Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was sentenced to death for the murder of two thirteen-year-old girls. Defendant challenged his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2254, arguing that he should receive an evidentiary hearing to develop the claim that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance at sentencing by failing to adequately investigate and present evidence that defendant suffered from organic brain damage at the time of the murders. The court held that, under the demanding standard of Strickland v. Washington, defendant had not presented a colorable claim that counsel's actions were constitutionally ineffective. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of an evidentiary hearing.

Defendant, a former Boeing engineer who gave technological information to China, appealed his convictions on six counts of violating the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (EEA), 18 U.S.C. 1831(a)(1), (3); on one count of conspiring to violate the EEA, 18 U.S.C. 371; on one count of acting as an unregistered foreign agent, 18 U.S.C. 951; and on one count of making a false statement to federal agents, 18 U.S.C. 1001. On appeal, defendant argued primarily that his convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence, and in the alternative, defendant contended that he was entitled to a new trial because the government failed to turn over exculpatory information in violation of its duty under Brady v. Maryland and because the district court made several erroneous evidentiary rulings. Defendant finally challenged the district court's calculation of his offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines. The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant's convictions; that there were no Brady violations; that there was no violation of defendant's Sixth Amendment rights where the admission of certain evidence at issue was harmless; and that the district court did not err in choosing section 2M3.2 as the most analogous guideline applicable to the foreign agent conviction.

Defendant appealed from the district court's denial in part of his motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). Defendant contended that the district court's modification of his sentence to the 120-month mandatory minimum term pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A) constituted the application of a new sentence in violation of Dillon v. United States and that the sentence the court ordered violated Apprendi v. New Jersey. The court affirmed and held that the district court's application of the mandatory minimum term pursuant to section 841(b)(1)(A) did not constitute an imposition of a new sentence.

Defendant pleaded guilty for violating 18 U.S.C. 704(a), which prohibited the unauthorized wearing of military medals, where defendant fraudulently obtained a Purple Heart and wore it in public. On appeal, defendant challenged the constitutionality of the statute. The court held that defendant's overbreadth challenge failed because a person violated the unauthorized wearing portion of section 704(a) only if he or she had an intent to deceive. The court rejected defendant's argument that United States v. Alvarez dictated that section 704(a) was unconstitutional. The court held that, under United States v. O'Brien, the government had a compelling interest in preventing the intentionally deceptive wearing of medals; those interests were unrelated to the suppression of free expression because section 704(a) did not prevent the expression of any particular message or viewpoint; and section 704(a) promoted the goals of maintaining the integrity of the military's medals and preventing the fraudulent wearing of military medals. Therefore, the court rejected defendant's facial First Amendment challenge.

The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), a part of the United States Department of Treasury, froze the assets of Al Haramain Islamic Foundation, Oregon (AHIF-Oregon), a non-profit organization, and designated AHIF-Oregon as a "specially designated global terrorist" pursuant to Executive Order No. 13,224. AHIF-Oregon eventually filed an action asserting that the OFAC violated a variety of its statutory and constitutional rights. The Multicultural Association of Southern Oregon, which the government had not accused of supporting terrorism, challenged certain laws that barred it from providing services to designated entities such as the AHIF-Oregon. With the exception of one claim not at issue on appeal, the district court granted summary judgment to OFAC. The court affirmed the district court's ruling that substantial evidence supported OFAC's redesignation of AHIF-Oregon as a specially designated global terrorist, and the court affirmed the district court's rejection of AHIF-Oregon's due process claims. The court reversed the district court's rejection of AHIF-Oregon's Fourth Amendment claim and remanded for the district to determine what judicial relief, if any, was available. Finally, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' First Amendment claim.

The Tribes of the Yakima Nation claimed that the principle of Indian tax immunity had been violated by the State of Washington's current cigarette excise tax, which the Tribes argued left their retailers liable for payment of the tax when retailers sold cigarettes to non-Indians. The court held that, although some elements of Washington's cigarette tax law had been modified over the past thirty years, the court concluded that none of those changes had materially altered the legal incidence of the cigarette tax approved of in Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation v. Washington. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the state.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of nine counts of bank fraud, two counts of fraudulent use of an access device, two counts of attempted fraudulent use of an access device, two counts of laundering monetary instruments, and one count of money laundering. The district judge found by clear and convincing evidence that defendant had murdered his wife and that her death was the means he used to commit his crimes. Relying on that finding, the judge imposed a sentence of 262 months. Defendant appealed his sentence, arguing that the district court committed procedural error and that, in any event, its sentence was substantively unreasonable. The court held that it was eminently reasonable for the district court to infer that the victim was dead, that defendant knew she was dead, and that he had brought about her death in order to pillage her assets. The court also held that the district court's references to the seriousness of defendant's conduct and resulting harm to the victim was more than adequate to explain both its decision to depart drastically and its ultimate sentence. The court further held that its review of the record satisfied the court that the district court took great pains to fashion its sentence in light of the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors. The court finally held that given that defendant's involvement in the victim's death was factually established, the district court was not unreasonable in giving it great weight; having determined that defendant intended to murder the victim, it was reasonable for the district court to substantially increase defendant's sentence; and the pre-indictment delay was not a relevant sentencing factor. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment.

Defendant pleaded guilty for unlawfully attempting to reenter the United States after having previously been removed. At issue was whether the district court erroneously held that defendant's petty theft convictions each categorically qualified as an aggravated felony. The court held that because the judicially-noticeable documents submitted by the United States Attorney established clearly and unequivocally that defendant's May 30, 2006 petty theft conviction was based upon his plea of guilty to conduct that constituted a generic theft offense, and because this was a theft offense conviction for which the term of imprisonment was at least one year, defendant's offense level was correctly increased by eight levels under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(C).

Petitioner, a citizen and national of Honduras, filed an application for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The BIA denied the application, concluding that petitioner had not established that he would more likely than not be tortured if removed to Honduras. The court held that, because the BIA failed to give reasoned consideration to potentially dispositive testimony by petitioner's expert witnesses and did not address all of petitioner's claims, the court granted the petition and remanded to the BIA.

Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus, challenging the California Board of Parole Hearings' (Board) denial of his parole. Defendant, the warden, appealed the district court's order instructing the Board to conduct a new parole hearing. The court held that because the district court's order was not a final decision, the court dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.