Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

A technology company developed an artificial intelligence system and imposed contractual and technical restrictions to prevent its use for fully autonomous lethal military operations and mass domestic surveillance. The company had previously adapted its product to meet some government needs but refused to remove these two key restrictions when the Department of War (formerly the Department of Defense) sought contractual terms allowing all lawful uses of the AI system. This disagreement coincided with a dispute over the product’s use in a sensitive military operation and previous incidents where the AI’s restrictions prevented it from fulfilling government requests. As a result, the Secretary of War determined that continued use of the AI posed a national security risk and ordered its removal from the Department’s supply chain under the Federal Acquisition Supply Chain Security Act of 2018.The Department promptly notified the company, offered an opportunity for reconsideration, and began implementing the exclusion. The company petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review and raised statutory and constitutional challenges, arguing that the exclusion was arbitrary, beyond statutory authority, and violated due process and First Amendment rights. The company also sought a stay, which was denied, and later requested rescission, which was also denied by the Secretary.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that it had jurisdiction under the statute to review the procurement action. The court found the Department’s determination reasonable, concluding that the company’s ability and willingness to restrict the AI’s use posed a covered “supply chain risk” under the statute, even without evidence of malicious intent. The court also held that less intrusive measures were not reasonably available, and that any procedural deficiencies in notice did not prejudice the company. The court further held that the exclusion did not violate the Fifth or First Amendments. The petitions for review were denied. View "Anthropic PBC v. United States Department of War" on Justia Law

A minister sought to hold a small prayer event on the lower section of the Eastern Steps of the United States Capitol, advocating for various causes including opposition to federal funding of abortion. Under federal regulations, public demonstrations on these Steps are generally prohibited unless sponsored by a member of Congress, with violations carrying criminal penalties. The minister, unable to secure sponsorship, faced the threat of arrest and had previously been arrested for similar conduct.After protracted litigation and partial settlement, the parties stipulated to key facts and proceeded to cross-motions for summary judgment in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. That court ruled in favor of the minister on his First Amendment claim, holding that the lower section of the Eastern Steps was a traditional public forum and that the regulations at issue suppressed more speech than necessary. The district court entered a permanent universal injunction, barring enforcement of the regulations against anyone wishing to demonstrate on the lower Steps. The Capitol Police Board appealed, and the district court later limited the injunction to the minister and up to 14 others pending appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case de novo regarding summary judgment and for abuse of discretion as to the injunction. The appellate court disagreed with the district court’s forum classification, holding that the Eastern Steps constitute a nonpublic forum because of their specialized function and physical integration with the Capitol. Nevertheless, the court held that the regulation’s requirement of congressional sponsorship for demonstrations was unreasonable, as it granted unbridled discretion to members of Congress, violating First Amendment protections. The court affirmed summary judgment for the minister but vacated the universal injunction, remanding for the district court to determine the proper scope of injunctive relief in light of recent Supreme Court guidance limiting universal injunctions. View "Mahoney v. United States Capitol Police Board" on Justia Law

Eric Flannery owns and operates The Big Board, a bar and restaurant in Washington, D.C. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the District imposed masking and proof-of-vaccination requirements for restaurants and bars. Flannery publicly criticized these policies, and The Big Board refused to comply. After the mandates were lifted, Advisory Neighborhood Commission 6C (ANC 6C) formally opposed renewal of The Big Board’s liquor license, citing concerns such as impact on property values and public safety. Flannery and The Big Board attempted to resolve the protest but received little cooperation. Investigators found no evidence supporting ANC 6C’s stated concerns. Ultimately, ANC 6C withdrew its protest after an unproductive mediation session.Flannery and The Big Board sued ANC 6C commissioners in their personal capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging First Amendment retaliation for Flannery's public criticism and the restaurant's noncompliance. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the complaint, holding that The Big Board’s refusal to comply with the mandates was not expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment and that the complaint failed to plausibly allege a causal link between Flannery’s protected speech and ANC 6C’s protest.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the appeal de novo. The court agreed with the district court that The Big Board’s noncompliance was not inherently expressive conduct under the First Amendment. However, it found that the complaint plausibly alleged that Flannery’s public criticism—protected speech—was a but-for cause of ANC 6C’s protest, based on statements by a commissioner and lack of evidence supporting the protest’s grounds. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "Flannery v. Eckenwiler" on Justia Law

The case concerns Cesar Gomez Almonte, who was convicted for his role in an international drug-smuggling conspiracy. Beginning in 2016, conspirators based in the Dominican Republic transported large quantities of cocaine into the United States using boats with secret compartments. Almonte was responsible for procuring and outfitting these vessels. After U.S. officials became aware of the operation, Almonte was indicted under seal in Washington, D.C., and later arrested during a layover at Miami International Airport.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia oversaw Almonte’s trial, during which a jury found him guilty of conspiracy to import cocaine and sentenced him to 184 months in prison. Almonte raised several constitutional claims on appeal: he argued that the 18-month delay between his indictment and arrest violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, that venue in D.C. was improper under Article III and 18 U.S.C. § 3238, and that the district court’s refusal to grant a new trial after certain jurors expressed concerns about his counsel denied him an impartial jury.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed these claims. The court held that the delay between indictment and arrest did not violate Almonte’s right to a speedy trial, given the government’s good-faith investigative reasons and his failure to show specific prejudice. On venue, the court found that Almonte waived his only meritorious venue argument regarding the Eastern District of Virginia by not raising it when invited, and his other arguments about venue in Florida were either without merit or forfeited. Regarding juror impartiality, the court concluded that the district court handled the matter appropriately through voir dire and did not abuse its discretion in denying a mistrial or new trial. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "USA v. Almonte" on Justia Law

In 2022, Soohyung Kim and his company, through an affiliate, secured a winning bid to purchase TEGNA, a large broadcast television company. The transaction required regulatory approval from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) within 450 days, as specified in the merger agreement. The proposal drew objections from several organizations and individuals, including labor unions, public interest groups, and a rival bidder. Amid ongoing objections and extended public comment periods, the FCC’s Media Bureau ultimately failed to approve the license transfer within the required timeframe, resulting in the expiration of the merger agreement and obligating Kim’s group to pay significant break-up fees.After the collapse of the merger, the appellants filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against both the FCC and various private parties. They alleged constitutional and statutory violations, including Equal Protection claims, Communications Act violations, federal civil rights and conspiracy claims, and D.C.-law tort claims, asserting that the FCC and private parties conspired to prevent the merger based on race. The District Court dismissed all claims. Regarding the FCC, the court found the appellants lacked standing for prospective relief, as they failed to allege a substantial risk of future injury. The court also dismissed the Communications Act claims for lack of jurisdiction. As to the claims against private parties, the court applied Noerr-Pennington immunity and found no plausible basis for the civil rights or tort claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the District Court’s dismissal. The court held that the appellants lacked standing against the FCC due to insufficient allegations of likely future injury. The court further held that the claims against private appellees failed because the complaint did not plausibly allege intentional race discrimination or actionable tortious interference, and thus did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted. View "SGCI Holdings III LLC v. FCC" on Justia Law

Two investigative journalists, on assignment for a nonprofit media organization known for undercover reporting, infiltrated Democratic political consulting operations in 2016 using false identities. One reporter, posing as a philanthropist, met with a political consultant who then arranged for his colleague to hire the second reporter, also undercover, as an unpaid intern at the consultant's firm. The intern secretly recorded conversations and internal meetings over eight days, gaining access to nonpublic information. The media organization later published a video series alleging a conspiracy to incite violence at political events, using footage from both public interactions and the intern’s covert recordings.After the video’s release, major clients of the consulting firm terminated their contracts, citing concerns about scandal and the security breach. The consulting firm and its principals sued the journalists and their organizations in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging fraudulent misrepresentation, conspiracy, and violations of federal and D.C. wiretapping laws. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on some claims but allowed others to proceed to trial. A jury found for the plaintiffs on the remaining claims and awarded damages for lost contracts and statutory damages for wiretapping.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the verdict. It held that the First Amendment barred damages based on losses caused by the publication’s protected speech, as the plaintiffs failed to prove that the unprotected conduct (the infiltration and covert recording) was the predominant cause of their damages. The court also held that the intern did not owe a fiduciary duty to the consulting firm under D.C. law, and therefore the wiretapping claims could not stand. The court reversed the district court’s denial of judgment as a matter of law and vacated the damages awards. View "Democracy Partners, LLC v. O'Keefe" on Justia Law

A man with two prior felony convictions for carrying a pistol without a license in the District of Columbia was sentenced in 2022 to a period of supervised probation in lieu of imprisonment for his second offense. While still under this court-ordered supervision, he knowingly possessed a firearm, which was reportedly stolen and modified for automatic firing, and was alleged to have brandished it during a shootout. He was indicted by a federal grand jury under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the federal felon-in-possession statute.In the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, the defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that § 922(g)(1) violated the Second Amendment both facially and as applied to him, particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, which emphasized historical tradition over means-end scrutiny in Second Amendment cases. The district court rejected his arguments, holding that earlier circuit precedent (Medina v. Whitaker) upholding § 922(g)(1) remained good law, and denied the motion to dismiss. The defendant then pleaded guilty while preserving his right to appeal the constitutional issue.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that, even assuming prior precedent did not control and that § 922(g)(1) implicated conduct covered by the Second Amendment, there exists a widespread historical tradition of temporarily disarming felons while they are serving their criminal sentences, including during periods of noncustodial supervision such as probation or supervised release. Therefore, § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to individuals still serving their sentences, and is not facially unconstitutional. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "USA v. Richardson" on Justia Law

A pharmaceutical company that manufactures both branded and generic drugs challenged the federal agency rules implementing the Medicare Drug Price Negotiation Program created under the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022. Specifically, the company objected to two rules: first, the agency’s grouping of two drugs with the same active ingredient and manufacturer, but approved under separate applications, as one “qualifying single source drug” for price negotiation; and second, the agency’s requirement that a generic drug must be engaged in “bona fide marketing” to be considered as marketed, which affects when a branded drug exits the negotiation program. The company argued that these rules exceeded the agency’s statutory authority and that the program deprived it of protected property interests without due process.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the case. It found that the statutory bar on judicial review did not prevent the company’s challenges to generally applicable agency guidance. On the merits, the district court upheld the agency’s definition of a qualifying single source drug, ruled that the challenge to the “bona fide marketing” standard was not yet ripe, and rejected the due process claim due to lack of a protected property interest. The company appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The appellate court held that the statutory review bar precludes review only of drug-specific determinations, not generally applicable legal standards. On the merits, it concluded that the statute permits the agency to treat drugs with the same active ingredient and manufacturer as one statutory drug. The court found that the due process challenge failed because the company lacked a protected property interest. However, it determined that the challenge to the “bona fide marketing” requirement was ripe and remanded that issue to the district court for further proceedings. The court thus affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

A technology company, along with its U.S. subsidiary, was designated by the Secretary of Defense as a “Chinese military company” under Section 1260H of the National Defense Authorization Act. This listing, published annually in the Federal Register, leads to significant legal consequences, including prohibitions on entering into certain federal contracts and receiving federal funds or support. The designation also carries reputational harm, as it publicly identifies the company as having ties to the Chinese military. The company develops and sells LiDAR products primarily used in advanced driver-assistance and autonomous vehicle systems.After being listed in January 2024, the company sued the Department of Defense in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, challenging both the original and an October 2024 redesignation under the Administrative Procedure Act and the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The company argued that it was not provided notice of the unclassified evidence relied upon or a meaningful chance to respond before the designation was finalized. The district court granted summary judgment to the government, upholding the designation and concluding that any due process violation was harmless because the company did not show prejudice.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the company had a protected liberty interest under the “stigma-plus” doctrine, as the designation combined reputational harm with formal exclusion from government contracting opportunities. The Court ruled that the Constitution required the Secretary to provide notice of the unclassified evidence and a meaningful pre-deprivation opportunity to respond. The Secretary’s failure to do so was not harmless error. The appellate court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to remand to the Secretary for further proceedings, but did not vacate the designation pending remedial process. View "Hesai Technology Co., Ltd v. DOD" on Justia Law

A Chinese drone manufacturer and its subsidiary challenged their designation by the U.S. Secretary of Defense as a “Chinese military company” under Section 1260H of the National Defense Authorization Act. The designation, which is published annually, restricts the company from contracting with certain government agencies and can damage its business reputation. DJI was added to the list in 2022 and again in 2024 and 2025 without prior notice. DJI petitioned for removal, which was denied, and subsequently received a report explaining the designation, though portions of the rationale were redacted.DJI filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging violations of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and the Administrative Procedure Act. The company argued that it was denied due process, that there was insufficient evidence for the designation, that the agency failed to explain disparate treatment compared to other companies, and that the Secretary’s finding that DJI “contributes” to the Chinese defense industrial base was unsupported. The district court granted summary judgment against DJI, relying solely on the unclassified administrative record and declining to review the classified materials.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s rejection of DJI’s due process, evidentiary, and disparate treatment claims, holding that DJI failed to show deprivation of a protected liberty or property interest, and that sufficient evidence supported the finding that DJI received government assistance. However, the appellate court reversed the district court’s conclusion regarding DJI’s “contribution” to the Chinese defense industrial base, finding that the lower court improperly relied on post hoc agency arguments and failed to review the classified record. The case was remanded for further proceedings on that issue. View "SZ DJI Technology Co., Ltd. v. DOD" on Justia Law