Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

During petitioner's murder trial, defense counsel failed to object to the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to strike six Hispanic venirepersons. Petitioner appealed the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus based on defense counsel's claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. At issue was whether defense counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's allegedly group bias-based peremptory challenges constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, which ineffectiveness now required a grant of federal habeas relief under the Sixth Amendment. The court affirmed the district court's denial of petitioner's claim because he failed to present evidence sufficient to overcome the strong presumption that counsel's performance was reasonable, as set out in Strickland v. Washington.

Appellant, owner and operator the Custer Battlefield Museum, was investigated in 2005 for unlawfully attempting to sell migratory bird parts and for fraudulently misrepresenting the provenance of historical artifacts for sale. During that investigation, two search warrants were executed and the court sealed the affidavits supporting the warrant applications. The government ultimately declined prosecution of any criminal charges. In 2010, appellant asked the district court for a copy of the search warrant applications and supporting affidavits. At issue was whether the public had a common law or First Amendment right of access to materials filed in support of search warrant applications after an investigation had been terminated. The court held that the public had a qualified common law right of access to warrant materials after an investigation had been terminated. The court also held that the district court properly recognized that right here, but it erred by granting appellant only restricted access to the warrant materials without articulating a compelling reason for its ruling or making specific factual findings. Therefore, the district court's order was vacated and the matter remanded to the district court to reapply the common law standard to appellant's request.

Defendant appealed from his conditional guilty plea to receiving material involving the sexual exploitation of minors in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2). Defendant challenged the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized from computers in his custody. The court held that, giving the appropriate deference to the appointed Primary Search Authority Military Magistrate's determination as required by Illinois v. Gates and the court's own precedent, there was probable cause to support the issuance of the warrant. Alternatively, even if the court were to determine that there was no probable cause for the warrant, the court would affirm the district court's determination that the warrant fit within the good-faith exception set forth in United States v. Leon. Accordingly, the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress was affirmed.

Defendant appealed his sentence of 25 months' imprisonment plus five years of supervised release following his guilty plea to ten counts of embezzlement under 18 U.S.C. 656, and eight counts of bank fraud under 18 U.S.C. 1344. The eighteen counts defendant pleaded guilty to related to two schemes to defraud Wells Fargo: an embezzlement scheme and a check-kiting scheme. On appeal, defendant's primary contention was that because he did not know he was the subject of a pending criminal investigation at the time he committed perjury in a civil suit concerning the very same conduct later charged in the criminal indictment, the district court erred in applying U.S.S.G. 3C1.1 to enhance his sentence for willfully obstructing justice. The court held that because the district court applied the correct legal standard and relied upon probative evidence submitted by the government, the district court did not err in calculating the intended loss at being over $200,000. The court also held that "willful" meant only that defendant had engaged in intentional or deliberate acts designed to obstruct any potential investigation, at the time an investigation was in fact pending; it did not mean that defendant had to know for certain that the investigation was pending. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Plaintiff brought this suit in 2004, challenging the constitutionality of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, 10 U.S.C. 654(b). While an appeal was pending in this case, Congress enacted the Don't Ask, Don't Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515. Consequently, the court held that this case became moot when the repeal of section 654 took effect on September 20, 2010. Therefore, the court vacated and remanded with directions to dismiss.

Plaintiffs, representing a putative class of purchasers of contact lens solutions, appealed the district court's order granting summary judgment for defendant. Plaintiffs brought suit alleging that defendant violated California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 17200 et seq., and False Advertising Law (FAL), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 17500 et seq., by marketing Complete MoisturePlus as a product that cleaned and disinfected lenses. The district court ruled that plaintiffs lacked standing. Defendant argued that the ruling was not in error and that even if it was, the suit was properly dismissed because the class' claims were preempted by 21 U.S.C. 360k(a) of the Medical Devices Amendments of 1976 (MDA), 21 U.S.C. 360(c) et seq. The court held that the district court was incorrect to conclude that this class of plaintiffs lacked standing where they had demonstrated economic harm, but the court held that it could affirm the district court's summary judgment on any ground supported by the record. Therefore, the court held that the record demonstrated that the class' claims were preempted, so the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment.

Defendant was convicted of illegal reentry in 2004, escape, and a second count of illegal reentry with a found-in date of June 7, 2007. Defendant appealed his conviction on the second illegal reentry offense, challenging the denial of his motion to dismiss based on violation of the 30-day preindictment time limit imposed by the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161(b). The court held that the Speedy Trial Act's 30-day preindictment time limit, which ordinarily ran from the date of the defendant's initial arrest, restarted when the underlying complaint was dismissed without prejudice and the charges were later refiled. In this case, the 30-day clock both started and stopped upon the filing of the second superseding indictment, which reinstated the dismissed illegal reentry charge. Therefore, there was no violation of section 3161(b) and the district court properly denied defendant's motion to dismiss.

Plaintiff, a Washington State prisoner, sought relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for alleged violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment right of access to the courts and alleged supplemental state law claims for conversion and fraud. Along with his complaint, plaintiff moved to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915. Plaintiff subsequently appealed the district court's sua sponte dismissal of his pro se civil rights action for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. In light of the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act's (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. 1915(g), "three-strikes" provision, the court concluded that because three of the five dismissals on which defendants relied were not final at the time plaintiff took his appeal, they could not count against him in this case. Therefore, the court declined to revoke plaintiff's IFP status. The court also reversed the district court's order dismissing plaintiff's right to access the courts, retaliation, and state law conversion claims and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed the district court's judgment as to plaintiff's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961-1968, claim because the district court properly concluded that the deficiencies in plaintiff's complaint could not be cured by an amendment.

Plaintiff, a former recruiter for Nielsen Media Research, Inc. (Nielsen), appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment on her age and disability discrimination and wrongful termination claims under California law against Nielsen. The court held that, in viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, reasonable jurors could find that Nielsen's proffered reason for terminating plaintiff's employment was a pretext for age discrimination. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment against plaintiff on her age discrimination and wrongful termination claims. The court affirmed summary judgment against plaintiff on her disability discrimination claim.

This case arose when the Port of Los Angeles prohibited motor carriers from operating drayage trucks on port property unless the motor carriers entered into concession agreements with the port. The concession agreements set forth fourteen specific requirements covering, among other things, truck driver employment, truck maintenance, parking, and port security. The agreements were adopted as part of the port's "Clean Truck Program," adopted in response to community opposition that had successfully stymied port growth. Plaintiff challenged the concession agreements, arguing that they were preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAA Act), 49 U.S.C. 14501 et seq. The court held that the district court meticulously identified and applied the governing law. The court affirmed the district court's holding that the financial capability, maintenance, off-street parking, and placard provisions were not preempted. The court reversed the district court's conclusion that the employee-driver provision was saved from preemption by the market participant doctrine, and remanded for further proceedings.