Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed from his conviction for importation of marijuana and possession of marijuana. Defendant contended, inter alia, that the district court erred by preventing him from presenting evidence of duress at trial and by refusing to give a jury instruction on the defense of duress. The court held that the district court did not err in finding that defendant failed to make the prima facie showing of duress necessary to present the defense at trial and to receive a duress jury instruction.

Defendant was convicted of, among other things, shipping and receiving firearms through interstate commerce while using a controlled substance, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(3) because defendant illegally grew and sold marijuana, as well as had a business of dealing in firearms. At issue was the constitutionality of section 922(g)(3). The court held that because Congress could constitutionally deprive felons and mentally ill people of the right to possess and carry weapons, the court concluded that Congress could also prohibit illegal drug users from possessing firearms.

Defendant was convicted of misdemeanor possession of methamphetamine possession and sentenced to three years' probation. Defendant appealed his conviction and two conditions of probation, one permitting suspicionless searches and one requiring him to submit to DNA collection. The court affirmed defendant's conviction and upheld the imposition of the suspicionless search condition in light of the court's precedents. The court held, however, that the district court exceeded its statutory authority by imposing the DNA condition pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 14132(d). Accordingly, the court reversed with instructions to strike that condition and to order expungement of DNA records collected pursuant to it.

Plaintiffs alleged that defendant, a non-profit Christian organization operating a residential drug treatment program and two homeless shelters, engaged in religious discrimination in providing shelter and residential recovery services in violation of the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. 3601-3631. At issue was the extent of the protection afforded by the FHA against religious discrimination. The court affirmed summary judgment for defendant and held that, even assuming that section 3604(a) and (b) applied to defendant's homeless shelters, the FHA's religious exemption permitted the practices challenged by plaintiffs in this case. Therefore, the court expressed no view on the merits of defendant's arguments about the proper scope of section 3604(a) and (b) and the proper definition of "residence" in section 3602(b). The court also affirmed summary judgment on the sex discrimination claim because there was no evidence to establish that defendant treated the men in its parallel drug treatment program any differently than it treated the women and the interference, coercion, or intimidation claim claim because plaintiffs had not exercised a right granted to them by section 3604.

Petitioner sought, inter alia, to reopen his immigration proceedings by raising challenges to, or seeking an exception to, the April 26, 2005, deadline to seek relief under former section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 C.F.R. 1003.44. The court held that section 1003.44's deadline to file special motions to reopen was a constitutionally-sound procedural rule and that absent some exceptional circumstances, not present here, petitioners that missed the deadline were not entitled to relief from that deadline.

Day-laborer organizations challenged a city anti-solicitation ordinance that barred individuals from standing on a street or highway and soliciting, or attempting to solicit, business, or contributions from an occupant of any motor vehicle. The court agreed with the day laborers that the ordinance was a facially unconstitutional restriction on speech where the ordinance failed to satisfy the narrow tailoring element of the Supreme Court's time, place, and manner test and where the ordinance was not narrowly tailored because it regulated significantly more speech than was necessary to achieve the city's purpose of improving traffic safety and traffic flow at two major intersections. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Costco appealed the district court's order granting class certification in a class action brought by Shirley Ellis, Leah Horstman, and Elaine Sasaki (plaintiffs), alleging that Costco's promotional practices discriminated based on gender. The court held that at least one plaintiff (Sasaki) had standing to bring suit. The court also held that the district court abused its discretion by applying the wrong legal standard in its analyses of commonality and typicality under Rule 23(a). Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's findings on those issues and remanded for application of the correct standard. The court further held that, although the district court correctly determined that Sasaki was an adequate class representative, the court held that Ellis and Horstman were inadequate representatives for pursuing injunctive relief, given that they were former employees, and remanded for the district court to consider whether they were adequate representatives if a (b)(3) class was certified. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's certification of a class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) and remanded for reconsideration.

Petitioner appealed the district court's dismissal of his habeas petition as untimely, and not subject to statutory tolling. Petitioner's petition challenged his jury conviction in California state court for murder and attempted murder. The court concluded that the California Supreme Court found petitioner's 2005 habeas petition timely. Since petitioner then filed in federal district court on July 3, 2007, less than a month after the California Supreme Court denied his petition on June 13, 2007, his federal petition was timely filed. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of the petition and remanded for further proceedings.

Petitioner timely petitioned for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's holding that defendant was ineligible for cancellation of removal because his domestic violence conviction constituted an "aggravated felony" under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F). Defendant argued that because an aggravated felony was defined as a crime of violence for which a term of imprisonment was at least one year, and because his 365-day sentence was completed during a leap year, which was 366 days long, his California conviction did not qualify as an aggravated felony. The court held that the BIA was correct to conclude that, for purposes of section 1101(a)(43)(F), a sentence of 365 days qualified as a term of imprisonment of at least one year," even when the sentence was served in whole or in part during a leap year. The court concluded that all of petitioner's arguments for cancellation of removal have been addressed by the court's precedents and none have been resolved in his favor. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review.

Defendant appealed his 70-month below-Guidelines sentence of incarceration for illegal reentry after a prior deportation. The court held that, because a conviction for willful infliction of corporal injury on a spouse, under California Penal Code 273.5, was a categorical crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines, defendant's conviction under this section warranted a 16-level sentencing enhancement. The court also held that the district court did not commit procedural error in imposing a 70-month sentence of incarceration. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.