Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the Bureau of Prison's (BOP) calculation of his Good Conduct Time (GCT) credit under 18 U.S.C. 3624(b), contending that he accrued 82 days of GCT during the 21 months he served in state custody on state charges before he was sentenced in federal court on a related felon-in-possession charge. The court affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Court held that, because a prisoner could receive GCT credit under section 3624(b) only on time he had served on his federal sentence, and his federal sentence did not begin under 18 U.S.C. 3585 until he had been sentenced in federal court, defendant was not eligible for GCT credit for the 21 months he spent in state custody, serving a state sentence, before imposition of his federal sentence, notwithstanding the district court's statement that defendant's federal sentence was to be served concurrent to his unfinished sentence. Accordingly, the BOP's calculation of defendant's GCT credit and of his expected release date must be upheld.

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against defendants claiming that she had been demoted in retaliation for exercising her First Amendment rights by attending a school board meeting and sitting next to her boss, who was fired at the meeting. At issue was whether the district court properly granted defendants' motion for summary judgment holding that defendants' efficiency interests were greater than plaintiff's interest in free association. The court held that it appeared that the triggering factor in defendants' action was simply plaintiff's decision to sit next to her boss at the public school meeting, without even speaking to him. The court also held that, because defendants produced no evidence that plaintiff's association with her boss actually disrupted the office or her performance, or reasonably threatened to cause future disruption, defendants failed to show that its interests in work-place efficiency outweighed plaintiff's First Amendment interests. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants.

Petitioner, a native of the Philippines, petitioned for review of an order of the BIA directing his removal, as well as the BIA's order denying reconsideration. At issue was whether the IJ erred in finding him removable, whether the IJ erred in finding him ineligible for withholding of removal, and whether the IJ violated his due process rights. As a preliminary matter, the court held that petitioner's notice of appeal gave the BIA an adequate opportunity to pass on the arguments he presented. The court also held that the government satisfied its burden of proving removability where petitioner was convicted of a controlled substance offense. The court held, however, that petitioner failed to carry his burden of proving that he was entitled to relief from removal where he failed to demonstrate persecution on a protected ground or that the IJ violated his due process rights where petitioner failed to demonstrate prejudice. Accordingly, the petition for review was denied.

Plaintiffs, married couples who worked as house parents to children who were "severely emotionally disturbed" in defendants' homes, sued defendants for overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. 203(r)(2)(A). The children attended local public schools and participated in other activities away from the homes. Although, the children participated in group therapy conducted by clinicians in the homes, they received most of their medical and psychological treatment outside the homes. Plaintiffs were not licensed medical or social service professionals. Defendants filed an interlocutory appeal challenging the district court's conclusion that defendants' homes were covered by the FLSA and were subject to its overtime provisions. The court held that defendants' homes were not covered by the FLSA because they were not an "institution primarily engaged in the care of the sick, the aged, mentally ill or defective who resided on the premises of such institution." Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Former Arizona Congressman Richard G. Renzi sought to invoke the Speech or Debate Clause ("Clause") of the Constitution to preclude his prosecution for allegedly using his public office to benefit himself rather than his constituents. Renzi denied the charges against him but argued on interlocutory appeal that he was protected by the Clause from even the burden of defending himself. Specifically, Renzi claimed that the public corruption charges against him amounted to prosecution on account of his privileged "legislative acts"; that "legislative act" evidence was improperly presented to the grand jury; that the United States must show that its investigation did not benefit from its review of "legislative act" evidence; and that the district court erred by declining to wholly suppress all of the evidence against him relating to his illicit "negotiations." The court held that it lacked jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine to consider Renzi's suppression claim and therefore, dismissed that part of his appeal. The court also held that the Clause was a privilege that "had enabled reckless men to slander and even destroy others with impunity," but the Supreme Court had made equally clear that the Clause did not "make Members of Congress super-citizens, immune from criminal responsibility." Accordingly, the court held that Renzi's actions fell beyond the Clause's protections and denied him the relief that he sought.

This case stemmed from a federal grand jury indictment of twenty-two persons, including the seven defendants at issue, for illegal activities related to the Mexican Mafia. Defendants appealed their convictions of conspiracy in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. 1962(d), and their sentencing enhancement for carrying out the conspiratorial agreement by acts subjecting them to life imprisonment. Defendants raised numerous issues individually and collectively but the court found no error and held that the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to correct a federal sentencing enhancement imposed on account of his Utah conviction for burglarizing a "dwelling." At issue was whether the court's decision in United States v. Grisel had retroactive effect. The court concluded that Grisel did have retroactive effect where Grisel was a non-constitutional decision of substantive law. Under Grisel, defendant's burglary conviction did not qualify categorically as a predicate offense and the documents in the record were not sufficient to sustain the sentence under a modified categorical analysis. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court and remanded for resentencing on an open record.

Defendant was arrested on September 13, 2009, by Customs and Border Protection agents and was charged in a one-count indictment with attempting to transport an illegal alien. Defendant pleaded not guilty and his trial subsequently resulted in a hung jury. On March 24, 2010, defendant was arraigned on a four-count superseding indictment for charges related to transporting illegal aliens. On appeal, defendant sought interlocutory appellate review of the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss the superseding indictment on double jeopardy grounds. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the district court's denial of the motion for acquittal and that the issuance of a superseding indictment following a mistrial did not create a colorable double jeopardy claim because the issuance of the superseding indictment did not nullify the original indictment and because it did not terminate the original jeopardy. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

Defendant pleaded guilty in federal court to one count of receipt of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(1),(2), and the district court applied an enhanced sentence of 40 years imprisonment in light of defendant's prior attempted sexual assault in violation of Mont. Code Ann. 45-5-103. At issue was whether a prior conviction for attempted sexual assault under Montana law was a predicate offense triggering the application of the enhanced sentencing range. The court held that the statute and the case law made clear that an attempt under Montana law "relates to" the completed offense. Therefore, the court held that a conviction for attempted sexual assault under Montana law "relates to" sexual abuse within the meaning of section 2252A(b)(1). Accordingly, the court held that the district court did not err in applying the sentencing enhancement.

Defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, which was prohibited by 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The government subsequently appealed from defendant's 37 month sentence, arguing that the district court erred when it refused to impose a "crime of violence" sentencing enhancement based on his prior conviction of first-degree burglary in California. The court held that a violation of California's first-degree burglary statute was a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a)'s residual clause and therefore, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing so that the district court could accurately calculate the correct Sentencing Guidelines range.