Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, an employee of the Veterans Health Administration, submitted eight requests under the Freedom of Information Act, (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552, and the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a, primarily asking for emails to and from specified individuals. At issue was whether an agency fulfilled its disclosure obligation by offering to supply the documents to the requester, but only in his capacity as an employee of that agency. Also at issue was the application to internal emails of FOIA Exemption 6, which provided that an agency could withhold "personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." The court held that plaintiff's claim as to the 157 emails was not mooted by the VA's offer to provide him the records in his capacity as its employee. The court remanded for the district court to consider the VA's claimed exceptions as to those emails in the first instance. The court also held that, as to the VA's application of Exemption 6 to the nine in camera emails, the district court's decision was vacated and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Plaintiff, a disabled individual who required the use of a motorized wheelchair to get around, filed a lawsuit against defendants, alleging that a Food 4 Less grocery store in Chula Vista, California did not comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101, 12213, and certain state laws. At issue was whether the district court erred in refusing to consider the allegations in plaintiff's expert report; in granting summary judgment to defendants as to the barriers he claimed violated California's Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD), which was based on the district court's conclusion that violations of the MUTCD were not per se violations of the ADA; and in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state claims. The court held that the district court did not err in refusing to consider the barriers that plaintiff identified only in his expert report; the district court properly granted partial summary judgment to defendants regarding those of plaintiff's allegations premised on noncompliance with the MUTCD rather than the ADA Accessibility Guidelines; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing plaintiff's state law claims with prejudice. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

In these consolidated appeals, respondents appealed the district court's order granting petitioner's, an enrolled member of the Pascua Yaqui Tribe, amended petition for writ of habeas corpus. At issue was whether the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. 1302(7), prohibited the tribal court from imposing consecutive sentences cumulatively exceeding one year for multiple criminal violations arising from a single criminal transaction. The court held that section 1302(7) unambiguously permitted tribal courts to impose up to a one-year term of imprisonment for each discrete criminal violation. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court.

Appellee sued Mary Lafond, DSHS's Child Study and Treatment Center's (CSTC) CEO, and Norman Webster, the Director of Nursing Services, under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violating her Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right to safe conditions while in the custody of a state-run mental institution. LaFond and Webster, relying on qualified immunity, appealed the district court's order denying their motion for summary judgment. The court held that the allegations and evidence against LaFond sufficiently supported a constitutional violation that defeated qualified immunity, while those against Webster did not. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of summary judgment as to LaFond and reversed the district court's denial of summary judgment as to Webster. The court remanded for further proceedings.

This case arose when a student told a police officer that her teacher, plaintiff, inappropriately touched her and police subsequently searched plaintiff's home for child pornography. Plaintiff and his son sued the police officer, the City of Covina, and the Chief of Police for violating his constitutional rights, claiming that the city and the officers violated his and his son's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure; the city inadequately trained and inadequately investigated complaints about its officers (Monell claim); and all defendants inadequately supervised and trained their subordinates with respect to the incidents alleged. The court held that, under the totality of the circumstances, a search warrant issued to search a suspect's home computer and electronic equipment lacked probable cause when no evidence of possession or attempt to posses child pornography was submitted to the issuing magistrate; no evidence was submitted to the magistrate regarding computer or electronics used by the suspect; and the only evidence linking the suspect's attempted child molestation to possession of child pornography was the experience of the requesting police officer, with no further explanation. The court held, however, that it had not previously addressed such issues and therefore, the officers involved in the search were entitled to qualified immunity. The court also affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's Monell and supervisory liability claims where amending the complaint would be futile.

This consolidated appeal asked the court to consider the constitutionality of the Nevada Department of Corrections' (NDOC) policy prohibiting inmates' personal possession of typewriters. NDOC inmates appealed pro se the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the NDOC. The court held that the NDOC's prohibition on inmate possession of typewriters did not unconstitutionally infringe upon the rights of the inmates. The ban was enacted to reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal of institutional safety. As applied to these inmates, it did not result in an unconstitutional denial of access to courts because they have failed to demonstrate actual injury. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in either admitting the NDOC's affidavits or ruling on summary judgment when it did. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition in connection with his membership in the Mongols Motorcycle Club, a motorcycle gang. On appeal, defendant challenged his convictions and sentence. The court held that the search warrant was valid and did not consider whether the officers acted in good faith in relying on it. Therefore, the evidence of the guns and ammunition could not be suppressed because the warrant was invalid. The court also held that there was sufficient evidence for a trier of fact to concluded that defendant constructively possessed the firearms. The court further held that the judge exercised sound discretion to ensure the punishment fit the crime by weighing the seriousness of the offense with all the mitigating factors and sentencing defendant to a significantly below-Guidelines term of imprisonment. Therefore, the sentence was reasonable.

Petitioner, a 71 year old native of Turkmenistan and a citizen of Armenia, petitioned for review of the BIA's denial as untimely of her motion to reopen removal proceedings to apply for adjustment of status, on account of ineffective assistance of counsel. The court found that petitioner first had reason to become suspicious of counsels' ineffectiveness in preparing her asylum claim after the BIA denied her appeal on February 25, 2005, and did not establish her diligence in discovering counsel's deficiency or continuing to pursue asylum after that date. Thus, the court held that the BIA did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that petitioner's motion to reopen on this ground was untimely. The court held, however, that petitioner did not have reason to become suspicious of her prior counsels' ineffectiveness in pursuing adjustment of status until she met with her current counsel. Petitioner then, with due diligence obtained and reviewed her file, and filed a motion to reopen within 90 days of reviewing the file with competent counsel. Thus, the BIA abused its discretion in denying as untimely petitioner's motion to reopen on the grounds of ineffective assistance in applying for adjustment of status.

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). At issue was whether a February 2000 conviction for burglary in the second degree under Oregon Revised Statutes (ORS) 164.215 was a predicate offense under the ACCA and that a May 1999 conviction for felony attempt to elude the police under ORS 811.540(1) was not a predicate offense under the ACCA. The court held that, although burglary in the second degree was not categorically a violent felony under the ACCA, defendant's conviction was a violent felony under the modified categorical approach. The court also held that felony attempt to elude police was a violent felony under the ACCA where the prohibition fell within the residual clause of section 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) in that flight presented a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's ruling that defendant's prior conviction for felony attempt to elude the police was not a violent felony and affirmed the district court's ruling that defendant's conviction for second degree burglary qualified as a violent felony. Because defendant had three prior violent felony convictions, the court remanded for resentencing under the mandatory minimum sentence in section 914(e)(1).

Petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder, kidnapping, and molestation of a nine-year-old girl and received the death sentence. Petitioner requested permission to file a second or successive application for a writ of habeas corpus and a stay of his execution. The court held that defendant failed to satisfy the requirements of 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(2) where petitioner waited ten years after the enactment of Arizona's DNA testing statute, Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-4240, before filing a motion requesting DNA testing of inculpatory hair evidence presented at trial and where, whatever the DNA testing of the hair evidence might reveal, the evidence could not refute the overwhelming inculpatory evidence presented at petitioner's trial. The court also held that petitioner's motion to stay pending disposition of his application was moot and that petitioner's motion to stay in light of the recent appointment of the Arizona Federal Public Defender as associated co-counsel was denied where petitioner's prior counsel remained on the case and the recent addition of new counsel did not deny petitioner the meaningful assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the court denied petitioner's application for permission to file a second or successive habeas corpus petition and denied petitioner's motions for stay of execution.