Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to manufacture and possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine. At issue was whether defendant was entitled, under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. 2000bb-2000bb-4, to use marijuana during his period of supervised release. The court held that because the government's interest in prohibiting a convicted methamphetamine dealer from using controlled substances during supervised release was compelling and because Standard Condition Number 7 was the least restrictive means of advancing that interest, the district court correctly imposed the condition.

Defendant was convicted of attempting to possess a controlled substance with the intent to distribute and sentenced to 180 months in prison. On appeal, defendant alleged that the district court erred under Apprendi v. New Jersey by sentencing him for attempted possession with intent to distribute an unspecified amount of cocaine even though he never admitted that he attempted to possess cocaine. The court held that the district court erred under Apprendi and, because defendant contested the fact that the drug he intended to possess was cocaine and because the record evidence was far from overwhelming, the court concluded that the Apprendi error in this case was not harmless.

Plaintiff filed a federal complaint against officers and the Mount Shasta Police Department pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights when they entered his home without a warrant and obtained evidence that he had driven under the influence of alcohol. Plaintiff had pled nolo contendere to a violation of California Vehicle Code section 23103.5(a). The district court dismissed plaintiff's section 1983 complaint, concluding that the case was barred by Heck v. Humphrey and that the district court therefore lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The court held, however, that Heck did not bar the section 1983 claim where plaintiff's conviction derived from his plea, not from a verdict obtained with supposedly illegal evidence. The court also held that, even if the terms of plaintiff's appellate waiver were ambiguous, the court would construe that ambiguity against the government and conclude that the waiver in the plea agreement did not affect plaintiff's ability to pursue this separate civil law suit. The court further held that there was no collateral estoppel bar to plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim in this civil action. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded.

Defendant was convicted of child molestation in Washington state and sentenced to two years confinement. At issue was whether the government must prove that a defendant knew that the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 18 U.S.C. 2250(a), imposed a registration requirement in order to convict a defendant of a violation of this statute. The court joined its sister circuits in holding that the government need not prove this knowledge element. In this instance, although defendant did not receive notice of the requirement to register under SORNA, the government did not have to prove that he knew of this requirement in order to convict him of an offense under section 2250. Defendant was required by the terms of his judgment to register in Washington as well as in any new state to which he moved. Therefore, the court held that there was ample evidence on which the district court could base its determination that defendant knew he was required to register and failed to do so. Accordingly, the court rejected defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.

This case stemmed from plaintiff's detention as an undocumented immigrant where plaintiff claimed that various authorities deprived him of medication for his schizophrenia and that the detention resulted from the insufficient training of public defenders regarding the immigration consequences of criminal pleas. At issue was whether plaintiff properly exhausted his administrative remedies under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346, 2671-80, where the federal agencies denied plaintiff's administrative tort claims before he amended his complaint in an ongoing civil action to name the United States as a party and allege a new cause of action under the FTCA. The court held that the claims were properly exhausted but affirmed the district court's dismissal on the alternative ground that plaintiff stated FTCA claims that fell outside the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity. The court also affirmed the grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's ineffective assistance of counsel claims, premised on 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Monell v. Department of Social Services.

This case arose from a traffic stop for a seatbelt violation in which a Los Angeles County Sheriff pepper sprayed plaintiff and struck him with a baton after plaintiff exited his vehicle and disobeyed the Sheriff's order to reenter it. Plaintiff filed this action against the Sheriff and the county, claiming that the Sheriff's use of force was excessive under the Fourth Amendment and that the Sheriff's conduct constituted false imprisonment and negligence under California tort law. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Sheriff with respect to plaintiff's false imprisonment claim because the Sheriff had lawful authority to arrest plaintiff on account of his violation of Cal. Penal Code 148(a)(1). The court held, however, that the use of intermediate force was unreasonable and the suspect clearly posed no threat to the officer or the public safety. Therefore, the court reversed as to the dismissal of plaintiff's excessive force and negligence claims.

Plaintiff and his wife filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against defendants, alleging, among other things, that police officers violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by securing the search and arrest warrants of plaintiff's home, to search for evidence of child pornography, with an affidavit that deliberately or recklessly contained material omissions and false statements. At issue was whether the district court properly granted the officers' motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, concluding that the officers' conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional right of which a reasonable officer would have known. The court held that plaintiff had made a substantial showing of the officers' deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth and had established that, but for the dishonesty, the searches and arrest would not have occurred. The court also held that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiff's right not to be searched and arrested as a result of judicial deception was clearly established at the time one of the officers prepared and submitted her affidavit. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded for trial.

Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of attempted entry after deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326(a) and (b). On appeal, defendant claimed that the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA) precluded any meaningful judicial review of an expedited removal order, including review of a collateral challenge to such an order in a section 1326 action; under United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, some meaningful review of the order was constitutionally required before the order could be used as a predicate to a criminal proceeding; and therefore, because the statue precluded review, expedited removal orders could not be used as predicates in section 1326 prosecutions. The court held that defendant was entitled to judicial review of the predicate expedited removal orders underlying his section 1326 prosecution but failed to show any prejudice resulting from the alleged procedural flaws in the proceedings that resulted in those orders. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss his indictment and the subsequent conviction and sentence.

Appellant appealed his conviction on various counts related to transporting and harboring illegal aliens. Appellant challenged the district court's decision to admit into evidence videotaped deposition testimony of detained material witnesses pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3144. For the first time on appeal, defendant argued that the statute was facially invalid and that the court erred by permitting the government to admit the depositions into evidence at trial without any showing of a witness's unavailability. Appellant also argued that the magistrate judge failed to comply with the statue and that certain procedural requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 15 and General Order 05-34 of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona were unmet. The court held that the bulk of appellant's claims were meritless. The court did agree that the district court plainly erred by permitting the government to introduce the now-contested depositions into evidence without a showing of unavailability. The court, however, declined to accord appellant any relief because the court was not persuaded that "the error seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of [the] proceedings." Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment of conviction.

Plaintiffs, a class of economically vulnerable Arizonians who receive public health care benefits through the state's Medicaid agency, sued the U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services (Secretary) and the Director of Arizona's medicaid agency (director)(collectively, defendants), alleging that the heightened mandatory co-payments violated Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. 1396a, cost sharing restrictions, that the waiver exceeded the Secretary's authority, and that the notices they received about the change in their health coverage was statutorily and constitutionally inadequate. The court affirmed the district court's conclusion that Medicaid cost sharing restrictions did not apply to plaintiffs and that Arizona's cost sharing did not violate the human participants statute. The court reversed the district court insofar as it determined that the Secretary's approval of Arizona's cost sharing satisfied the requirements of 42 U.S.C. 1315. The court remanded this claim with directions to vacate the Secretary's decision and remanded to the Secretary for further consideration. Finally, the court remanded plaintiffs' notice claims for further consideration in light of intervening events.