Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioners challenge the Commission's 2015 Open Internet Order, which reclassified broadband service as a telecommunications service, subject to common carrier regulation under Title II of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. 201. The Commission determined that broadband service satisfies the statutory definition of a telecommunications service: “the offering of telecommunications for a fee directly to the public.” In accordance with Brand X, the Commission's conclusions about consumer perception find extensive support in the record and together justify the Commission’s decision to reclassify broadband as a telecommunications service. See National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services. The court rejected petitioners' numerous challenges to the Commission's decision to reclassify broadband, finding that none have merit. The court concluded that the Commission adequately explained why it reclassified broadband from an information service to a telecommunications service and its decision was not arbitrary and capricious. US Telecom never questions the Commission’s application of the statute’s test for common carriage, and US Telecom cites no case, nor is the court aware of one, holding that when the Commission invokes the statutory test for common carriage, it must also apply the NARUC test. See National Ass’n of Regulatory Utility Commissioners v. FCC. Where the Commission concluded that it could regulate interconnection arrangements under Title II as a component of broadband service, the court rejected US Telecom's two challenges to the Commission's decision. The court rejected mobile petitioners’ arguments and find that the Commission’s reclassification of mobile broadband as a commercial mobile service is reasonable and supported by the record. In the Order, the Commission decided to forbear from numerous provisions of the Communications Act. The court rejected Full Service Network's procedural and substantive challenges to the Commission’s forbearance decision. The Commission promulgated five rules in the Order: rules banning (i) blocking, (ii) throttling, and (iii) paid prioritization; (iv) a General Conduct Rule; and (v) an enhanced transparency rule. The court rejected Alamo's challenge to the anti-paid-prioritization rule as beyond the Commission’s authority and rejected US Telecom's challenge to the General Conduct Rule as unconstitutionally vague. Having upheld the FCC’s reclassification of broadband service as common carriage, the court concluded that the First Amendment poses no bar to the rules and the court rejected Alamo and Berninger's challenges. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review. View "United States Telecom Assoc. v. FCC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her employer, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., after she was suspended without pay for seven days in 2008 and was terminated in 2010. The district court granted summary judgment against plaintiff's suspension claims and dismissed her termination claims. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of her termination-based claims because she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. The court concluded that plaintiff introduced enough evidence for a reasonable jury to concluded that her suspension was motivated by racial discrimination. Accordingly, the court reversed as to this issue. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment as to the retaliation claim because plaintiff has not introduced evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to infer that either her supervisors knew of any protected activity. View "Morris v. McCarthy" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, four retired correctional officers, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the District deprived them of their federal right under the Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act (LEOSA), 18 U.S.C. 926C, to carry a concealed weapon. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. Plaintiffs allege that they meet the statutory requirements but have been unable to obtain firearms training because the District of Columbia has refused to certify that, as correctional officers, they had a statutory power of arrest. The court held that, taken together, the LEOSA’s plain text, purpose, and context show that Congress intended to create a concrete, individual right to benefit individuals like plaintiffs and that is within “the competence of the judiciary to enforce.” The court, applying de novo review, held that the complaint states a claim under section 1983. In this case, plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that the federal right they seek to enjoy has been unlawfully deprived by the District to be remediable under Section 1983. Further, plaintiffs allege that the District’s actions resulting from its erroneous interpretation of how the LEOSA applies to these facts have deprived them of their federally established concealed-carry right. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Duberry v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a legally-blind, African-American woman, filed suit alleging that she was denied a promotion at the Department because of her race and disability. The court concluded that, as a matter of law, at least where a manager regularly requests and receives upgraded vacancies that are earmarked for his subordinates, his decision not to engage in that process because of an employee’s disability or race can be an adverse employment action under the court's case law. The court nevertheless concluded that plaintiff failed to show that she was denied her promotion because of her race or disability. In this case, no reasonable juror could find from the record that her supervisor contributed to the agency's inaction in creating a GS-11 position for plaintiff. Rather, the record supplies ample evidence that the supervisor made the request for the GS-11 position that plaintiff desired, and plaintiff provides no probative evidence in response. Whatever the reason for the Deputy Assistant Secretary’s denial, it could not have been based on discrimination if, as plaintiff recognizes, he was not aware that the requested position was designed to facilitate plaintiff’s promotion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment against plaintiff. View "Chambers v. Burwell" on Justia Law

Appellant, an African-American temporary employee of the U.S. Department of Labor, filed suit against the Department, alleging that it dismissed him from his position as a Veterans Employment Specialist because of his race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. The district court granted summary judgment to the Department for want of evidence of racial discrimination. The court affirmed on the slightly different ground that no reasonable juror could find that the Department's stated, nondiscriminatory reasons for dismissing appellant were not its real reasons. In this case, the Department’s position is that it terminated appellant because his performance was deficient and his demeanor was argumentative in response to supervisor feedback. Appellant has failed to identify record evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that race played a role in his discharge. View "Johnson v. Perez" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, as a holder of U.S. public debt, filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the Debt Limit Statute, 31 U.S.C. 3101. Plaintiff alleged violations of the Fourteenth Amendment Public Debt Clause and the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims for lack of standing because he failed to allege plausible factual allegations to establish the constitutional minimum requirements for Article III standing, either in the first amended complaint (FAC) filed with the district court or in his proposed amended complaint filed with this Court under 28 U.S.C. 1653. The court also affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiff's motion to amend his FAC and denied plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint on appeal. View "Williams v. Lew" on Justia Law

The PACT Act, 15 U.S.C. 376a(a)(3)-(4), (d), prohibits the remote sale of cigarettes unless sales taxes have been paid in advance. Plaintiff, an enrolled member of the Seneca Indian tribe of New York State, operated a tobacco business in the Allegany Indian Territories and sold tobacco products from there across state lines. In 2010, plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of several sections of the PACT Act. The district court preliminarily enjoined the provisions and the court affirmed. The court found that plaintiff's closure of his business in the course of the litigation had not mooted the appeal, but observed that facts might later develop that had that effect. After remand, plaintiff renewed his pursuit of relief. The district court concluded that the case was moot and vacated the preliminary injunction because plaintiff stipulated that he had no intent to re-enter the business and the BATFE submitted a declaration stating that it had no intention of seeking or recommending enforcement action against plaintiff. The court concluded that, because plaintiff faces only a remote risk of federal prosecution or civil penalties, and any further merits decision would not shield him from the effects of possible state or local lawsuits, the case is moot. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Gordon v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against NASA, his former employer, claiming unlawful discrimination. In plaintiff's first appeal, the court granted summary judgment to NASA on plaintiff's various claims of discrimination and retaliation over a six-year period. In this appeal, plaintiff alleges claims of discrimination and retaliation occurring between 1996-2004, under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 791(b), and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. The court concluded that, without a disability within the meaning of the statute, or NASA regarding him as so impaired, plaintiff's claim of discrimination in violation of the Rehabilitation Act fails. The court also concluded that plaintiff's Title VII discrimination and retaliation claims based on eight discrete events failed. Even assuming all of these events are actionable, there is no basis whatsoever for a reasonable jury to infer either discrimination or retaliation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to NASA in its entirety. View "Nurriddin v. Bolden" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and various D.C. statutes, seeking damages after officers shot and killed her dog while executing a search warrant. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the officer who first shot the dog based on the grounds that plaintiff's eyewitness account of the shooting was uncorroborated and contradicted by other evidence. The court concluded that the district court improperly assumed the jury functions of making credibility determinations, weighing the evidence, and drawing legitimate inferences from the facts. Therefore, the court reversed and concluded that, viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences most favorably to plaintiff, a jury could conclude that the officer acted unreasonably in shooting the dog. The court also reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the officers on plaintiff's claim that they violated the Fourth Amendment by unreasonably destroying her personal property during the shooting because this claim is intertwined with the dog's seizure. However, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to another officer who shot the dog, as well as to the District of Columbia. View "Robinson v. Pezzat" on Justia Law

The Institute, a Section 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization, filed suit against the FEC, challenging the constitutionality of the disclosure requirements of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 52 U.S.C. 20104(f). The district court denied the Institute's request to convene a three-judge district court pursuant to the statutory provision that requires three-judge district courts for constitutional challenges to the BCRA. On the merits, the district court held that the Institute's claim was unavailing under McConnell v. FEC, and Citizens United V. FEC. The Institute appealed. The court concluded that, because the Institute’s complaint raises a First Amendment challenge to a provision of BCRA, 28 U.S.C. 2284(a) entitles it to a three-judge district court. In this case, the Institute’s attempt to advance its as-applied First Amendment challenge is not “essentially fictitious, wholly insubstantial, obviously frivolous, and obviously without merit.” Therefore, section 2284 “entitles” the Institute to make its case “before a three-judge district court.” Accordingly, the court reversed and vacated the district court's judgment, remanding for further proceedings. View "Independence Institute v. FEC" on Justia Law