Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was terminated from his position as a police reserve officer for making harsh and accusatory statements to his superiors in emails with his co-workers cc’d. Plaintiff filed suit alleging that he was terminated in violation of his First Amendment right to free speech. The court concluded that, under Pickering v. Board of Education, plaintiff's emails are not protected under the First Amendment where his interest in sending them is outweighed by the police department’s interest in promoting office harmony and efficiency. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the case and denial of plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. View "LeFande v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

In the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, 12 U.S.C. 5491, Congress established a new independent agency, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), an independent agency headed not by a multi-member commission but rather by a single Director. PHH is a mortgage lender that was the subject of a CFPB enforcement action that resulted in a $109 million order against it. PHH seeks to vacate the order, arguing that the CFPB’s status as an independent agency headed by a single Director violates Article II of the Constitution. The court concluded that CFPB’s concentration of enormous executive power in a single, unaccountable, unchecked Director not only departs from settled historical practice, but also poses a far greater risk of arbitrary decisionmaking and abuse of power, and a far greater threat to individual liberty, than does a multi-member independent agency. The court noted that this new agency lacks that critical check and structural constitutional protection, yet wields vast power over the U.S. economy. The court concluded that, in light of the consistent historical practice under which independent agencies have been headed by multiple commissioners or board members, and in light of the threat to individual liberty posed by a single-Director independent agency, Humphrey’s Executor v. United States cannot be stretched to cover this novel agency structure. Therefore, the court held that the CFPB is unconstitutionally structured. To remedy the constitutional flaw, the court followed the Supreme Court’s precedents and simply severed the statute’s unconstitutional for-cause provision from the remainder of the statute. With the for-cause provision severed, the court explained that the President now will have the power to remove the Director at will, and to supervise and direct the Director. Because the CFPB as remedied will continue operating, the court addressed the statutory issues raised by PHH and agreed with PHH that Section 8 of the Act allows captive reinsurance arrangements so long as the amount paid by the mortgage insurer for the reinsurance does not exceed the reasonable market value of the reinsurance; CFPB’s order against PHH violated bedrock principles of due process; and the CFPB on remand still will have an opportunity to demonstrate that the relevant mortgage insurers in fact paid more than reasonable market value to the PHH-affiliated reinsurer for reinsurance, thereby making disguised payments for referrals in contravention of Section 8. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review, vacated the order, and remanded for further proceedings. View "PHH Corp. v. CFPB" on Justia Law

Rothe filed suit alleging that the statutory basis of the Small Business Administration’s (SBA) 8(a) business development program, Amendments to the Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. 637, violates its right to equal protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Rothe is a small business that bids on Defense Department contracts, including the types of subcontracts that the SBA awards to economically and socially disadvantaged businesses through the 8(a) program. The court rejected Rothe's claim that the statute contains an unconstitutional racial classification that prevents Rothe from competing for Department of Defense contracts on an equal footing with minority-owned businesses. The court concluded that the provisions of the Small Business Act that Rothe challenges do not on their face classify individuals by race. In contrast to the statute, the SBA’s regulation implementing the 8(a) program does contain a racial classification in the form of a presumption that an individual who is a member of one of five designated racial groups (and within them, 37 subgroups) is socially disadvantaged. Because the statute lacks a racial classification, and because Rothe has not alleged that the statute is otherwise subject to strict scrutiny, the court applied rational-basis review. Under rational-basis review, the court concluded that the statutory scheme is rationally related to the legitimate, and in some instances compelling, interest of counteracting discrimination. Finally, Rothe's evidentiary and nondelegation challenges failed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment granting summary judgment to the SBA and DOD. View "Rothe Development v. DOD" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against individual FBI agents and a Metropolitan Police Department detective, under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics and 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging claims arising out of a search of his home and his coinciding arrest. The court affirmed the district court's holding that defendants have qualified immunity for the timing of the search where it was not clearly established in Maryland at the time that the Fourth Amendment prohibits the nighttime execution of a daytime-only warrant. However, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims for unlawful seizure and no-knock entry. The court concluded that, taking plaintiff's allegations as true for the purpose of passing upon a motion to dismiss, plaintiff has made a prima facie showing that defendants violated the Fourth Amendment; the statute of limitations has not yet begun on plaintiff's section 1983 and Bivens claims; and the court rejected defendants' claims that plaintiff is collaterally estopped from litigating the legality of the search and seizure and that Heck v. Humphrey barred plaintiff's claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Jones v. Kirchner" on Justia Law

Appellants, three federal prisoners who spent several years housed in specially designated Communication Management Units (CMUs), filed suit contending that their designation to CMUs violated their due process rights. One appellant also alleges his continued CMU placement was in retaliation for protected speech in violation of the First Amendment. Appellants seek damages under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e, for injuries arising out of their confinement in CMUs. The district court granted summary judgment for the government. The court found that the duration and atypicality of CMU designation sufficient to give rise to a liberty interest and thus reversed and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether appellants were afforded sufficient process. The court affirmed the judgment as to the retaliation claim because appellant cannot show that his First Amendment rights were violated. The court held that appellants have alleged harms qualifying for compensation under the PLRA because their injuries were neither mental nor emotional in nature and so do not require a showing of physical injury. Nonetheless, the court upheld the district court's grant of summary judgment because the prison official was entitled to qualified immunity. View "Aref v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 after the District of Columbia Lottery and Charitable Games Control Board terminated his employment, alleging in part that his termination violated his Fifth Amendment right to due process. At issue is the district court’s most recent dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint, as well as its denial of his motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that plaintiff has shown that his due process rights were violated and that this violation caused his alleged damages. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the District and, in part, its denial of plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. The court remanded to the district court to address whether the District can be held liable under section 1983 for this violation and, if it can, for a determination of the amount of damages to which defendant is entitled. View "Thompson v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the IRS and several of its individual employees, seeking money damages by way of relief under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, and equitable relief by way of injunction and declaratory judgment. Additionally, the complaints alleged that the IRS invaded plaintiffs’ statutory rights by violating 26 U.S.C. 6103, by conducting unauthorized inspection and/or disclosure of tax return information from their applications and the other information improperly obtained from them. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Bivens actions under Rule 12(b)(6). The court held, however, that the equitable actions are not moot. After the initiation of the suits, the IRS took action to end some unconstitutional acts against at least a portion of plaintiffs. Based on these actions, the district court dismissed the equitable claims as moot. Even if the court accorded deference to the district court, the government has not carried its heavy burden of showing mootness under the voluntary cessation doctrine. Therefore, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings with respect to the equitable claims. View "True the Vote, Inc. v. IRS" on Justia Law

PAG sought a preliminary injunction against FEC's rule prohibiting unauthorized political committees, like PAG, from using candidates’ names in the titles of their websites and social media pages. The district court denied PAG's motion. The court concluded that PAG is entitled to a preliminary injunction because there is a substantial likelihood that, as applied to PAG, the FEC’s naming restrictions in 11 C.F.R. 102.14(a) violate the First Amendment. In this case, the restriction, as applied to PAG, is a content-based ban on speech that likely violates the First Amendment. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court’s denial of PAG’s motion for a preliminary injunction and remanded for the district court to enter a preliminary injunction enjoining the application of section 102.14(a) against PAG’s websites and social media pages. View "Pursuing America's Greatness v. FEC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against HUD, alleging discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. The district court granted summary judgment to HUD. Under Circuit precedent the action complained of must be “materially adverse” to support a discrimination claim. In this case, the court affirmed the district court's finding that the denial of plaintiff's requests for lateral transfers on the basis of race and/or national origin was not cognizable under Title VII because it did not constitute an adverse employment action. View "Ortiz-Diaz v. HUD" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action alleging that Urban Outfitters’ and Anthropologie’s zip code requests at the cashier stand violated two District of Columbia consumer protection laws. The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim. The court concluded that the district court lacked jurisdiction to decide the merits of the case because neither plaintiff has alleged a concrete Article III injury tied to disclosure of her zip code that could support standing. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded for dismissal of the case. View "Hancock v. Urban Outfitters, Inc." on Justia Law