the court reversed on petitioner's penalty-phase claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, which was not decided on the merits in state court. The court concluded that counsel's complete failure to investigate and present mitigating evidence of petitioner's troubled childhood, his mental illness, and his history of chronic drug abuse constituted deficient performance. The court further concluded that this failure prejudiced petitioner. Therefore, the court granted the writ with respect to petitioner's death sentence.