Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a California prisoner, appealed the district court's denial of his habeas corpus petition challenging his California felony murder conviction. At issue was whether petitioner was entitled to habeas corpus relief where petitioner alleged violations that required the California state courts to suppress the incriminating statement he made after he expressly waived his Miranda rights. The court held that it could not conclude that the decisions of the California state courts were contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, established Supreme Court precedent. Therefore, because petitioner could not show that the state's court's ruling was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fair-minded disagreement, the court affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief.

Plaintiff appealed a district court order dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction his suit against defendants, asserting that federal constitutional and state common law torts arising out of allegations that defendant fraudulently enlisted plaintiff into the National Guard. At issue was whether plaintiff's suit was barred by the doctrine of intra-military immunity in Feres v. United States because it sought monetary damages for injuries arising out of or were in the course of activity incident to military service. The court held that the Feres doctrine did not bar a discharged serviceman, who remained in the Individual Ready Reserve, from suing active duty National Guard recruiters whom he accused of forging his signature on re-enlistment papers where the alleged injury was not incident to the plaintiff's service. The court also held that defendants met the prima facie test as federal employees under the Westfall Act, 28 U.S.C. 2671, and remanded for further factual determinations on this issue.

Defendant pled guilty to importing 33.46 kilograms of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. 952 and 960 and sentenced to 57 months imprisonment. At issue was whether the district court erred in declining to decrease the base offense level, as recommended by the plea agreement he had entered into with the government, where the district court found that he had failed to demonstrate that he was a minor participant in the offense. The court held that the district court did not clearly error in its factual determination or abuse its discretion in declining to award the minor-role adjustment under U.S.S.G. 3B1.2(b) and that there was no support in the record for defendant's claim that the judge purposefully circumvented U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(a)(5). The court also held that the sentence imposed was substantively reasonable where it weighed the totality of the circumstances and the 18 U.S.C. 3553 factors. Accordingly, the court affirmed the sentence imposed upon defendant by the district court.

Defendant appealed his statutorily mandated, five-year minimum sentence following his guilty plea to conspiracy to possess crack cocaine with intent to distribute, and distribution of at least five grams of crack cocaine under 21 U.S.C. 846 and 841(a)(1). At issue was whether the Fair Sentencing Act ("Act"), 21 U.S.C. 841, applied to a sentence that was imposed prior to the date of the new statute's enactment. The court held that it was compelled to affirm defendant's five-year mandatory minimum sentence where it could find no evidence that Congress intended for the Act to apply to defendants who had been sentenced prior to the August 3, 2010 date of the Act's enactment.

Defendant appealed the district court's dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion as untimely. Defendant argued that the court's order recalling the mandate, so that it could consider his motion for appointment of certiorari counsel, restarted the clock for the 90-day period within which he was required to petition the Supreme Court for certiorari review of his conviction on direct appeal. Defendant also argued, in the alternative, that misconduct by his attorney and misinformation provided by someone in the office of the Ninth Circuit Clerk entitled him to equitable tolling. The court held that its order recalling the mandate did not restart the clock for purposes of petitioning for certiorari and therefore, defendant's petition for certiorari and his section 2255 motion were untimely. The court held, however, that defendant's contention that the court's clerk provided him with inaccurate advice, if true, could entitle him to equitable tolling. Accordingly, the court vacated the dismissal of the section 2255 motion and remanded for further proceedings.

The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation ("CDCR") had a paid chaplaincy program that employed Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, Muslim, and Native American clergy. These chaplains served all inmates but other religions were also served by volunteer chaplains. A Wiccan volunteer chaplain and a small group of inmates challenged the paid chaplaincy program asserting that the Wiccan chaplain should be eligible for employment in the paid-chaplaincy program. The court held that the inmates failed to exhaust their claims or brought them in an untimely fashion and the chaplain was pursuing constitutional claims that were derivative of the inmates' claims rather than his own. Accordingly, the court held that the district court properly dismissed and granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on the Wiccan chaplains' claims because, for the most part, he lacked standing. The court agreed that the district court need not exercise jurisdiction over these derivative claims. The court also held that, although the Wiccan chaplain had standing to pursue his personal employment claims, and also constitutional claims for different treatment as a volunteer chaplain and retaliation, ultimately he could not prevail on those claims.

Plaintiff applied for disability benefits based on combined impairments including bullous emphysema, depression, anxiety, and bipolar disorder and alleged that her disability began when her right lung collapsed. Plaintiff appealed the district court's decision affirming the Commissioner of Social Security's denial of her application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. et seq. The court held that the administrative law judge ("ALJ") erred by failing to follow the requirements of 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(a) in determining whether plaintiff's mental impairments were severe and, if severe, whether they met or equaled a listed impairment. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court with instructions to remand to the ALJ to conduct a proper review of plaintiff's mental impairments.

Petitioner, a native of Guatemala, filed a petition of review of the Department of Homeland Security's decision to reinstate an immigration judge's 1989 order of deportation pursuant to post-Illegal Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA"), 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(5), reinstatement provision 241(a)(5). At issue was whether the reinstatement provision, enacted as part of the IIRIRA, applied retroactively to a petitioner who applied for discretionary relief prior to IIRIRA's effective date. The court held that the application of section 241(a)(5) was permissibly retroactive when it applied to such petitioners in light of Landgraf v. USI Films Prod. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review in part and remanded for further proceedings. Because the court lacked jurisdiction to review agency determinations of eligibility for special rule cancellation of removal under section 203 of the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act of 1997 ("NACARA"), however, the court denied the petition in part.

Petitioner appealed the Board of Immigration Appeals' ("BIA") determination that it did not have jurisdiction to accept an appeal filed one day late due to a post office error. At issue was whether the 30 day deadline for filing a notice of appeal with the BIA was jurisdictional. The court held that the 30 day deadline must be read as a claim-processing rule that was not jurisdictional. The court also held that, since the BIA erred as a matter of law in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction, the court must remand to the BIA to permit it to fully reconsider whether, under the circumstances presented, it would hear the appeal from the immigration judge's decision in this case. The court also concluded that all the BIA needed to do to avoid subjecting aliens to the risk of losing their appeals due to bad weather or delivery service error was to allow people to send notices of appeal over the internet.

Petitioner appealed the district court's denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus where he was convicted of attempted second degree robbery and first degree murder of a Long Beach shop owner with the special circumstance that he was an active participant in a criminal street gang and the murder was carried out to further the activities of the criminal street gang under Cal. Penal Code 190.2(a)(22). The jury also found that a principal discharged a firearm resulting in the shop owner's death under Cal. Penal Code 12022.53(d), (e)(1) and imposed two gang enhancements pursuant to Cal. Penal Code 186.22(b)(1). At issue was whether petitioner's due process rights were violated because there was insufficient evidence to support the special circumstances finding pursuant to section 190.2(a)(22) and the gang enhancements imposed pursuant to sections 186.22(b)(1) and 12022.53(d) and (e)(1). The court held that petitioner's due process rights were not violated where there was ample evidence supporting the jury's conclusion that petitioner used extreme violence to avenge a minor slight against a casual acquaintance and a rational trier of fact could have found that when he and another gang member acted together to commit the robbery and murder, petitioner specifically intended to assist in criminal conduct. Therefore, the denial of the petition for writ of habeas corpus was affirmed.