Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted on six counts of setting public lands afire under 18 U.S.C. 1855, when he burned about a thousand acres owned by the Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") that were covered by sagebrush and other vegetation. Defendant argued that he did not destroy or attempt to destroy a place of public use, but waived the issue by conceding that he had. Therefore, the court declined to address the issue. Thus, the principal issue on appeal was whether the burning of grass and sagebrush destroyed the land where there was no evidence "that a member of the public was denied usage [sic] of the land for some higher cultural or recreational purpose" or "that the land itself was . . . rendered unusable into the indeterminate future" pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines. The court held that the district court correctly interpreted U.S.S.G. 2K1.4(a)(1) to require that the land suffered more than short-term damage, but less than complete obliteration. The court held, however, that the district judge failed to state the basis for his finding and the court could see no evidence in the record to support it. The court also held that it could not conclude that defendant only "endangered" the land, which would have resulted in a lower base offense level than if he had destroyed it pursuant to U.S.S.G. 2K1.4(a)(2). Therefore, the court held that, if on remand, the district court found that the damage to the land did not amount to destruction, then it would probably determine that defendant endangered the land. Accordingly, the court vacated defendant's sentence and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant pled guilty to violating the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1), and (b)(1)(B)(ii), and received the mandatory minimum sentence of five years imprisonment. At issue was whether the district court improperly calculated his criminal history score by counting his prior conviction under California Vehicle Code section 23140(a), which made it unlawful for a person younger than twenty-one years of age to drive with a blood-alcohol content of .05% or greater. The court applied a "commonsense" interpretation of the guidelines and the statute at issue, holding that a violation of section 23140(a) was not similar to a juvenile status offense and was properly counted in the calculation of defendant's criminal history score. Accordingly, the court affirmed the conviction and sentence.

This case arose from the controversial late-night arrests and subsequent release of two Phoenix newspaper executives. The newspaper executives and the Phoenix New Times, LLC (collectively, "plaintiffs") subsequently sued various officials connected with the Maricopa County Attorney's Office and the Sheriff's Office, including the county attorney, the sheriff, and a special prosecutor, alleging that the special prosecutor and possibly others ordered the arrest of the newspaper executives at their homes in the middle of the night after The Phoenix New Times newspaper published various articles critical of the officials. At issue was whether the district court erred in dismissing plaintiffs' federal claims and in remanding their remaining claims to state court. The court held that, while many of the actions alleged were protected by either absolute or qualified immunity, the actions of the special prosecutor in arranging the newspaper executives' arrest raised colorable claims of First and Fourth Amendment violations. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part.

This action stemmed from the City of San Diego's Municipal Election Campaign Control Ordinance, San Diego, Cal., Municipal Code ch. 2, art. 7, div. 29, which imposed limitations on campaign finance. Plaintiffs raised a First Amendment challenge to the campaign finance laws. The district court considered the provisions and generally upheld the city's pure contribution limits but enjoined a provision that restricted both the fundraising and spending of independent political committees. Both parties cross-appealed the district court's grant in part of preliminary injunctions for certain provisions at issue. The court affirmed the district court's judgment because the district court properly applied the applicable preliminary injunction standard in the context of the presently discernible rules governing campaign finance restrictions.

Appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus relief where he was found guilty of first-degree murder. At issue was whether appellant's constitutional right to confront witnesses was denied in his jury trial by the admission of testimony by law enforcement officers regarding statements made by a potential witness who did not testify. The court held that the admission of the testimony was erronous and prejudicial under the Brecht v. Abrahamson standard where the testimony bolstered the the state's weak case against appellant and flatly contradicted appellant's alibi defense. Accordingly, the court reversed the denial of appellant's petition for writ of habeas corpus and remanded with instructions to grant the writ unless the State elected to retry appellant within a reasonable amount of time.

Appellant appealed the grant of summary judgment in his civil rights action arising from the suspension of his medical staff privileges at the University Medical Center of Southern Nevada ("UMC"), a county hospital organized under the laws of Nevada, as well as the denial of his motion for leave to file a third amended complaint asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The principal issue on appeal was whom, if anyone, could appellant sue under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for his constitutional injury. The court held that the district court erred in determining that only the MEC, not named a party to the suit, could be liable for appellant's alleged section 1983 claims. The court also held that, because appellant alleged sufficient facts that the individually named voting members of the MEC acted under color of state law in effecting the unconstitutional deprivation of his protected property interest, amending his complaint to include reference to section 1983 would not be futile or prejudice defendants.

This appeal arose from a Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. 552, request concerning documents about individuals who reported to the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") regarding their suspicions that appellant, a real estate company, was violating the law. HUD produced the documents with certain redactions, asserting that the redactions were justified pursuant to FOIA Exemption 6. At issue was whether the district court properly granted HUD's motion for summary judgment. In light of FOIA's strong presumption in favor of disclosure, and the narrow reach of FOIA exemptions, the court could not affirm the grant of summary judgment where HUD had conjured the specter of privacy interests but it had not adduced evidence establishing such interests were actually at stake, or if they were, how much weight they should be accorded. Accordingly, the court vacated the grant of summary judgment to HUD and remanded to allow the parties to develop an adequate factual basis for the district court to determine whether the information at stake could be withheld pursuant to Exemption 6.

Defendant appealed his conviction and 220 month sentence after being found guilty by a jury of one count of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations ("RICO") conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 1962(d), for participation in violent acts undertaken by the Aryan Brotherhood prison gang. Defendant appealed his convictions and sentence and raised several issues of error. In light of the district court's extensive curative instructions, the strength of the evidence of defendant's guilt on the offenses for which he was convicted, and the jury's independence in rejecting five of the alleged predicate acts, the court held that defendant was not prejudiced by any improper conduct on the judge's part, either individually or in the aggregate. The court affirmed the sentence where defendant was sentenced within a properly calculated Guidelines range; the presentence report ("PSR") explained in great detail the calculations and responses to objections; and defendant did not argue for a sentence outside the Guidelines and where no detailed explanation by the district court was necessary.

Defendant appealed from the sentence imposed by the district court following his guilty plea to one count of attempted reentry after deportation. At issue was whether the district court committed reversible error by applying a 16 level increase to the offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). The court held that defendant failed to satisfy the applicable plain error standard of review with respect to the district court's determination that he was previously convicted of a "crime of violence," namely, "statutory rape." The court also held that the district court did not otherwise abuse its discretion or impose a sentence that was either procedurally erroneous or substantively unreasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the sentence entered by the district court where the district court provided a thorough explanation for its determination, appropriately responded to the various arguments made by defense, did not give undue weight to the Guidelines, and reasonably took into account defendant's prior record as well as several mitigating factors.

Petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to imprisonment in 1982. In 2005, the California Board of Prison Terms ("Board") found petitioner eligible for parole and calculated a tentative release date. Four months later, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger reversed the Board's decision, concluding that the gravity of petitioner's offense and his violent criminal history made him unsuitable for parole. After a series of unsuccessful petitions for collateral relief in state court, petitioner was subsequently granted federal habeas corpus relief. At issue was whether petitioner's habeas corpus claims were foreclosed by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Swarthout v. Cooke and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), 28 U.S.C. 2254. The court held that due process did not require that the Governor hold a second suitability hearing before reversing a parole decision and due process was satisfied because petitioner was allowed to speak at his parole hearing and to contest the evidence against him, was afforded access to his records in advance, and was notified as to the reasons why parole was denied. The court also held that, because there was no Supreme Court precedent holding that a state governor must conduct a second parole hearing before reversing a parole board's favorable decision, petitioner's habeas corpus claims necessarily failed. Accordingly, in light of Cooke and AEDPA, the court reversed the district court's order directing habeas corpus relief.