Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

A journalist, Simon Ateba, sought preferred access to the White House Press Area through a special press credential known as a "hard pass." The White House issues hard passes only to reporters accredited by either the Supreme Court Press Gallery or a congressional press gallery. Ateba applied for membership in the Senate Daily Press Gallery as a prerequisite to securing a hard pass, but his application was still under consideration. In the meantime, he accessed the Press Area with a daily pass, which required him to wait for an escort. Ateba argued that the White House Hard Pass Policy violated the First Amendment because it burdened his access and conditioned fuller access on accreditation by the Senate Daily Press Gallery, which he claimed exercised unbridled discretion.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment in favor of the White House. The court concluded that while Ateba had suffered a cognizable First Amendment injury, the White House acted reasonably under the First Amendment by outsourcing part of its press-credentialing process. The district court also ruled that the Senate Daily Press Gallery did not impermissibly exercise discretion in deciding who could become a member and that extraordinary procedural protections were not constitutionally required.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that the White House Hard Pass Policy was both reasonable and viewpoint neutral. It found that the policy's reliance on external credentialing bodies was reasonable given the White House's lack of its own vetting system. The court also determined that the Senate Daily Press Gallery's membership criteria, including the "of repute" standard, did not confer unbridled discretion because it was guided by concrete rules. Additionally, the court held that the First Amendment did not require the gallery to set a deadline for processing membership applications. View "Ateba v. Leavitt" on Justia Law

California collects a fee from in-state hospitals and uses the revenue, along with federal Medicaid funds, to provide subsidies to California hospitals serving Medicaid beneficiaries. Out-of-state hospitals near the California border, which sometimes serve California Medicaid beneficiaries but do not pay the fee, sought access to these subsidies. They argued that their exclusion violated the dormant Commerce Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and federal Medicaid regulations.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia rejected the out-of-state hospitals' arguments and granted summary judgment in favor of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). The hospitals appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the QAF program does not discriminate against interstate commerce because it does not tax out-of-state hospitals, and the supplemental payments are based on in-state provision of medical care. The court also found that the program does not violate the Equal Protection Clause, as California could rationally decide to target subsidies to in-state hospitals serving a disproportionate share of Medi-Cal beneficiaries. Lastly, the court concluded that the QAF program does not violate federal Medicaid regulations, as the regulation in question pertains to base payments for specific services rendered to beneficiaries, not supplemental subsidies like the QAF payments. View "Asante v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

In October 2019, Edward Magruder pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute more than a kilogram of heroin. He later sought to withdraw his plea, arguing that the district court erred by requiring him to assert his innocence to withdraw the plea and that his plea was tainted due to ineffective assistance of counsel. The investigation leading to his arrest involved the FBI and Colombian National Police, who identified Magruder through wiretaps and geolocation data as part of a drug-trafficking conspiracy. Magruder was arrested in June 2019 after being observed traveling between D.C. and New York with heroin in his backpack.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied Magruder's motions to withdraw his plea. The court found that Magruder failed to assert a viable claim of innocence and that his plea was not tainted by ineffective assistance of counsel. Magruder's new counsel filed multiple motions to withdraw the plea, all of which were denied. The district court sentenced Magruder to 180 months of imprisonment followed by 60 months of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Magruder's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The appellate court found that even if the district court erred in requiring an assertion of innocence, the error was harmless because Magruder's Fourth Amendment claims were meritless. The court concluded that Magruder's counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise these claims, as the search of Magruder's backpack was lawful and the evidence obtained from the Louisiana search warrant was admissible under the good-faith exception. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "USA v. Magruder" on Justia Law

Jeffrey Brown, Markus Maly, and Peter Schwartz were tried and convicted by a jury for assaulting police officers on the Capitol grounds on January 6, 2021. They traveled separately to Washington, D.C., and participated in the riot following then-President Trump’s rally. Evidence showed that Maly and Schwartz assaulted officers on the Lower West Terrace, with Schwartz throwing a chair and both using pepper spray. All three later entered the Tunnel, where they used pepper spray against officers and attempted to push through the police line.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied Schwartz’s motions to suppress evidence obtained from his cellphone and to sever the trials. The court found that the FBI had compelled Schwartz to unlock his phone but ruled that this act was not testimonial. The jury convicted all three defendants on all counts, and the district court sentenced Schwartz to 170 months, Maly to 72 months, and Brown to 54 months.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed Brown’s and Maly’s convictions and Brown’s sentence. It vacated Schwartz’s conviction on the 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) charge and remanded for resentencing. The court also held that compelling Schwartz to unlock his cellphone violated the Fifth Amendment and remanded to the district court to determine which, if any, of Schwartz’s counts of conviction must be vacated due to this error. The court found sufficient evidence to support the jury’s findings that the defendants used pepper spray and, in Schwartz’s case, a chair as deadly or dangerous weapons. The court also upheld the district court’s refusal to give a special unanimity instruction for Maly’s Section 111 counts and found no abuse of discretion in Brown’s sentencing. View "USA v. Brown" on Justia Law

Appellant challenged two district court orders directing him to produce various documents in response to a subpoena issued by the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. While the appeal was pending, appellant turned over some of the documents and the Subcommittee completed its investigation, issuing a final report. The DC Circuit held that the case was moot because the relief appellant seeks is barred by the separation of powers. The court explained that the separation of powers, including the Speech or Debate Clause, barred the court from ordering a congressional committee to return, destroy, or refrain from publishing the subpoenaed documents. Furthermore, there was no reasonable expectation that the Subcommittee, having completed its work and issued its final report, will nonetheless reopen its investigation and again issue a subpoena to appellant. Accordingly, the DC Circuit vacated the district court's judgments and dismissed the case as moot. View "Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations v. Ferrer" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit reversed the denial of summary judgment to BNA and remanded with directions that the district court grant summary judgment to BNA on plaintiff's defamation claims. Plaintiff was convicted of murdering two U.S. Marshalls, and BNA subsequently summarized plaintiff's mandamus petition in one of its publications. Plaintiff filed suit against BNA for falsely reporting that the sentencing judge had said that plaintiff lacked contrition and believed the murders were justified. The DC Circuit held that the inaccuracy of the report alone does not constitute sufficient evidence of actual malice for plaintiff to overcome summary judgment, and the remaining evidence in the record does not suffice for plaintiff to overcome summary judgment. View "Kahl v. Bureau of National Affairs" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from the parties' dispute over the precise language used in "corrective statements" cigarette manufacturers were ordered to disseminate. The district court's remedy requiring the manufacturers to issue corrective statements complied with the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1964(a), because the manufacturers would be impaired in making false and misleading assurances about cigarettes if simultaneously required to tell the truth. In this case, the court held that the modified preambles satisfy RICO. Therefore, the court rejected the manufacturers' argument that the only reason to prefer the government's proposal is to taint manufacturers with implications of past wrongdoing. In regard to the manufacturers' First Amendment challenge, the court concluded that the preamble requirements are reasonably related to the government's interest in preventing deception of consumers. Here, the preambles are confined to purely factual and uncontroversial information, geared toward thwarting prospective efforts by manufacturers to either directly mislead consumers or capitalize on their prior deceptions by continuing to advertise in a manner that builds on consumers' existing misperceptions. In regard to the manufacturers' challenge to the topic descriptions in the preambles to Statements C and D, the court concluded that the manufacturers waived its argument as to Statement D, but the language in Statement C was not previously considered and is indeed backward-looking, because it implies that the manufacturers previously sold and advertised cigarettes in such a way. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part, remanding for further proceedings. View "United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a group of individuals who resolved their misdemeanor charges using the District of Columbia's post-and-forfeit procedure, filed suit challenging the procedure and the statute authorizing it as unconstitutional. The district court dismissed the claims. The court concluded that the post-and-forfeit statute does not deprive arrestees of their procedural due process rights under the Due Process Clause. The court could not say that the post-and-forfeit procedure offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental, and does not transgress any recognized principle of fundamental fairness in operation. The court explained that offering arrestees an option to participate in the voluntary post-and-forfeit procedure does not unfairly deprive any arrestee of an opportunity for a hearing. The court concluded that plaintiffs' vagueness challenge to the post-and-forfeit statute is likewise unavailing. The court explained that the fact that the post-and-forfeit statute gives police the discretion to offer an arrestee an opportunity to post and forfeit does not render the statute unconstitutionally vague. Therefore, the post-and-forfeit statute complies with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Kincaid v. Government of the District of Columbia" on Justia Law

This appeal and cross-appeal relate to the district court's orders releasing video recordings made at Guantanamo Bay, depicting military personnel removing a detainee, Abu Wa'el (Jihad) Dhiab, from his cell, transporting him to a medical unit, and force-feeding him to keep him alive while he was on a hunger strike. The government classified these recordings as "SECRET" because disclosing them could damage the national security, but the district court determined that the public had a constitutional right to view the recordings because the detainee's attorney filed some of them under seal, at which point the recordings became part of the court's record. The government appealed, arguing that the public has no such constitutional right. The Intervenors cross-appealed, arguing that several categories of redactions the court approved prior to public release were too extensive. The court concluded that Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court did not apply to this case and neither the intervenors nor the public at large have a right under the First Amendment to receive properly classified national security information filed in court during the pendency of Dhiab's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The court further explained that, even if the intervenors had a qualified First Amendment right of access to the Dhiab recordings, the court would still reverse the district court's decision, because the government identified multiple ways in which unsealing these recordings would likely impair national security. Because the recordings will remain sealed, the intervenors' cross-appeal about the extent of the redactions was dismissed as moot View "Dhiab v. Trump" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit seeking to hold the Palestinian Authority vicariously liable for an attack of a holy site in the West Bank by an armed gunman. The court rejected plaintiffs' claim that the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause imposes personal jurisdiction restrictions that are less protective of defendants than those imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment, explaining that precedent foreclosed this claim. Therefore, the court concluded that plaintiffs failed to carry their burden of demonstrating that personal jurisdiction over the Palestinian Authority in this case would meet the requirements of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiffs' motions for jurisdictional discovery and its grant of the Palestinian Authority's motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. View "Livnat v. Palestinian Authority" on Justia Law