Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

After plaintiff served four and a half years in prison and then ordered freed when his petition for a writ of habeas corpus was granted, he filed an action for damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Plaintiff alleged that defendants, acting under color of State law, unlawfully suppressed the criminal history of a confidential informant who was the main witness against him, failed to produce the documents reflecting that criminal history, and thus caused him to be found guilty of several counts of drug trafficking and to be sentenced to a term of ten to twenty-five years. The district court dismissed the action as time-barred because it was not filed within two years of the time plaintiff learned that the confidential informant had an extensive criminal history. The court granted Washoe County's motion to supplement the record and the court took judicial notice of the court documents presented by the motion. Under Heck v. Humphrey, plaintiff's cause of action did not accrue until his conviction was held invalid. Therefore, plaintiff's claims did not accrue until the Nevada court vacated his convictions on December 2, 2008. Since plaintiff commenced his lawsuit on December 1, 2010, less than two years after December 2, 2008, his claim was timely and the district court erred in dismissing it as time-barred. The court rejected Defendant Palmer's argument for dismissing the complaint against him; plaintiff's claims against Washoe County and the City of Reno were dismissed without prejudice; and the court remanded for the district court to consider if and to what extent plaintiff's plea to the crime of Unlawful Giving Away of Controlled Substances affects his section 1983 action. View "Rosales-Martinez v. Palmer" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an Idaho state prisoner, filed suit against individual prison officials under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq., claiming that they had imposed an unwarranted burden on his exercise of religion. Prison officials curtailed plaintiff's opportunities for chapel access after they found out that he was utilizing the chapel facilities to further his romantic relationships with prison guards. The court joined its sister circuits and held that plaintiff may not seek damages against prison officials in their individual capacities principally because RLUIPA was enacted pursuant to Congress's constitutional powers under the Spending Clause, and the individual defendants are not recipients of any federal funds. In regards to plaintiff's First Amendment claim, there was insufficient evidence to create a material issue of fact as to a retaliatory motive. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants. View "Wood v. Yordy" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit seeking to enjoin enforcement of Ariz. Rev. Stat. 36-449.03(E)(6), and its implementing regulation, which restricts the manner in which certain medications may be used to perform abortions. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the district court's denial of their motion for preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs argued that, under a proper reading of its text, the Arizona law prohibits all medication abortions. The State argued that the law allows medication abortions, but only if they are performed in accordance with the on-label regimen. The court assumed without deciding that the Arizona law passes rational basis review and moved directly to the application of the undue burden test in light of Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey and Gonzales v. Carhart. The court concluded that plaintiffs have introduced uncontroverted evidence that the Arizona law substantially burdens women's access to abortion services, and Arizona has introduced no evidence that the law advances in any way its interest in women's health. Therefore, the court held that the district court abused its discretion when it held that plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their undue burden claim. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions to issue the requested preliminary injunction. View "Planned Parenthood Arizona v. Humble" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of his wife's estate, filed suit against Desert View and Dr. Tannoury, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq.; Section 505 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794; and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress under state law. Plaintiff alleged that his health care providers failed to communicate effectively with a person who is deaf. The district court granted in part and denied in part Dr. Tannoury's motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that plaintiff has now shown a real and immediate threat that he will be denied effective communication by defendants either as a patient in his own right or as a companion to another patient. Because plaintiff's complaint is "jurisdictionally defective" and he has failed to introduce any evidence to cure the defect, he lacked standing to bring his ADA claims. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss the claims with prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. Because each and every discrete discriminatory act causes a new claim to accrue under Section 504, any discriminatory acts that Desert View or Dr. Tannoury took after September 1, 2008 are actionable. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court erred in finding the claims under the Rehabilitation Act untimely. The court reversed the judgment of the district court as to the Rehabilitation Act claims and the state law claims and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ervine v. Desert View Reg'l Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

California prisons have been operating under a receivership since 2006 to comply with consent decrees. This appeal involved provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 18 U.S.C. 3626, relating to the termination of such decrees. After the Supreme Court affirmed the three-judge court decision concerning the release orders in this case, the three-judge court in early 2013 asked the State when it intended to file a motion to terminate. The State responded that it hoped to be able to file within a few months. Plaintiffs indicated their need to file an informed response to such motion and the district court ordered the State to disclose its expert witnesses and their reports at least 120 days before it filed a motion to terminate. The court concluded that the district court's order was a sensible scheduling order designed to provide the court and plaintiffs with adequate notice of the evidence the State intended to rely upon in a motion to terminate; the order established a schedule for expert disclosures that was consistent with the State's own time line, and did not affect the operation of the automatic stay; and there was no clear error in the district court's issuance of the order. The court need not reach plaintiffs' claim that without the notice provisions of the order, the automatic stay provision violates due process. Accordingly, the court denied what the court construed as the State's Petition for a Writ of Mandamus. View "Plata v. Brown" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against two officers, a medical doctor, and nurse alleging that they violated his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments when the doctor, forcibly and without consent, removed a plastic baggie containing cocaine base from plaintiff's rectum. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment to the officers. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment claim, holding that the doctor's actions could be attributed to the state, based on the court's holding that a reasonable jury could conclude that the officers provided false information, encouragement, and active physical assistance to the doctor; therefore, the officers could be held responsible for the procedures performed by the doctor; based on the Winston v. Lee factors, a jury could conclude that the procedures performed by the doctor violated the Eighth Amendment; and the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity. The court affirmed summary judgment as to the Fourteenth Amendment claim where plaintiff has not identified a single case finding a Fourteenth Amendment violation under circumstances like those here. The court declined to address issues related to the doctor. Accordingly, the court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "George v. Edholm, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging California's Political Reform Act of 1974, Cal. Gov. Code 81000-91014 (PRA), which requires political committees to report certain information about their contributors to the State. Plaintiffs are political committees that supported the November 2008 passage of Proposition 8 and argued that their donors have been harassed as a result of the PRA disclosures. Plaintiffs sought an injunction exempting them from the PRA's future reporting deadlines and declaratory and injunctive relief requiring the State to purge all records of their past PRA disclosures. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the State on all counts. The court held that Family PAC v. McKenna directly precluded plaintiffs' challenge to the $100 contribution threshold and the government's interest in disclosing contributions to ballot initiative committees is not merely a pre-election interest. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment with regard to plaintiffs' facial challenges to the post-election reporting requirements. In regard to plaintiffs' as-applied challenges, the court concluded that plaintiffs' request for an injunction does not present a live controversy where the information that plaintiffs seek to keep private has been publicly available on the Internet and in hard copy for nearly five years; plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief did not fall within the mootness exception for cases that are capable of repetition, yet evading review; and plaintiffs' claim for forward-looking relief is not ripe for judicial review. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, dismissed in part, and remanded with instructions. View "ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen" on Justia Law

Mohammad Usman Chaudhry's family and three organizational plaintiffs filed suit after Usman was shot and killed by an LAPD officer. The Coroner took custody of his body but did not notify his family until twenty-one days later and the delay prevented Usman's family from burying him in accordance with the religions customs of Islam. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged most of the district court's orders granting defendants' motions to dismiss and for summary judgment. The City and the officer cross-appealed. The court concluded that plaintiffs waived claims against some defendants by not addressing them in their opening brief. The court held that California's prohibition against pre-death pain and suffering damages limits recovery too severely to be consistent with 42 U.S.C. 1983's deterrence policy; thus, California's survival statute, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 377.34 does not apply to section 1983 claims where the decedent's death was caused by the violation of federal law; and therefore, the court reversed the district court's finding that section 377.34 is not inconsistent with section 1983 and the district court's striking of the jury's $1,000,000 verdict in favor of the Estate. The court remanded to the district court to consider in the first instance a motion for remittitur. The district court erred in dismissing the Estate's Cal. Civ. Code 52.1 claim and in denying its post-trial motion to amend the judgment where the City conceded that a successful claim for excessive force under the Fourth Amendment provides the basis for a successful claim under section 52.1. The court reversed and remanded with instructions to amend the judgment to reflect the Estate's success on that claim. The court reversed the district court's dismissal of Usman's parent's section 1983 claim against the officer for violating their Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due process. The court concluded that the court's decision recognizes that parents have a liberty interest in the companionship of their adult children and have a cause of action under the Fourteenth Amendment when the police kill an adult child without legal justification. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the County defendants on the negligence claim under California law; affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants on Usman's siblings' intentional infliction of emotional distress and section 1983 substantive due process claims; reversed as to their negligence claim against the County; and vacated the district court's attorneys' fees award. View "Chaudhry, et al v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law for wrongful detention, false arrest, and excessive force. An SFPD officer, Sergeant Kim, made a "high-risk" stop of plaintiff's vehicle after mistakenly identifying the vehicle as stolen. Plaintiff was held at gunpoint, handcuffed, forced to her knees, and detained for up to twenty minutes. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants on the grounds that plaintiff could not establish a Fourth Amendment constitutional violation as a matter of law on her wrongful seizure, false arrest, or excessive claims because a rational jury could find for plaintiff on all three claims. The court reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's suit on the grounds that Sergeant Kim was protected by qualified immunity because the court could not make a determination as a matter of law that Sergeant Kim could have reasonably believed at the time that the force actually used was lawful under the circumstances; consequently, the court remanded plaintiff's claims against the City and the SFPD for further resolution; and the court reversed and remanded the state law claims. View "Green v. City & Ctny. of San Francisco" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an unsuccessful candidate for judicial office in Mohave County, Arizona, filed suit challenging the facial and as-applied constitutionality of certain provisions of the Arizona Code of Judicial Conduct. The court held that Rule 4.1(A)(6) (the solicitation clause) is unconstitutional as applied to non-judge judicial candidates because it restricts speech that presents little to no risk of corruption or bias towards future litigants and is not narrowly tailored to serve those state interests. The court held that Rules 4.1(A)(2)-(5) - prohibiting speechifying, endorsements, and fundraising - are not sufficiently narrowly tailored to serve the state's interest in an impartial judiciary, and are therefore unconstitutional restrictions on political speech of non-judge candidates for judicial office. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants. View "Wolfson v. Concannon, et al." on Justia Law