Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Tennessee and sixteen other states challenged a regulation by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) under the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act, which mandates reasonable accommodations for pregnancy-related conditions, including abortion. The states argued that the regulation unlawfully required them to accommodate employees seeking abortions, conflicting with their policies. They sought an injunction and a declaratory judgment against the rule, claiming it was arbitrary, exceeded EEOC's authority, violated the First Amendment and federalism principles, and was unconstitutional under Article II.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas dismissed the case, ruling that the states lacked standing as they did not demonstrate an imminent injury or that the alleged injuries were redressable. The court found the risk of enforcement speculative and compliance costs not directly traceable to the rule. The court also dismissed the states' motion for a preliminary injunction as moot and for failing to show irreparable harm.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the states had standing as they were the direct objects of the EEOC's regulation, which imposed new obligations on them. The court found that the states were injured by the regulatory burden itself and that setting aside the rule would remedy this injury. The court concluded that the states' need to comply with the rule constituted an injury in fact, caused by the EEOC's action, and redressable by a favorable judicial decision. The case was remanded for further proceedings without addressing the merits of the claims. View "State of Tennessee v. EEOC" on Justia Law

LaVance LeMarr Cooper was found guilty of being a drug user in possession of a firearm after officers discovered a Glock 20 pistol in his car during a traffic stop. Cooper admitted to smoking marijuana three to four times a week, including two days before the traffic stop. He was sentenced to 37 months in prison by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa.The district court, referencing the case United States v. Veasley, acknowledged that as-applied challenges to the drug-user-in-possession statute are available but concluded that Congress's decision to disarm drug users as a class left no room for individual assessments. Cooper argued that his prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) violated the Second Amendment, but the district court disagreed, maintaining that the statute applied categorically to all drug users.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that while keeping firearms out of the hands of drug users does not always violate the Second Amendment, it can in certain circumstances. The court emphasized that historical analogues, such as the confinement of the mentally ill and going-armed laws, support disarmament only when the individual poses a danger to others. The court found that the district court erred in not considering whether Cooper's marijuana use made him dangerous or induced terror.The Eighth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case for a reexamination of Cooper's motion to dismiss the indictment, instructing the lower court to determine whether Cooper's specific circumstances justified disarmament under the Second Amendment. View "United States v. Cooper" on Justia Law

Keshon Baxter was charged with being an unlawful user of a controlled substance in possession of a firearm. In May 2023, police encountered Baxter in Des Moines, Iowa, and found a loaded pistol and a baggie of marijuana on him. Baxter moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that the statute under which he was charged, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), violated the Second Amendment as applied to him and was unconstitutionally vague. The district court denied his motion without a hearing, and Baxter entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa rejected Baxter's arguments. The court found that the government had shown adequate historical analogues to reject the Second Amendment challenge and that Baxter had not demonstrated that the statute was vague as applied to his conduct. Baxter then appealed these rulings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court did not make sufficient factual findings regarding Baxter's drug use and its overlap with his firearm possession to properly address the as-applied Second Amendment challenge. Therefore, the appellate court remanded the case to the district court for the necessary factual findings. The appellate court affirmed the district court's rejection of Baxter's vagueness challenge, noting that Baxter had not shown that the term "unlawful user" was vague as applied to his conduct. The court also affirmed the rejection of any facial Second Amendment challenge, as it was foreclosed by precedent.In conclusion, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision on the vagueness and facial Second Amendment challenges, reversed the ruling on the as-applied Second Amendment challenge, and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Baxter" on Justia Law

Fourteen civilly committed clients of the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP) filed a lawsuit challenging MSOP policies that affected their spiritual group activities, particularly those impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic. Before the pandemic, MSOP allowed clients to participate in spiritual groups under certain conditions. However, during the pandemic, MSOP implemented new regulations that restricted these activities. Plaintiffs argued that these restrictions violated the U.S. Constitution and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA).The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that the plaintiffs' claims were moot because the COVID-19 restrictions had been lifted, and pre-pandemic policies were reinstated. The court also declined to address new concerns raised by the plaintiffs regarding MSOP's current policies, as these issues were not included in the second amended complaint.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the plaintiffs' claims about the pandemic-era policies were moot since those policies were no longer in effect. The court also found that the plaintiffs' new concerns about MSOP's current policies were not properly pled in the second amended complaint and thus were not before the court. Additionally, the appellate court denied the plaintiffs' motion to supplement the record with discovery documents, as the plaintiffs failed to provide a valid reason for not including these documents earlier, and their inclusion would not change the case's resolution. View "Allan v. Minnesota DHS" on Justia Law

Iowa enacted Senate File 2340, which criminalizes the presence of aliens who have illegally reentered the United States within its boundaries. The Act mandates that aliens violating it must return to the country they reentered from and prohibits judges from abating state prosecutions due to pending or possible federal determinations of the alien’s immigration status. The United States sought a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the Act, which the district court granted. Iowa appealed the decision.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa ruled that the United States had standing to sue and could state a cause of action to enjoin the Act. The court found that the United States established a likelihood of success on the merits, showing that federal immigration law preempts the Act under both conflict and field preemption. The court also found that irreparable harm would occur if the Act went into effect and that the balance of equities and public interest favored granting the injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion, examining factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the United States had standing and an equitable cause of action to enjoin the Act. The court found that the Act likely conflicts with federal immigration law, as it obstructs the discretion of federal officials and creates a parallel enforcement scheme. The court also agreed that the United States demonstrated irreparable harm and that the balance of equities and public interest favored the injunction. The preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the Act was affirmed. View "United States v. State of Iowa" on Justia Law

Marcus Todd, a state employee in Minnesota, alleged that a union violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by deducting union dues from his paycheck without his consent. Todd joined the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees in 2014 and authorized dues deductions. In 2018, a new authorization card was allegedly signed electronically with Todd's name, which he claims was forged. After the Supreme Court's decision in Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, Todd attempted to resign from the union and stop dues deductions, but the union continued until May 2021, citing an annual opt-out period.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota dismissed Todd's federal claims, stating that he voluntarily agreed to the dues deductions before Janus and was contractually bound to the opt-out period. The court also found that the union did not act under color of state law regarding the alleged forgery and dismissed Todd's claims for prospective relief as moot. The court declined to exercise jurisdiction over Todd's state law claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that Todd's claims failed due to the lack of state action, as the union's actions were based on private agreements, not state statutes. The court referenced Hoekman v. Education Minnesota and Burns v. School Service Employees Union Local 284, which established that private agreements for dues deductions do not constitute state action. The court also found that the alleged forgery did not establish state action, as it was a private misuse of state law. Consequently, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Todd v. AFSCME" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against an Arkansas state police officer, alleging that the officer used excessive force by pepper spraying and choking him in the course of arresting him for taking eight pairs of shorts from a department store. The district court denied the officer qualified immunity. The Eighth Circuit held that a jury could find that the officer used an unreasonable amount of force when he pepper sprayed plaintiff. In this case, the officer used force on a non-resisting, non-fleeing individual suspected of a completed, non-violent misdemeanor. The court explained that, while some use of force was reasonable here, it was not reasonable to immediately use significant force. The district court erred in concluding that plaintiff's right not to be pepper sprayed was clearly established. The court also held that defendant unreasonably used excessive force by choking plaintiff, and plaintiff's right to be free from such force was clearly established at the time. Therefore, the district court correctly denied qualified immunity on the chocking claim. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Tatum v. Robinson" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the Forest Service's determination that an 85-fold increase in predicted drilling in the Ozark–St. Francis National Forests did not require a "correction, supplement, or revision" to the original environmental analysis. The Eighth Circuit dismissed the suit based on lack of jurisdiction, holding that plaintiffs failed to identify any particular member who stands to be harmed by the government action it challenges, and that plaintiffs lack a concrete interest in this dispute. View "Ozark Society v. United States Forest Service" on Justia Law

The district court granted in part petitioner's motion to vacate his drug-related conviction and sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, based on ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court ordered the government to reoffer an earlier plea deal. The Eighth Circuit held that the district court clearly erred in finding that petitioner suffered from mental illness that impaired his ability to understand legal advice and make reasoned decisions; the district court erred in finding that counsel should have known that petitioner was not able to understand legal advice or make reasoned decisions; the district court's finding that counsel's communication style did not mesh well with petitioner's difficulties did not provide a basis for ineffective assistance of counsel; the district court did not err in finding counsel deficient in failing to explain the safety-valve exception; and the district court erred in directing the government to reoffer the five-year deal. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for the district court to determine whether petitioner was prejudiced by the safety-valve advice. View "Davis v. United States" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his criminal sentence. Petitioner was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), based on predicate offenses for possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine and two Nebraska felony convictions for making terroristic threats (one as a juvenile and one as an adult). The Eighth Circuit affirmed and held that the Nebraska statute qualifies under the ACCA force clause; an act of juvenile delinquency cannot qualify as a violent felony under any clause of the ACCA, including the residual clause, unless the court first determines that it involved the use or carrying of a firearm, knife, or destructive device; that question is completely separate from the question of whether the juvenile conviction is an enumerated offense or qualifies under the force clause; the court sua sponte determined that petitioner's claim that his juvenile offense did not involve the use or carrying of a firearm, knife, or destructive device is procedurally defaulted; and even if the theoretical possibility exists that the Nebraska statute could encompass threats only to property, petitioner has not demonstrated a realistic probability that Nebraska would apply the statute in that manner. View "Fletcher v. United States" on Justia Law