Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his 52-month sentence imposed following his open plea of guilty to a single-count indictment charging him with illegal re-entry after deportation. The court held that, after considering the state court records, defendant's conviction for attempted sexual abuse of a child qualified as a "crime of violence" under the Sentencing Guidelines. Therefore, the district court committed no error, plain or otherwise, in applying a 16-level enhancement. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Defendant appealed the 46-month sentence of imprisonment imposed following his guilty plea to one count of illegal reentry. The court held that because it agreed with the district court that a conviction for forcible rape under California Penal Code 261(a)(2) was categorically a "crime of violence" as defined by the Sentencing Guidelines, the court held that the district court correctly imposed a 16-level sentencing enhancement. The court also held that the district court did not commit procedural error in calculating the Guidelines range and that the sentence of 46 months was not substantively unreasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Plaintiff, a high school math teacher, filed suit in federal court alleging that the school district violated his constitutional rights by making him remove banners he displayed in his classroom which referenced "God" and the "Creator." At issue was whether a public school district infringed the First Amendment liberties of plaintiff when it ordered him not to use his public position as a pulpit from which to preach his own views on the role of God in our Nation's history to the captive students in his mathematics classroom. The court agreed with the district court that no genuine issue of material fact remained in the present case. The court held, however, that the district court made a critical error when it determined that the school district had created a limited public forum for teacher speech and evaluated the school district's actions under a traditional forum-based analysis rather than the controlling Pickering-based inquiry. Applying the correct legal principles to the undisputed facts, the court held that the school district was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on each of the claims raised by plaintiff. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded with instructions.

Plaintiff foster children appeal the dismissal of their class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, in which they alleged that the caseloads of the Sacramento County Dependency Court and court-appointed attorneys were so excessive as to violate federal and state constitutional and statutory provisions. The district court abstained from adjudicating plaintiff's claims. The court held that the district court properly abstained from consideration of the claims plaintiff raised here based on O'Shea v. Littleton. Accordingly, the court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.

Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 1155 motion to correct a federal sentencing enhancement imposed on account of his Utah conviction for burglarizing a "dwelling." At issue was whether the court's decision in United States v. Grisel had retroactive effect. The court held that because its decision in Grisel was a non-constitutional decision of substantive law, it applied retroactively. Under Grisel, defendant's burglary conviction did not qualify categorically as a predicate offense. All but two of the documents tendered for the courts consideration in the modified categorical approach did not qualify as judicially noticeable documents under Shepard v. United States. The two remaining documents required re-examination through the lens of Grisel and its progeny. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.

Plaintiff, a frequent filer of lawsuits and indigent, sought money damages and other relief against defendant resulting from an alleged mistreatment of plaintiff when he was a prisoner. Plaintiff appealed the district court's denial of plaintiff's in forma pauperis status. As a preliminary matter, the court held that because the underlying substantive claims were not moot and because a ruling in favor of plaintiff would permit those claims to proceed, the court could provide effective relief and the appeal was not moot now that plaintiff was released from jail and was on parole. The court held that because only two of the four dismissals identified by the district court qualified as "strikes" under 28 U.S.C. 1915(g), the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Protrero Hills Landfill, a privately owned solid waste and recycling business in Solano County, and twenty-two related businesses appealed the dismissal on Younger v. Harris abstention grounds of their 42 U.S.C. 1983 action for declaratory and injunctive relief, challenging the constitutionality of a voter-enacted county ordinance restricting the import of out-of-county solid waste into Solano County. The court held that Younger abstention did not apply here because a federal court's exercise of jurisdiction over Protrero Hill's claim would not interfere with the state's exercise of basic state function and would not offend the principles of comity and federalism that Younger abstention was designed to uphold. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded, asking the district to consider whether R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman rather than Younger abstention might be appropriate.

This case stemmed from an indictment charging defendant with two counts of transporting an illegal alien for profit. At issue was whether a district court could, in the absence of a motion for a new trial by the defendant, order a new trial for a defendant who was tried before the judge but never properly waived his constitutional right to a jury trial. The court held that, insofar as the district court's order for a new trial was premised on the post-verdict declaration of a mistrial, it was error. The court also held that the district court erred in converting defendant's motion, over his objection, into a Rule 33 motion for a new trial. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's December 11, 2009 order that set aside the conviction and ordered a new trial under Rule 33, as well as its January 26, 2010 order that also justified the new trial by declaring the first proceeding a mistrial under Rule 26.3. The court remanded with instructions to deny defendant's "Motion to Set Aside Verdict by Trial Court," which cited no rule or authority and was procedurally improper.

This case arose when federal law enforcement officers seized funds from passengers who were temporarily in the Atlanta airport changing planes. The travelers truthfully explained that the funds were legal gambling proceeds, not evidence of drug transactions. The travelers subsequently claimed that the seizure and later efforts to institute forfeiture proceedings were unconstitutional and sued in Las Vegas, where they were heading, lived at least part time, and suffered the inconvenience of arriving with absolutely no money, as well as other financial injuries. At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed the Bivens action against the federal officers for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court held that an officer's intentional acts with regard to the false probable cause affidavit and the consequent delay in returning the travelers' money were expressly aimed at Nevada and so satisfied the requirement for personal jurisdiction. As to the search and seizure claim, the court remanded to the district court for the exercise of discretion with regard to pendant personal jurisdiction. The court also held that venue was proper in the District of Nevada.

Plaintiff, a minor with dyslexia, by and through her mother and Guardian Ad Litem, appealed from the district court's order affirming the Administrative Hearing Officer's conclusion that the Hawaii Department of Education (DOE) properly found plaintiff ineligible for services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. The court held that the DOE procedurally violated the IDEA by applying regulations that required exclusive reliance on the "severe discrepancy model" at plaintiff's final eligibility meeting. This violation deprived plaintiff of a significant educational opportunity because it resulted in an erroneous eligibility determination. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's order affirming the Hearing Officer's decision and remanded for further proceedings.