Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, an African-American, was tried and convicted of aggravated mayhem, torture, assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, assault with a deadly weapon, corporal injury on a cohabitant, and criminal threats. During voir dire examination, the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to remove nine potential jurors. At issue was whether the state court's decision to deny a Batson v. Kentucky claim when petitioner made no contemporaneous objection to the use of peremptory challenges in the trial court was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. The court held that petitioner could not raise a Batson claim in his habeas petition where petitioner failed to timely object to the prosecution's use of peremptory challenges at trial. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying petitioner habeas relief.

Pinnacle Armor, Inc. ("Pinnacle") produced armor designed to protect buildings, vehicles, and the human body. Among Pinnacle's primary customers were local law enforcement agencies who depended in large part upon a federal subsidy to purchase the body arbor. The federal subsidy was conditioned on certification that the manufacturer's body armor was compliant with standards set by the National Institute of Justice ("NIJ"). Pinnacle alleged that the NIJ's decision to revoke certification of one of its products violated its procedural due process rights under the Fifth Amendment and was arbitrary and capricious in violation of 706(2)(A) of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. 701(a)(2). The court held that the due process claims were properly dismissed because the NIJ afforded Pinnacle adequate process. The court also held that the NIJ's certification decision was not committed to agency discretion by law and was therefore reviewable under the APA where Pinnacle's claims were sufficient to survive a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) claim.

Appellant, director of a child development center on the Elmendorf Air Force Base, sued appellees alleging claims of discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16, and a claim of unlawful removal from employment pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 7702. Appellant appealed from the district court's denial of summary judgment affirming a decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board ("MSPB"), which in turn upheld a decision by the United States Air Force ("Agency"), to terminate her employment after she requested 120 days leave without pay pursuant to the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 5 U.S.C. 6382(a)(1)(D), and failed to provide the minimum information required by section 6383(b) of the FMLA. The court held that the MSPB's finding was supported by substantial evidence where appellant's WH-380 form and the two doctors' notes she submitted did not provide the minimum information required by section 6383(b). The court further held that, because appellant refused to submit the minimal mandated medical certification, she could not show any harm arising from the Agency's request for more documentation that was required by the FMLA. The court further held that the administrative law judge properly rejected appellant's argument that the Agency failed to give her adequate time to provide medical certification. The court finally held that substantial evidence supported the MSPB's finding and therefore, the Agency acted within its discretion in removing her from her position.

Defendant appealed his sentence for seven counts of bank robbery. Defendant argued that his sentence must be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing because the government breached the plea agreement; the district court's decision to make an upward departure from criminal history category II to III, U.S.S.G. 4A1.3, was procedurally erroneous; and the district court's overall sentence was substantially unreasonable. The court held that the government did not breach the plea agreement where it made no argument that the district court should increase the offense level calculation set forth in the presentence report ("PSR") and plea agreement. The court also held that the court reviewed upward departures under section 4A1.3 for substantive reasonableness, not for procedural error, and concluded that the district court's sentence was substantively reasonable and procedural error was harmless where the district court deviated only 30 and 16 months from the high end of the PSR and its own Guidelines ranges and where the district court's characterization of defendant's seven armed robberies as serious offenses reflected a rational and meaningful consideration of the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a).

Plaintiffs, a class of indigent children who suffered from severe emotional and mental disabilities, sued Idaho state officials more than three decades ago, alleging that the officials were providing them with inadequate care in violation of their constitutional and statutory rights. The parties reached agreements intended to remedy deficiencies in care and those agreements were embodied in three consent decrees entered and monitored by the district court. Plaintiffs appealed the 2007 order of the district court finding that defendants had substantially complied with the remaining Action Items, which were specified in an Implementation Plan that resulted from the third consent decree, asserting that it was error for the district court to apply the standard for civil contempt in determining whether to vacate the decrees. Plaintiffs further contended that the district court committed errors in fact and law in issuing protective orders barring them from taking supplemental depositions of appellee and two non-parties. The court held that the district court's application of the contempt standard with the imposition of the burden of proof on plaintiffs was error where the district court accepted the Action Items as the entire measure of compliance with the consent decree. Accordingly, the court reversed the order of the district court. The court also held that the district court committed no errors in upholding the assertion of the deliberative process privilege to one non-party and appellee, as well as the legislative privilege to the second non-party. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the protective orders.

Defendants, the chairman and chief executive officer of Lunde Electric Company ("company"), appealed convictions stemming from the misappropriation of employee 401(k) contributions to pay the company's operating expenses. At issue was whether there was sufficient evidence to support defendants' convictions under 18 U.S.C. 664, for embezzlement or conversion of elective deferrals, and 18 U.S.C. 1027, for false or misleading statements in a required Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C 1001 et seq., document. The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support defendants' convictions on Counts 17 and 18 under section 664 where there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the 1991 Profit Sharing Plan had been restated before defendants retained their employees' elective deferrals in the company's general account; where defendants commingled their employees' contributions with the company's assets to prop up their failing business and therefore, intentionally used their employees' assets for an unauthorized purpose; where they sent participants account statements showing 401(k) balances which were in fact non-existent; where defendants' decision to deviate was the wilful criminal misappropriation punished by section 664; and where defendants were alerted repeatedly about their obligation to remit the deferrals and defendants hid their actions from employees. The court also held that there was sufficient evidence to support defendants' convictions on Count 21 under section 1027 where defendants' initial decision to mislead their own employees about the solvency of their retirement plans by filing false account statements and false Form 5500s were the behaviors targeted by section 1027.

Appellant was convicted of robbery affecting commerce and use of a firearm during a crime of violence. At issue was whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the definition of "brandish." The court affirmed the conviction and held that the district court neither erred nor abused its discretion in instructing the jury with the statutory definition of "brandish" and declining appellant's proffer of a dictionary definition where, in light of the well-settled principle that, for purposes of statutory interpretation, the language of the statute was the first and, if the language was clear, the only relevant inquiry.

Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus relief after she was found guilty of murder with special circumstances and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. At issue was whether the trial court violated petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial by dismissing a juror who was known to be the lone holdout for acquittal. The court held that the removal of Juror No. 6 deprived petitioner of her right to a fair trial by jury where there was at least a reasonable possibility that Juror No. 6's discharged stemmed from his disagreement with his peers over their views of the merits of the case and where there was no good cause to justify the juror's discharge. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded with instructions to grant the writ.

Defendants, both Mexican citizens, were arrested and charged with illegal entry into the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1325. Defendants appeared at a group plea hearing in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona as part of the district's Operation Streamline. At issue was whether the taking of guilty pleas at a large group plea hearing violated the Fifth Amendment right to due process where defendants contend that the record did not disclose that they voluntarily and understandably pleaded guilty. The court concluded that, because they were not faced with a silent record, defendants must demonstrate that any error in the proceeding or in the transcript was plain and affected their substantial rights. Namely, they must show a reasonable probability that, but for the error, they would not have entered their pleas. The court also held that, because defendants did not even suggest, much less show, that they would not have pleaded guilty if the plea hearing had been more individualized, it could not conclude that there was any plain error. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Plaintiffs filed a suit in federal court seeking injunctive relief against the City and County of San Francisco and its election officials (collectively, "city") alleging that when more than four candidates run for a particular office, the restricted instant runoff voting ("IRV") system precluded some groups of voters from participating to the same extent as others. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the city where plaintiffs alleged that the restricted IRV system was unconstitutional by violating the First Amendment, the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court held that, if the aspects of the city's restricted IRV system scheme imposed any burdens on voters' constitutional rights to vote, they were minimal at best. The court also held that the city had advanced valid, sufficiently-important interests to justify using its system. Accordingly, the court held that plaintiffs had not established that the city's chosen IRV system was unconstitutional and affirmed summary judgment in favor of the city.