Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his conviction for one count of importation of marijuana and one count of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. The court held that it was an abuse of discretion to allow the government to introduce evidence of defendant's prior "law enforcement contacts." Therefore, the court held that because this error was not harmless, defendant's conviction was vacated and the case remanded for a new trial. The court declined to address defendant's remaining arguments.

A jury convicted defendant of felony murder and/or aiding and abetting felony murder, but acquitted him of premeditated murder. The trial judge then imposed the death penalty. Defendant subsequently appealed the district court's denial of habeas relief. The court held that, although it rejected defendant's contentions on appeal, absent the State's knowing presentation of perjured inmate testimony, the result of defendant's penalty-phase hearing could have been different. Accordingly, the court held that the State violated defendant's due process rights under Napue v. Illinois and reversed the district court's denial of the writ with respect to defendant's death sentence.

Defendant was convicted of possession of methamphetamine and oxycodone with intent to distribute, being a felon in possession of a firearm and an armed career criminal, and with possession of a firearm during the commission of a drug trafficking crime. Defendant appealed the denial of his suppression motion, arguing that the initial stop, the extended duration of the seizure, and the search of his vehicle all violated the Fourth Amendment. The court held that all the physical evidence seized and defendant's subsequent statements to police must be suppressed under the exclusionary rule because there was no probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained evidence of a crime where there was no specific particularized fact indicating that the passenger of the vehicle had identification and that such identification was located in defendant's car.

The Small Property Owners of San Francisco Institute (SPOSFI) and Mary Figone appealed the district court's judgment rejecting their facial First Amendment and vagueness challenges to portions of "Proposition M," a popularly enacted amendment to the rent-stabilization ordinance of the City and County of San Francisco. The court held that, because both SPOSFI and Figone lacked standing, the court could not reach the merits of their challenges. Instead, the court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

The State of Arizona appealed the district court's order granting a preliminary injunction to prevent a state law from taking effect that would have terminated eligibility for healthcare benefits of state employees' same-sex partners. The district court found that plaintiffs demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits because they showed that the law adversely affected a classification of employees on the basis of sexual orientation and did not further any of the state's claimed justifiable interests. The district court also found that plaintiffs had established a likelihood of irreparable harm in the event coverage for partners ceased. The court held that the district court's findings and conclusions were supported by the record and affirmed the judgment.

Defendant, a native and citizen of Mexico, challenged his conviction for illegal reentry after removal on the ground that the removal order on which the conviction was based was invalid. The court held that in light of the "unique circumstances" of defendant's case, it was not plausible that the IJ would have granted him permission to withdraw his application for admission. Therefore, defendant could not show that he was prejudiced by the IJ's alleged error and could not show that the entry of the February 27, 2006 removal order was "fundamentally unfair" as required by 8 U.S.C. 1326(d)(3). Accordingly, defendant's collateral attack on the removal order failed and the court upheld the district court's ruling.

Over thirty years ago, petitioner was convicted and sentenced to death for the 1979 kidnapping, rape, and murder of a sixteen-year-old female. Petitioner subsequently appealed the district court's denial of habeas relief. The court held that the district court erred by dismissing as unexhausted petitioner's claim for denial of an impartial jury, but after receiving supplemental briefing from the parties, the court denied the claim on the merits. The court affirmed the district court on the other three claims. As to the uncertified claims, the court granted a COA on the prosecutorial misconduct claim because the district court erred by finding this claim unexhausted, but also denied that claim on the merits. The court denied a COA on the remaining uncertified claims. Therefore, petitioner was not entitled to habeas relief.

Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and rape and the attempted murder of two individuals. Defendant was sentenced to death. On appeal, defendant appealed two procedural issues: whether counsel rendered ineffective assistance in the penalty phase for failure to investigate and present evidence of social history and whether the prosecution's failure to disclose a confidential informant's status as a government agent was a Brady violation. Defendant also appealed two uncertified issues: whether defendant was deprived of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to investigate or present evidence of PTSD at the penalty phase and whether his sentence must be overturned because of cumulative errors. The court dismissed the challenge to California's lethal injection protocol as premature, and otherwise affirmed the judgment.

Plaintiffs appealed the district court's dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) of their putative consumer class action against defendants. Plaintiffs also appealed the district court's denial of leave to amend their second amended complaint, alleging that the design of defendants' retail gasoline dispensers was fundamentally flawed due to a residual fuel occurrence: when plaintiffs purchased premium grade fuel, they received between two and three-tenths of a gallon of residual fuel from the previous transaction, and therefore were overcharged when the previous purchaser had selected mid-range or regular grade fuel. The court agreed with the district court that plaintiffs' well-pleaded factual allegations, accepted as true, did not give rise to a reasonable inference that defendants have committed any misconduct for which the court could grant relief. Accordingly, further amendment would be futile and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend.

Defendant was convicted by a jury in an Arizona state court of first degree murder. Defendant subsequently petitioned for federal habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254, raising, inter alia, the same ineffective assistance of counsel claims that he had brought in state court. The district court found that the felony murder instruction was not erroneous; that it did not deprive defendant of due process; and that, therefore, counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to it. The court held that, since the district court rejected defendant's claim that the trial court's felony murder instruction was erroneous, the district court never reached certain questions under Strickland v. Washington and Harrington v. Richter. The court further held that, since defendant framed the issue in his certificate of appealability as an instruction issue, not an ineffective assistance of counsel claim more broadly, neither party addressed these issues. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings.